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THE COMPLEXITY DILEMMA IN POLICY
MARKET DESIGN
TODD S. AAGAARD* & ANDREW N. KLEIT**
Regulators are increasingly pursuing their policy objectives by
creating markets. To create a policy market, regulators require firms to
procure a product that is socially useful but that confers little direct
private benefit to the acquiring party. Examples of policy markets
include pollutant emissions trading programs, renewable energy credit
markets, and electricity capacity markets. Existing scholarship has
tended to analyze policy markets simply as market-based regulation.
Although not inaccurate, such inquiries are necessarily incomplete
because they do not focus on the distinctive traits of policy markets.
Policy markets are neither typical regulations nor typical markets.
Concentrating on policy markets as a distinctive type of market brings to
light common characteristics of such markets, which in turn generates
insights into how they can be used more effectively to implement policy.
In particular, this Article focuses on a recurring fundamental challenge
in policy market design: managing complexity. Typical markets manage
complexity through market forces. As a regulatory creation, however,
policy markets require regulators to manage their complexity. This poses
what we call the complexity dilemma, which requires regulators to
balance strong pressures both toward and away from complexity. The
central argument of this Article is that although policy markets are an
important part of a regulator’s toolkit, they are also subject to complexity
that limits their usefulness. Understanding the complexity dilemma and
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its crucial role in policy market design forms an essential step toward
progress in improving the design and function of these markets.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The value of markets to society is clear. Two parties choose to
enter into a transaction for an exchange of goods or services. Since the
transaction leaves both parties better off than before—self-evident by
their voluntary decisions to enter into the transaction—the benefit of
the transaction is apparent. People engaged in numerous transactions
of identical or similar products comprise a market. Since each
transaction in a market improves the well-being of parties to the
transaction, a properly functioning market should substantially
improve overall well-being.1 Moreover, markets often function
effectively with relatively little government involvement.2 As long as
1. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 11 (2d ed. 1977) (“The
transaction would not have occurred if both parties had not expected it to make them better off.”).
2. This is not to say that governments are unnecessary to markets. At a minimum,
governments are generally necessary to enforce legal rights of property and contract. N.
GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 11–12 (7th ed. 2012); see also ALEX
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there is an underlying structure in place to define rights and enforce
bargains, markets can arise organically and generate wealth for society,
as Adam Smith described through his metaphor of the “invisible
hand.”3
The role of government in regulating markets, at least at its basic
level, is also rather clear. Sometimes markets have problems, which
economists call market failures.4 Perhaps one of the parties to a
transaction did not have sufficient information to understand the value
of what was being exchanged. Perhaps the transaction harmed some
third party who was not represented in the transaction. Perhaps one of
the parties was able to eliminate the choices of the other, changing the
terms of exchange. Government regulation aims to address market
failures in order to make markets more socially beneficial.5
Market forces are so powerful that government policy sometimes
creates entirely new markets to alleviate market failure in other
markets. These markets would not exist but for active government
involvement. Indeed, in these circumstances, the extent of government
involvement in these markets is so deep that labeling its role as an
“intervention” fundamentally misstates the relationship. The
government is not just regulating the market; the government is
regulating through the market. The basic reason for creating these
markets is to reduce, through trading, the cost of government
intervention and, therefore, better address the underlying market
failure.
These government-created markets, which we call policy markets,

MARSHALL, THE SURPRISING DESIGN OF MARKET ECONOMIES 9–114 (2012) (discussing
examples in other countries of government regulations enhancing productivity).
3. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 477–78 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1976) (“[B]y directing that industry in such a manner as its
produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many
other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention . . . . By
pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of society more effectively than when he
really intends to promote it.”); see, e.g., MANKIW, supra note 2, at 10–11 (quoting Smith and
noting the importance and relevance of Smith’s insights).
4. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, NO. PAD-77-34, GOVERNMENT
REGULATORY ACTIVITY: JUSTIFICATIONS, PROCESSES, IMPACTS, AND ALTERNATIVES 6 (1977)
(defining “market failure” as “a term which economists use to designate a flaw in the marketplace
which produces undesirable consequences”).
5. The mere existence of a market failure does not by itself fully justify government
regulation to address the market failure. Government regulation may not be effective in
counteracting the market failure. Even when government regulation effectively counteracts the
market failure, regulation may impose other costs that outweigh its benefits. See id. at 9 (“Thus,
the cost of an uncorrected market failure must be weighed against the costs of regulation to
correct the failure.”).
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are of two primary types.6 In the first type, the government seeks to
restrict the output of things that are harmful to society, such as
pollution. It is generally costly for firms to reduce their pollutant
emissions, so policy markets have been created to reduce the
regulatory burdens on firms by allowing them to reallocate emissions
rights among themselves through market transactions. In the second
type of policy market, the government seeks to increase the production
of products that may be good for society, such as renewable energy
sources and electricity capacity. Here, the government creates a market
so that suppliers compete to sell the beneficial product, reducing the
price that buyers of the product must pay.
Policy markets, even when they are noticed as particular
institutions, tend not to receive attention as a coherent and distinctive
phenomenon. Examinations of policy markets usually analyze these
markets as a form of regulation—that is, they frame policy markets
simply as market-based regulation, and they compare policy markets,
either favorably or unfavorably, to non-market-based regulation.7
These inquiries offer important insights and policy prescriptions, but
the story they tell is incomplete because they do not focus on the
distinctive traits of policy markets—that is, the ways in which policy
markets are markets and the ways in which such markets differ from
typical markets. Policy markets are properly considered markets
because they seek to gain the same welfare-enhancing benefits from
voluntary transactions that come out of markets that have arisen
organically, without direct government action. Yet, they are not typical
markets because they do not arise organically; rather, fundamental
elements of these markets must be determined through direct
government regulation.
Policy markets thus differ in important ways from more
conventional markets. Concentrating on policy markets as a distinctive
type of market brings to light common characteristics of such markets,
which in turn generates insights into how they can be used most
effectively. In particular, this Article focuses on a recurring
fundamental challenge in policy market design: managing complexity.
6. See MANKIW, supra note 2, at 11–12 (discussing government intervention in markets).
7. See generally, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental
Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985) (extolling the advantages of market-based environmental
regulation over traditional forms of regulation); TERRY L. ANDERSON & GARY D. LIBECAP,
ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETS: A PROPERTY RIGHTS APPROACH (2014) (similar); Amy Sinden,
The Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of a Private Property Solution, 78 U. COLO. L. REV.
533 (2007) (criticizing market-based environmental regulation as unwise privatization of the
environment).
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One of the great beauties of a typical market is its extraordinary ability
to manage a complex network of relationships between many sellers
and buyers without active, centralized coordination. Policy markets,
however, require more active supervision, and so regulators must make
administrative decisions that directly affect complicated relationships.
This sets up what we call the complexity dilemma.
On the one hand, the ability of policy markets to harness the
benefits of competitive markets depends on keeping them simple.
Policy markets function best as markets—that is, they generate more
of the welfare-enhancing benefits that we associate with markets—
when they are kept uncomplicated, allowing more trading. Simplicity
facilitates transactions, and transactions improve well-being.
On the other hand, the real world is extremely complex, and this
exerts strong pressures toward increasing the complexity of policy
markets. Regulators attempt to respond to real-world conditions,
which involve a multiplicity of potentially relevant factors. Reflecting
reality generates complexity.
The challenge that this creates—balancing the strong pressures
both toward and away from complexity—forms the complexity
dilemma. Understanding the complexity dilemma and its key role in
policy market design forms an essential step toward progress in
improving the design and function of these markets.
Thus, the central argument of this Article is that although policy
markets are an important part of a regulator’s toolkit, they are subject
to complexity that limits their usefulness. To illustrate the complexity
dilemma, we focus on two different policy markets as case studies:
emissions trading markets (also known as “cap and trade”) and
electricity capacity markets. Both examples attempt to leverage market
forces by creating a market for a product that is not believed to be
adequately managed in organically arising markets due to market
failures in the primary market. The product in each market is synthetic,
created by regulators to advance a policy objective, and then imposed
as a regulatory mandate on participants in a primary market.
This paper proceeds in three Parts. Part II introduces policy
markets by explaining the value of markets, how regulation can address
market failures, and how regulating by creating a policy market differs
from traditional regulatory approaches. Part III describes the basic
concepts of policy markets and the potential challenges of designing
and operating such markets. Part IV analyzes two examples of policy
markets that have grappled with the complexity dilemma. First, the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 created a sulfur dioxide emissions
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“cap-and-trade” program to address pollution that causes acid rain.8 At
the time, this system was a novel and innovative approach that allowed
more flexibility and therefore lower compliance costs than traditional
environmental regulations. Over time, this relatively simple emissions
trading program has been replaced by a far more complex interstate
emissions market with significant barriers to trading. Second,
electricity capacity markets arose in the late 1990s as a mechanism for
inducing investment in newly competitive electricity generation
markets.9 As with the Acid Rain Program, capacity markets have
become increasingly complex and controversial over time. The
challenges for the increasing complexity of the Clean Air Act emissions
trading markets and the electricity capacity markets aptly illustrate the
dilemma facing regulators who design and operate policy markets and
provide the basis for observations about how regulators should
approach the complexity dilemma.
II. MARKETS AND REGULATION
Before examining policy markets in particular, we must
understand the benefits of markets generally and how regulation can
address inadequacies in markets. Properly functioning markets are
important mechanisms for increasing social welfare. But when markets
do not function properly—when they suffer from market failures—
they can fall short of providing all possible benefits. Market regulation
attempts to correct or redress market failures to increase markets’
effectiveness in providing social benefits. Conventional market
regulation acts by constraining existing markets to counteract their
market failures—for example, by limiting the pollution that a factory
can emit, thereby limiting the environmental damage the factory
imposes on society. Some regulations, however, create their own
markets. We call these markets policy markets because the good or
service traded in the market exists only to comply with policy
requirements imposed by the regulator. Policy markets thus differ from
typical markets, in which demand is driven by the preferences of the
buyer rather than an obligation to comply with regulatory mandates.
A. The Benefits of Markets
Markets can be extremely powerful structures for organizing
individual economic decisions and conduct to the advantage of the

8. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the history of the Acid Rain Program).
9. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the background of capacity markets).
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individual market participants as well as for the overall benefit of
society.10 Markets achieve these benefits through several different
mechanisms.
First, properly functioning markets improve social welfare.
Markets operate as a system of voluntary transactions matching willing
buyers with willing sellers. Each party, buyer or seller, enters into the
transaction only because that party will, in its own assessment, be
better off after the transaction than before it.11 As long as we trust each
party’s assessment of its own welfare, it follows that each transaction
improves the well-being of both the buyer and the seller who willingly
enter into the transaction.12
Second, properly functioning markets maximize the value of the
goods and services being traded.13 This principle, too, follows directly
from the voluntary nature of market transactions. The previous
paragraph noted that both the seller and the buyer of a product
improve their well-being through the transaction.14 This implies that
the value of the product being exchanged must increase as well.
Because the transaction is voluntary, it must be the case that the buyer
attaches a higher value to the product than the seller does, and this
difference in values leads each of them to prefer the transaction to the
status quo. Thus, transactions move goods and services from lower- to
higher-value uses.15
Third, markets often manage multiple differentiated
(heterogeneous) attributes. The textbook model of a perfectly
competitive market generally posits many sellers competing to sell an
identical—that is, undifferentiated or homogenous—product to many

10. Economists readily acknowledge that the benefits of markets depend on the satisfaction
of certain conditions, which are generally collectively referred to as conditions of a competitive
market. See, e.g., MANKIW, supra note 2, at 66 (defining a competitive market as one in which
“there are many buyers and many sellers so that each has a negligible impact on the market
price”).
11. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 11 (“The transaction would not have occurred if both
parties had not expected it to make them better off.”).
12. Id. at 11; W. Kip Viscusi, Risk Equity, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 843, 846 (2000).
13. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 9 (noting that “resources [tend] to gravitate toward their
most valuable uses if voluntary exchange—a market—is permitted”); see also R.H. Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960) (noting that market transactions will “lead to
an increase in the value of production”).
14.
15. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 10 (“By a process of voluntary exchange, resources are
shifted to those uses in which the value to consumers, as measured by their willingness to pay, is
highest.”).
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buyers.16 Since the idealized textbook product is identical, the buyers’
only preference is to minimize price. However, the products in a
market are often significantly differentiated across multiple attributes
in addition to price. The market for hamburgers, for example, allows
sellers to offer a variety of attributes. Some of these attributes involve
the hamburger itself, such as size, method of cooking, quality of meat,
type of bun, and condiments. Others are attributes of the broader
customer experience, such as cleanliness of the restaurant, quality of
service, and location of the restaurant. Individual buyers have
particular preferences for each of the attributes.
Thus, what we think of as the market for a single product—in our
example, hamburgers—is really a category that aggregates multiple
smaller markets of individual products, each with its own unique set of
attributes. The market for a McDonald’s Big Mac is not exactly the
same market as the market for a Shake Shack Shackburger. Because
these individual markets are close substitutes, however, we can
aggregate them for conceptual purposes into a coherent overall
market. As such, Big Macs and Shackburgers can be considered as part
of an overall market for restaurant hamburgers.
The fact of attribute differentiation, although often overlooked or
assumed away,17 highlights an important aspect of how markets benefit
society. Markets function well even when products are differentiated
and manage those differentiated attributes for the mutual benefit of
sellers and buyers. Markets manage these differences by matching the
offerings of sellers with the preferences of buyers. Some hamburger
sellers may offer inexpensive run-of-the-mill ground beef, while others
offer freshly ground, organic beef at a higher price because of the
higher costs. Some buyers will prefer to pay more for the organic beef,
while others will not. Markets, by performing this matching of sellers
with buyers across multiple differentiated attributes that include both
16. See, e.g., MANKIW, supra note 2, at 66 (noting the common assumption that, in a
perfectly competitive market, “[t]he goods and services offered for sale are all exactly the same”);
Maurice E. Stucke, Morality and Antitrust, 2006 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 443, 453 n.25 (2006) (“A
model of perfect competition generally assumes homogenous products . . . .”); see also
Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking the Commitment to Free, Local Television, 52 EMORY L.J. 1579,
1588 (2003) (noting that “perfect competition assumes that there are a large number of producers
each selling undifferentiated products”).
17. See, e.g., Michal S. Gal, Reducing Rivals’ Prices: Government-Supported Mavericks as
New Solutions for Oligopoly Pricing, 7 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 73, 80 (2001) (“Let us assume an
industry with an almost perfectly homogenous product . . . .”); see also Edward J. Green & Robert
H. Porter, Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information, 52 ECONOMETRICA 87,
91 (1984) (“Consider an oligopoly of n firms which produce an undifferentiated product in a
stationary and time separable environment.”).
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price and other attributes, function as structures for coordinating
economic activity. And, they serve this coordination function simply by
buyers responding to sellers’ offerings and sellers responding to buyers’
preferences, without any action by a centralized authority. No
government authority needs to decide whether hamburgers should be
organic or not; the balance between conventional and organic
hamburgers is determined by the relative cost to the seller of
conventional versus organic beef and the relative appeal to the buyer
of conventional versus organic beef.
B. Market Failures
Despite the textbook model, markets do not always maximize
social value. In such circumstances, a market does not generate all the
theoretically possible value for society. Economists use the term
market failure to describe less than optimally functioning markets.18
Even the basic description in the previous section reveals some
potential limitations to the general principle that markets enhance
overall well-being. For example, the principle may not hold true if the
transaction affects persons other than the buyer and the seller—that is,
the transaction may improve the well-being of both the buyer and
seller, but if it negatively affects other persons, the transaction may
have an overall harmful effect on society.
Monopoly is one category of market failure.19 The classic
microeconomic model assumes competitive market conditions in which
sellers in the market act as “price takers.”20 A seller is a price taker if
its decisions regarding how much product to offer at what price do not

18. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL, supra note 4, at 6 (defining market failure as “a term
which economists use to designate a flaw in the marketplace which produces undesirable
consequences”); MANKIW, supra note 2, at 12 (defining market failure as “a situation in which
the market on its own fails to produce an efficient allocation of resources”); see also Frances M.
Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q.J. ECON. 351, 351 (1958) (defining market failure as
“the failure of a more or less idealized system of price-market institutions to sustain ‘desirable’
activities or to stop ‘undesirable’ activities”). Governments sometimes regulate for reasons other
than addressing market failures. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL, supra note 4, at iii (noting that,
in addition to regulating to address market failures, “[r]egulation is also used to achieve social
policy or other objectives”).
19. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, supra note 4, at 4.
20. See MANKIW, supra note 2, at 66 (“Because buyers and sellers in perfectly competitive
markets must accept the price the market determines, they are said to be price takers.”); G.
Marcus Cole, Rational Consumer Ignorance: When and Why Consumers Should Agree to Form
Contracts Without Even Reading Them, 11 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 413, 420 (2015) (“In perfectly
competitive markets, sellers are, therefore, ‘price takers,’ because they have no control over
prices. Each seller must take the market price as given.”).
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affect the market price of the product in question.21 Essentially, in a
competitive market, individual firms are too small to influence the
market appreciably. For example, in a country with many wheat
farmers, no individual farmer can affect the market price of wheat.
Each seller produces its product until the marginal cost of producing a
product unit equals the price the seller receives for selling the product
unit—that is, until the point at which the seller loses money on the
marginal product unit.22 The overall wheat market settles on a quantity
and price of wheat that, by balancing supply and demand, maximizes
the net gain to society. In the absence of perfect competition, however,
a seller is not a price taker and instead is large enough in the market
that it has the ability—known as market power—to profitably raise the
market price of its product above the competitive level.23 Take, for
example, a farmer in a market with only one or two farmers. An
unrestrained monopolist will reduce its production output below
competitive levels, which will increase the market price above the
competitive level.24 The farmer can charge more for its grain because
buyers of grain have only limited alternatives. This increases the profit
to the monopolist seller but reduces overall well-being as compared
with the perfect competition scenario.
Externalities are another important category of market failure.25
An externality occurs when someone imposes costs or benefits on
others without facing the costs or benefits of these effects.26 For
21. See MANKIW, supra note 2, at 66 (noting that a buyer or seller is a price taker if “buyers
and sellers are so numerous that no single buyer or seller has any influence over the market
price”).
22. See id. at 284 (“At the profit-maximizing level of output, marginal revenue [price] and
marginal cost are exactly equal.”).
23. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 20, at 460 (discussing Disney’s substantial market power and
its subsequent effects on the market).
24. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL, supra note 4, at 9 (“Unregulated monopolists usually
produce too little output and charge prices that are too high when compared to a competitive
regime . . . .”).
25. See id. at 14 (discussing externalities).
26. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY 17 (2d ed. 1988) (“An externality is present whenever some individual’s (say A’s) utility
or production relationships include real (that is, nonmonetary) variables, whose values are chosen
by others (persons, corporations, governments) without particular attention to the effects on A’s
welfare.”); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (OECD), GLOSSARY OF STATISTICAL
TERMS 256 (2007) (“Externalities refers to situations when the effect of production or
consumption of goods and services imposes costs or benefits on others which are not reflected in
the prices charged for the goods and services being provided.”); TOM TIETENBERG,
ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES ECONOMICS 47 (4th ed. 1996) (“An externality
exists whenever the welfare of some agent, either a firm or household, depends directly on his or
her activities and on activities under the control of some other agent as well.”).
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example, a homeowner rents out a home for parties, without regard for
the harm it is imposing on its neighbors by disturbing them.27 The
problem arises because of “interdependences that are external to the
price system, hence unaccounted for by market valuations.”28 The
“party house” homeowner, not facing the costs of the adverse impacts
on neighbors, charges a rental rate that does not reflect the harm to
neighbors. Because externalities are not directly reflected in market
valuations,29 they induce a divergence between the conduct of private
actors, which reacts only to market prices, and overall social welfare,
which depends on all effects on well-being whether or not they are
reflected in market valuation.30 Overall, social well-being depends on
the harm to the neighbors of the “party house,” even if the “party
house” homeowner does not care about harming its neighbors.
A third type of market failure involves public goods.31 A public
good is a good that is non-rivalrous and non-excludable.32 National
security is a classic example of a public good.33 Non-rivalrous means
that one person’s use of the good does not diminish another person’s
use of it.34 Therefore, for example, the benefit that one American
citizen gains from the existence of the U.S. diplomatic corps and armed
forces does not affect the benefit that another citizen receives. This

27. See, e.g., Brittany Levine, Airbnb ‘Party House’ in Glendale Shut Down After Police
Visits, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2014), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-airbnb-partyhouse-glendale-20140106-story.html (noting a home in Glendale, California, had been advertised
as “party central” on Airbnb, and that “constant partying” at the house was disturbing neighbors,
“interfering with their sleep in the early-morning hours”).
28. Bator, supra note 18, at 358.
29. Externalities may be reflected indirectly in property values. See, e.g., Dennis Guignet,
Rachel Northcutt & Patrick Walsh, Impacts of Ground Water Contamination on Property Values:
Agricultural Run-off and Private Wells, 45 AGRIC. & RESOURCE ECON. 293, 293 (2016) (finding
that groundwater contamination in Lake County, Florida, negatively affected property values);
P. Joan Poor et al., Objective Versus Subjective Measures of Water Clarity in Hedonic Property
Value Models, 77 LAND ECON. 482, 491 (2001) (finding that water clarity of freshwater lakes in
Maine, a measure of water quality, affected property values of lakefront properties).
30. See Guignet, supra note 29, at 294 (discussing how buyers and sellers can perceive
change in quality in the market).
31. See generally Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 387 (1954) (discussing why it is necessary for the government to invest in certain
sectors of the economy).
32. John P. Conley & Christopher S. Yoo, Nonrivalry and Price Discrimination in Copyright
Economics, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1801, 1805 (2009); MANKIW, supra note 2, at 216.
33. E.g., Leonard Champney, Public Goods and Policy Types, 48 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 988,
988 (1988); Richard B. McKenzie & Hugh H. Macaulay, A Bureaucratic Theory of Regulation, 35
PUB. CHOICE 297, 308 (1980); Richard Morrison, Price Fixing Among Elite Colleges and
Universities, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 807, 828 (1992).
34. Morrison, supra note 33, at 828.
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contrasts with a private good, such as an orange. If one consumer eats
an orange, another consumer cannot enjoy that product.35 National
defense is also non-excludable, meaning that people cannot easily be
excluded from using it. A private company providing national defense
protection for the entire United States would have difficulty effectively
charging people for its services. Rather, any individual citizen would
have a strong incentive to free ride, availing himself of the company’s
services without paying.36 Thus, the national security firm could not
expect to make money directly by supplying defense services to
customers. In contrast, a seller of oranges can easily require consumers
to pay for any oranges they are going to consume.
C. Regulating Markets
When market failures undermine a market’s social benefits,
governments often turn to regulation. The presence of market failures
may justify government regulation to counteract the inefficient
distortions caused by the market failures.37 Different market failures
are associated with different regulatory responses.
Regulation to address monopoly power can take either of two
approaches. The classic antitrust enforcement strategy restricts actions
that reduce competition in otherwise competitive markets.38 If, for

35. Although generally classified as distinct concepts, a public good can be considered as an
extreme form of a positive externality—that is, a good for which the externality in the form of the
public benefit to others swamps any private benefit to the owner. See Alan W. Evans, Private
Goods, Externality, Public Goods, 17 SCOTTISH J. POL. ECON. 79, 79 (1970) (“[W]e have a range
of externality with the pure private good and the pure public good as polar cases.”); John Hudson
& Philip Jones, “Public Goods”: An Exercise in Calibration, 124 PUB. CHOICE 267, 268 (2005)
(“Publicness is measured by the extent of the externality.”).
36. See Timothy J. Muris, Economics and Consumer Protection, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 103, 104
(1991) (“As with defense, there is a problem of efficiently excluding those who receive the
benefit.”).
37. This is not to say that government policies can only be justified to the extent they correct
a market failure. Other policy objectives, such as addressing distributional inequities to increase
the fairness of society, may also justify government intervention. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL,
supra note 4, at 6–7 (discussing the reasons government decides to regulate). Because the purpose
of such policies is not to correct a market failure, their justification cannot be evaluated merely
by whether they increase or decrease the efficiency of markets. See id. at 7. That said, because
virtually every government program affects markets, a program that does not correct a market
failure almost necessarily distorts markets in some way and to some extent. Whether the costs of
these distortions are sufficiently large in comparison to the perceived benefits of the program will
determine whether the program is nevertheless worthwhile.
38. See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 19 (1958) (holding that railroad
deeds and leases that required grantees and lessees of land to ship products by way of the railroad
were per se unlawful restraints of trade in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act); Loewe v.
Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 300–01 (1908) (holding that attempts by defendants to prevent plaintiffs
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example, Coca-Cola and Pepsi wished to merge to reduce competition
in the soft drink market, the Federal Trade Commission would likely
intervene to block the merger under the authority of federal antitrust
statutes.39
In some situations, however, inducing competition is not the best
course of action. Competition in a market may not be possible if the
costs of supplying the market by using only one producer are less than
the costs of supplying the market through two or more producers—
what is known as a natural monopoly.40 Mandating competition in such
a circumstance would only increase the costs of production to the
detriment of buyers. An example of such a market is the local
distribution of electricity. It would not make sense for regulators to
force competition by requiring more than one local electricity
distribution company to provide service, necessitating construction of
parallel distribution networks. Instead, state public utility commissions
allow local electricity distribution companies to operate as stateapproved monopolists within a defined geographic service area.
Commissions, however, regulate retail electricity rates so that the
companies only receive enough revenue to obtain a “fair” rate of
return on the companies’ investment, thereby limiting the companies’
ability to exercise their market power.41
Take, as another example, regulation to address externalities.
Recall that the problem with externalities is the presence of effects on
third parties who are not reflected in the market, such as the neighbors
of the rental “party house” whose sleepless nights do not factor into
either the homeowner’s decision to rent the house for parties or into
the decision of party organizers to rent the house. If regulation is
warranted, the ideal regulation would internalize the externality by
forcing the homeowner to face the costs it is imposing on its neighbors
from reselling hats violated Sherman Antitrust Act).
39. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (stating every “combination in the form of trust or otherwise . . .
in restraint of trade” is illegal); FTC v. Coca-Cola Co., 641 F. Supp. 1128, 1128 (D.D.C. 1986)
(granting the FTC’s request for a preliminary injunction blocking Coca-Cola’s attempted
acquisition of Dr. Pepper).
40. See MANKIW, supra note 2, at 302 (“An industry is a natural monopoly when a single
firm can supply a good or service to an entire market at a lower cost than could two or more
firms.”).
41. See, e.g., David B. Spence, The Politics of Electricity Restructuring: Theory vs. Practice,
40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 417, 419 (2005) (“Price regulation [of investor-owned utilities] was
necessary to prevent the deadweight losses and producer surpluses associated with monopoly
pricing.”). These “fair” rates of return theoretically mimic the return a company would receive in
a comparable, competitive market. Herbert Hovenkamp, Technology, Politics, and Regulated
Monopoly: An American Historical Perspective, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1263, 1274 (1984).
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by disturbing their sleep. This internalization could be accomplished
by, for example, holding the homeowner liable to its neighbors for
damages paid under a nuisance claim.42
Regulation generates both benefits and costs.43 The goal of
regulation is to improve well-being.44 Generally, this will mean
attempting to create more benefits than costs, although the distribution
of benefits and costs may matter as well.45 Regulators often justify their
regulatory proposals by showing that benefits exceed costs.46 A more
exacting criterion requires that a policy maximizes net benefits—that
is, the difference between the benefits and costs of a policy.47
In each of the examples in this section, regulating markets means
constraining options available to sellers and buyers in the market. For
example, regulation might restrain the price that could be charged by
a monopolist. It also might limit the hours that houses in a particular
neighborhood can hold noisy parties that can be heard by neighbors.
Essentially, regulating markets to address market failures requires
fixing the markets to reduce or eliminate the distortions caused by the
market failures. The market itself, however, continues to operate
relatively autonomously with buyers and sellers participating
voluntarily, within the constraints of the regulation, without active
government intervention to sustain it.
Some regulations, however, flip this observation on its head.
Instead of using regulations to constrain markets, some regulations
create markets as the regulatory mechanism. Regulators are not so
much intervening in markets as they are regulating through markets.
42. See Coase, supra note 13, at 14–15 (discussing the case Bass v. Gregory and how
internalizations can be accomplished through the judicial system).
43. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Commitments in Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 103 VA. L. REV. 1809, 1821 (2017) (“A regulation typically has both positive and
negative effects on welfare.”).
44. See id. at 1821–22 (noting that “the ultimate goal of regulation is to advance wellbeing”).
45. See John D. Graham, Saving Lives Through Administrative Law and Economics, 157 U.
PA. L. REV. 395, 414 (2008) (arguing in favor of using cost-benefit analysis to “distinguish[] good
rules from bad rules,” but acknowledging also the importance of “distributional values, such as
fairness to the poor”).
46. See, e.g., Energy Conservation Program for Consumer Products: Energy Conservation
Standards for Residential Furnaces, 80 Fed. Reg. 13,120, 13,122 (proposed Mar. 12, 2015)
(codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 430) (summarizing costs and benefits of proposed rule to consumers);
Occupational Exposure to Respirable Crystalline Silica, 78 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,277 (proposed
Sept. 12, 2013) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1910, 1915 & 1926) (same).
47. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994) (“[I]n
choosing among alternative regulatory approaches, agencies should select those approaches that
maximize net benefits . . . unless a statute requires another regulatory approach.”).
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III. POLICY MARKETS: REGULATING THROUGH MARKETS
Some regulations do not follow the traditional paradigm of
intervening in extant markets to correct perceived failures or
shortcomings in those markets. Instead, these regulations regulate
through markets by creating new markets that directly drive
implementation of policy objectives. In a policy market, the regulator
does not mandate certain attributes of the good or service, as in typical
market regulation, but instead requires procurement of the product
itself. An example would be an emissions trading program, in which
sources of pollution can buy and sell pollution credits in a market.48
Polluters have no innate demand for emissions credits, but the
government requires polluters to procure credits for their emissions,
thereby creating a market for such credits.49
This Article is the first to focus on policy markets as a discrete
policy phenomenon. Prior academic work and commentary have used
other terms to describe related market institutions. The term
compliance market, for example, refers to markets in which product
purchases are compelled to comply with a regulatory mandate.50 The
term compliance market, however, is generally employed for the
specific purpose of differentiating markets in which product purchases
are compelled to comply with a regulatory mandate from voluntary
markets for the same product, in which purchases are driven by
voluntary demand.51 Most policy markets do not have corresponding

48. See BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 26, at 177 (citing J.H. DALES, POLLUTION,
PROPERTY AND PRICES (1968)). These authors credit J.H. Dales for the idea of pollution permit
markets.
49. Not every government-created market is a policy market. For example, to the extent
that governments are the only purchasers of some military equipment such as ships, tanks, and
warplanes, the markets for such equipment is government-created. The government can also
create markets by subsidizing markets that are insufficiently profitable to exist otherwise, such as
the market for flood insurance in flood-prone areas.
50. See, e.g., Henry M. Banta & Sheldon L. Bierman, Acid Rain Legislation’s Complex
Problem—Fair and Efficient Emissions Limitation, 125 PUB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 1990, at 19, 19
(referring to “an emissions reduction compliance market”); William Boyd & James Salzman, The
Curious Case of Greening in Carbon Markets, 41 ENVTL. L. 73, 73 (2011) (discussing
“environmental compliance markets”).
51. See, e.g., Aaron Ezroj, Climate Change and International Norms, 27 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 69, 83 (2011) (“[T]here is currently no national policy market for carbon offsets. There
is, however, a significant and growing voluntary market.”); David Schraub, Renewing Electricity
Competition, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 937, 964 (2015) (noting that “Renewable Energy Credits are
traded in two primary markets,” the “compliance market” and the “voluntary market”); Michael
Zimmer, Jason T. Hungerford & Jennifer M. Rohleder, Recs Get Real, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Nov.
2007, at 25, 25 (“Currently, the United States has two distinct REC markets — the compliance
market and the voluntary market.”).
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voluntary markets for the same product; hence the term compliance
market is under-inclusive for the category of market that is the subject
of this paper. Similarly, the term fabricated markets refers to
consciously designed product markets.52 The concept of fabricated
markets is broader than a policy market, as it includes consciously
designed product markets even if the market would exist in the absence
of the conscious design.53 Thus, neither compliance markets nor
fabricated markets are congruent with the term policy market, nor do
the works employing those terms examine policy markets as a coherent
category of policy or of market.
Regulators designing policy markets face a common set of
challenges. Part III.A explains the basic concept of policy market
design through an idealized simple example. Part III.B examines policy
market design in more detail, explaining how the various decisions
necessary to design a policy market inevitably encounter the
complexity dilemma.
A. An Idealized Example
To illustrate the basic workings of a policy market, we start with a
conceptually straightforward example—a simple cap-and-trade system
of air pollutant emissions regulation. Assume that a government
authority decides that nitrogen oxide emissions in a particular area are
too high. Emissions are adversely affecting local air quality and thereby
posing risks to public health, such as an increase in respiratory
ailments. The government decides what level of air quality would be
acceptable and then determines how much emissions need to be
reduced in order to reach that air quality objective. This is the “cap” in
the cap-and-trade system.54 The purpose of the cap is to achieve

52. See, e.g., STEVEN K. VOGEL, MARKETCRAFT 38–42 (2018) (discussing the concept of
“fabricated markets,” which refers to markets “characterized by the deliberate planning of
market design, a specific moment of market launch, and/or the creation of a product and a market
that would not exist in the absence of conscious design”); see also Joseph P. Tomain, The
Dominant Model of United States Energy Policy, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 355, 379–83 (1990)
(explaining the concept of a “government market” in energy policy).
53. See, e.g., VOGEL, supra note 52, at 40 (discussing the Affordable Care Act because it
created a consciously designed health care market even though the market existed absent of the
conscious design); see also Adam J. Levitin, Safe Banking: Finance and Democracy, 83 U. CHI. L.
REV. 357, 364 (2016) (“Financial markets are not organic developments steered by the invisible
hand. Instead, they are marionettes, manipulated by the strings of the government. Market forces
operate within the framework created by the government.”).
54. See A. DENNY ELLERMAN, PAUL L. JOSKOW, & DAVID HARRISON, JR., PEW CTR. ON
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, EMISSIONS TRADING IN THE U.S.: EXPERIENCE, LESSONS, AND
CONSIDERATIONS FOR GREENHOUSE GASES 4 (2003) (“Under a cap-and-trade program, an
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environmental improvement by reducing emissions and improving air
quality.
The government then allocates emissions allowances to the
various individual sources of emissions in the particular area, such that
the total amount of emissions allowances across all sources is no more
than the amount of total emissions that will allow the area to reach its
air quality objective.55 Every source is required to have sufficient
allowances to cover its emissions.56 A source can either use its
emissions allowances for its own emissions or sell its emissions rights
to other sources.57 Transactions of allowances are the “trade” in the
cap-and-trade system.58 The purpose of trading is to minimize the costs
of reducing emissions to the level mandated by the cap. Thus, firms
with high pollution abatement costs will buy allowances from firms
with lower costs of abatement.59 The trading does not itself improve air
quality, but rather reduces the costs of meeting the emissions limit of
the cap.60

aggregate cap on emissions is set that defines the total number of emissions ‘allowances,’ each of
which provides its holder with the right to emit a unit (typically a ton) of emissions.”); see also
WORLD BANK GRP., EMISSION TRADING IN PRACTICE: A HANDBOOK ON DESIGN AND
IMPLEMENTATION 3 (2016) (“Under an ETS [Emission Trading System], the relevant authority
imposes a limit (cap) on the total emissions in one or more sectors of the economy . . . .”).
55. See ELLERMAN, JOSKOW, & HARRISON, supra note 54, at 4 (“The permits are initially
allocated in some way, typically among existing sources.”); PETER HEINDL & ANDREAS
LÖSCHEL, CTR. FOR EUROPEAN ECON. RESEARCH, DESIGNING EMISSIONS TRADING IN
PRACTICE: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS AND EXPERIENCES FROM THE EU EMISSIONS
TRADING SCHEME (EU ETS) 2 (2012) (“Permits can be sold or auctioned by the regulator or can
be partly or fully distributed for free (known as grandfathering).”).
56. ELLERMAN, JOSKOW & HARRISON, supra note 54, at 4 (“Each source covered by the
program must hold permits to cover its emissions . . . .”); HEINDL & LÖSCHEL, supra note 55, at
2 (noting that permits “must be surrendered (handed in to the regulator) for each emitted unit”).
57. See ELLERMAN, JOSKOW, & HARRISON, supra note 54, at 4 (“[S]ources [are] free to buy
and sell permits from each other.”); WORLD BANK GROUP, supra note 54, at 3–4 (noting that an
emission source can choose to surrender an allowance for its emissions, trade allowances to other
sources, bank allowances for future use, or purchase allowances from other sources).
58. See, e.g., ELLERMAN, JOSKOW & HARRISON, supra note 54, at 3 (providing a sample
transaction involving emissions in a cap-and-trade system).
59. Id. at viii.
60. That said, to the extent the emissions cap is set through a political compromise in which
cost feasibility is a factor, reducing compliance costs is likely to enable a political compromise that
adopts greater emissions reductions. Cf. Joseph Goffman, Title IV of the Clean Air Act: Lessons
for Success of the Acid Rain Emissions Trading Program, 14 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 177, 180
(2006) (noting that “the promise of cost savings through emissions trading . . . persuaded the Bush
administration to propose in its Clean Air legislation that the SO2 program stipulate an annual
reduction of 10 million tons,” as compared with prior proposals for an 8-million-ton reduction);
infra notes 165–169 and accompanying text (describing the political process that led to the
establishment of the emissions cap in the Clean Air Act’s Acid Rain Program).
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As long as transaction costs are sufficiently low and the costs of
pollution abatement differ across sources, firms will trade emissions
allowances among themselves to their mutual advantage. Each trade
will transfer emissions allowances from a source with lower abatement
costs to a source with higher abatement costs. We know this because
the value of an emissions allowance is necessarily higher for the source
that faces a higher pollution abatement cost. If the higher-cost source
does not purchase the allowance from a lower-cost source, it must
abate the emissions itself, at a higher cost. The price negotiated for the
transfer of the allowances will therefore be somewhere above the
lower-cost source’s abatement cost and below the higher-cost source’s
abatement cost, such that both sources are benefitted by the
transaction. This is a classic Coasean bargain.61
Trades from sources with lower abatement costs to sources with
higher abatement costs will continue until no source can, at the margin,
reduce its emissions by an additional unit at a lower cost than other
sources—that is, until the marginal cost of pollution abatement is equal
across all sources in the area. As allowances move to higher-cost
sources, pollution abatement migrates to lower-cost sources. The
overall effect of the trades will be to allocate emissions across the
sources in a way that minimizes the aggregate cost of pollution
abatement.62
B. Policy Market Design
Market-based regulations that act through the mechanism of
policy markets can reduce the cost of regulation by leveraging market
forces to accomplish regulatory objectives while reducing regulatory
burdens.63 Policy market design, therefore, requires regulators to focus
on creating well-functioning markets. Policy markets are most effective
at reducing costs when they are simple and unconstrained.64 This
maximizes the size of the market, which enhances competition and
enables transactions that reduce the costs of complying with the
regulatory mandate.65
61. See Coase, supra note 13, at 16 (discussing how the market naturally will achieve a more
efficient outcome the lower the transaction costs).
62. See Goffman, supra note 60, at 178 (“The virtue of cap and trade is simply that it makes
it easier to reach the right pollution reduction levels . . . .”).
63. See, e.g.. ELLERMAN, JOSKOW & HARRISON, supra note 54, at 1 (discussing “emissions
trading [as] one of several market-based approaches that theoretically should improve the
performance of regulatory regimes”).
64. Id. at 19–20.
65. See MANKIW, supra note 2, at 66 (defining a competitive market as one in which there
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Keeping policy markets large and simple, however, often requires
oversimplifying reality. Policy markets in the real world operate in a
context that is much more complex than in the idealized conceptual
example described above.66 Regulators must decide how to construct
demand—or supply, depending on the type of policy market—in a
market in which transactions are driven by regulation rather than the
preferences of the market participants. Regulators must decide
whether to overlook differences among products in the policy market
that render the products not perfectly equivalent. Regulators have to
weigh additional policy judgments beyond just correcting the relevant
market failure. All of these factors add complexity. But accounting for
complexity in market design requires limiting the market—for
example, by segmenting the market to take account of variations in the
product being traded. Limiting the market constrains its ability to
reduce costs, which is the primary purpose of these markets.
Thus, policy market design poses a complexity dilemma for
regulators: simplify the market to decrease the regulatory burden or
complicate the market to reflect reality.67 This complexity dilemma
underlies many of the key decisions regulators must make in creating
policy markets. Both factors—creating an effective market and
accurately reflecting reality—instrumentally advance the objectives of
the policy market, so there is no clear or easy answer to the dilemma.68
The complexity dilemma can be characterized in terms of the costbenefit framework widely used in assessing regulatory decisions.69 As
noted,70 the purpose of a policy market is to use market transactions to
reduce the burdens of regulation. The benefits of a regulation involve
the advantages of counteracting the market failure that led to the

are many buyers and many sellers).
66. See supra Part III.A (discussing the interaction of market goals and market complexity).
67. The field of market design examines how differences in the characteristics of markets
affect their performance. See, e.g., Alvin E. Roth, Marketplaces, Markets, and Market Design, 108
AM. ECON. REV. 1609, 1609–10 (2018) (“Market design . . . strives to understand how the design
of marketplaces influences the functioning of markets.”).
68. All regulators face the complexity dilemma in some form, regardless whether they are
working with a market-based program or some other form of regulation. The complexity dilemma
is a factor in all regulatory design and is not unique to policy market design. In contrast to policy
markets, the complexity dilemma does not occur in organically arising markets. Natural markets,
driven by the preferences and budget constraints of market participants, manage complexity
themselves. Policy markets, propelled by regulatory mandate, must manage complexity through
market design.
69. See supra notes 43–47 and accompanying text (discussing cost-benefit analysis).
70. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (discussing emissions trading as a marketbased approach).
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regulation. The better the regulation is at counteracting the market
failure, the greater the benefits the regulation should generate. But
generating benefits can also generate cost. Some of the burdens of
regulation take the form of program costs—the cost to the regulator of
creating, monitoring, and enforcing the regulatory program.71 Other
burdens take the form of compliance costs—the cost of complying with
the regulation.72
In this context, the complexity dilemma in policy markets can be
understood as a particular aspect of the benefit-cost tradeoff.
Regulators can increase the benefits of a policy market by tailoring it
more closely to the realities of the problem they are trying to address.
But doing so increases the complexities of the policy market, which
increases the costs—both program costs to the regulator and
compliance costs. Regulators designing a policy market must balance
the advantages of a policy market that better matches reality against
the disadvantages of a policy market that is, as a consequence of better
matching reality, necessarily more complex.
1. Constructed Supply or Demand
Policy markets, as we have defined them, create new markets that
would not otherwise exist, through regulations that mandate
procurement of the product sold in the market.73 Policy markets
require firms to acquire a product that firms would not otherwise
demand because acquiring the product does not bring significant direct
private benefits to the firms.74 Regulators create policy markets for one
of two reasons. First, regulators may create a policy market to limit the
amount of the product when the product represents a negative
externality or “public bad,”75 such as pollution. We will refer to such

71. See, e.g., ELLERMAN, JOSKOW, & HARRISON, supra note 54, at 1–2 (providing a simple
numerical example of how emissions trading can control costs).
72. Id.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 49–50 (discussing the nature of policy markets).
74. Thus, not all government mandates to acquire a product create policy markets. For
example, a building code requirement for homes to have smoke detectors, see generally NFPA
72, NATIONAL FIRE ALARM AND SIGNALING CODE (2019), does not create a policy market
because (a) a market for smoke detectors would exist even in the absence of the building code
requirement, because smoke detectors provide a private benefit to residents; and (b) the building
code requirement does not directly or even indirectly determine the quantities of home detectors
sold in the market. By contrast, a cap-and-trade program creates a market for emission allowances
that would not exist but for the regulatory program, and the program directly determines the
quantities of emission allowances sold in the market. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, supra note 4, at
6 (discussing the reasons for government regulation of the private market).
75. See Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1,
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markets as negative-externality policy markets. Second, regulators may
create a policy market to increase the amount of the product when the
product represents a positive externality or public good, such as
reliability of the electricity grid.76 We will refer to such markets as
positive-externality policy markets.
a. Constructed Supply in Negative-Externality Policy Markets
Negative-externality policy markets, such as emissions trading
markets, create rights that entitle the holders to engage in some private
activity with negative externalities. A regulator creating a negativeexternality policy market seeks to limit the amount of overall harm
caused by the negative externalities, such as pollution, by limiting the
total number of rights to pollute. The regulator initially allocates
(either by auction or by some other means) the rights to the regulated
industry. In a cap-and-trade emissions trading program, the total
amount of rights allocated are the cap.77 Firms in the regulated industry
then can reallocate the rights through market transactions with each
other.78
In deciding on a cap and then allocating the rights to the regulated
industry, the regulator is essentially creating the supply curve for the
policy market, insofar as a supply curve is simply a representation of
the quantities of product offered for sale at different prices.79 The price
28 (1982) (“Public-bads problems emerge because people may not face incentives optimally to
reduce production of goods that display negative externalities.”); Joshua A.T. Fairfield &
Christoph Engel, Privacy As A Public Good, 65 DUKE L.J. 385, 387–88 (2015) (“A public bad is
the mathematical mirror image of a public good.”).
76. See Morrison, supra note 33, at 828–29 (noting the relationship between public goods
and positive externalities). An analogous relationship exists between public bads and negative
externalities. Aranson et al., supra note 75, at 28–29 (discussing the concept of a public bad and
its externalities).
77. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (defining cap-and-trade systems).
78. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing the transferability of permits in a
cap-and-trade system).
79. See MANKIW, supra note 2, at 74 (defining a supply curve as “a graph of the relationship
between the price of a good and the quantity supplied”). Recall that we have defined policy
markets by the existence of a regulatory mandate to procure the product sold in the markets. See
supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text (discussing the difference between policy markets and
other regulatory markets). This specification, which focuses on demand in the policy market, may
seem inconsistent with the observation here that, for a negative-externality policy market, the
regulator creates the supply curve for the market (and not the demand curve). Although the
regulator creates the supply curve, this is not what creates the policy market. Merely making
emission allowances available, for example, would not create a market for emission allowances.
Rather, it is the requirement that the regulated industry procure the product—for example, the
requirement for pollution sources to procure allowances for their emissions—that creates the
market. The creation of the supply curve for the market just influences the equilibrium price and
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at which a product is offered should reflect the marginal cost of
producing the product.80 For a negative-externality policy market, the
product is the right to create some social harm, such as the right to emit
pollution. The marginal cost of producing the product, therefore, is the
marginal social cost of allowing the harm—for example, the cost to
society of allowing one more ton of pollutant emissions. We would
expect this marginal cost of harm to vary depending on the amount of
the harm—for example, the harm from each additional unit of
pollution may increase as the total amount of pollution increases. This
would yield an upward sloping supply curve, with lower values at lower
quantities and higher values at higher quantities.
In reality, however, negative-externality policy markets seldom, if
ever, reflect this complicated reality. Regulators rarely decide on an
emissions cap based on even an approximation of the marginal social
cost of pollution. There is simply not enough information available to
regulators to make such a determination.81 Instead, regulators tend to
decide the cap based on a pragmatic judgment regarding what is
appropriate and acceptable.82 Moreover, regulators also generally
choose a fixed total quantity of allowances that does not depend on the
price at which the allowances are sold.83 In effect, the regulator has
created a vertical supply curve, in which the quantity of allowances
offered for sale is fixed at the amount of the emissions cap and does
not vary with price.

quantity of the policy market that the regulator has created.
80. See Alan O. Sykes, Countervailing Duty Law: An Economic Perspective, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 199, 229 (1989) (noting that “the domestic supply curve reflects the marginal costs of
production for domestic producers”); Richard O. Zerbe, Jr., An Empirical and Theoretical
Comparison of Alternative Predation Rules, 61 TEX. L. REV. 655, 659 (1982) (“The supply curve
equals the marginal costs of production and represents the social costs of allocating resources to
the production of the good or service.”).
81. See William J. Baumol & Wallace E. Oates, The Use of Standards and Prices for
Protection of the Environment, 73 SWEDISH J. ECON. 42, 43 (1971) (“[I]t is usually not easy to
obtain a reasonable estimate of the money value of this marginal damage.”).
82. See id. at 45 (noting that regulators set targets “so as to achieve specific acceptability
standards rather than attempting to base them on the unknown value of marginal net damages”).
83. See id. at 54 (discussing the results of fixing emissions at a certain quantity and what
occurs if the “emission is taxed at a fixed rate per unit” as opposed to the imposition of a ceiling
on emissions).
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Price

Figure 1: Negative-Externality Policy Market with Vertical Supply
Curve
Supply
(Constructed)

Demand

Q*

Quantity

Figure 1 illustrates supply and demand in a negative-externality
policy market with a fixed cap on allowances. The fixed cap means that
quantity will always remain at the amount of the cap (Q*) regardless
of the price. This creates a vertical supply curve at quantity Q*. The
shape of the demand curve therefore solely determines the price, and
changes in demand may result in dramatic changes in price.
Although understandable in light of the difficulties with
estimating the marginal social cost of pollution, the use of fixed
emissions caps is unfortunate. For example, in the event that emissions
are much less expensive to abate than originally assumed, or the harms
from pollution exposure are worse than originally assumed, an upwardsloped supply curve would result in fewer emissions and an
improvement in social welfare. With a fixed vertical supply curve,
however, emissions are unaffected unless the regulator changes the
cap, which can be burdensome on the regulator and creates uncertainty
for the regulated industry.
Economists Dallas Burtraw, Karen Palmer, and Danny Kahn have
proposed a policy for emission trading markets that bears some
resemblance to an upward-sloped supply curve.84 Their proposal calls
for adding a “symmetric safety valve,” a design feature that would
84. See Dallas Burtraw, Karen Palmer & Danny Kahn, A Symmetric Safety Valve, 38
ENERGY POL’Y 4921, 4921 (2010) (discussing “how to set policy in the presence of
uncertainty . . . where meaningful efforts to control emissions could prove much more costly than
prior regulatory efforts to limit emissions of air pollution, and where the costs and benefits of
controlling emissions of greenhouse gases are highly uncertain”).
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increase an emissions cap in the event that the price of emissions
allowances exceeded a specified ceiling price level and decrease the cap
in the event that the price of allowances fell below a specified floor
price level.85 They contend that the symmetric safety valve would
reduce price volatility by adjusting supply in response to dramatic
increases or decreases in price.86 Burtraw, Palmer, and Kahn’s proposal
essentially creates a three-step supply curve, with the supply of
allowances changing at the low-side safety valve price, the cap, and the
high-side safety valve price, but fixed—that is, vertical—in the intervals
between these points.87 Thus, their proposal resembles a very simple
sloped supply curve and provides support for investigating the
potential gains from implementing sloped supply curves in negativeexternality policy markets.88

Price

Figure 2: Negative-Externality Policy Market with Stepped
Supply Curve
Supply
(Constructed)

High-side
safety valve
Low-side
safety valve
Demand

Qf

Q*

Qc

Quantity

Figure 2 illustrates supply and demand in a negative-externality
policy market with a stepped demand curve along the lines of Burtraw,
Palmer, and Kahn’s proposed symmetric safety valve. The presence of

85. See id. at 4922 (describing the symmetric “safety valve” as “provid[ing] a floor as well as
a ceiling on the price of emission allowances”).
86. See id. at 4922, 4931 (“[T]his design does a better job of insuring against price volatility
than does a one-sided safety valve.”).
87. See id. at 4931 (“A symmetric safety valve is a price stabilization policy that works in the
case of unanticipated spikes or drops in allowance price.”).
88. See id. (showing graphs that show the potential gains from using a symmetric safety valve
as opposed to other safety valves).
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the safety valves means that quantity will remain at the amount of the
cap (Q*) as long as the price of allowances remains below the ceiling
price and above the floor price. At prices above the ceiling price,
quantity increases to Qc. At prices below the floor price, quantity
decreases to Qf. This creates a stepped supply curve with vertical
segments at quantities Qf, Q*, and Qc. As a result of the steps in the
supply curve, prices will be less volatile in response to changes in
demand than they would be with a vertical supply curve.
b. Constructed Demand in Positive-Externality Policy Markets
Positive-externality policy markets, such as renewable energy
credit markets89 and electricity capacity markets,90 require firms in the
regulated industry to acquire a good that gives little, if any, direct
private benefit to the acquirer but generate positive externalities for
others. The regulator creates the policy market to increase the total
magnitude of the positive externality or public good at minimum cost.
The policy market effectuates this goal by forcing firms to purchase a
good in the market that generates social benefit. The regulator initially
allocates demand for the product by assigning firms quotas of the good
in question.
Firms can then meet their quotas in one of two ways. First, as in
renewable energy credit markets, they can be assigned a quantity
quota, which they can meet through a combination of their own
production and purchases in the policy market. Second, as in electricity
capacity markets, firms can be assigned a revenue quota and then

89. Renewable energy credits are tradeable environmental commodities intended to
incentivize generation of electricity from renewable energy sources. See Michael Gillenwater,
Redefining RECs—Part 1: Untangling Attributes and Offsets, 36 ENERGY POL’Y 2109, 2109 (2008)
(“Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs) are one type of environmental commodity intended to
provide an economic incentive for electricity generation from renewable energy sources.”). A
renewable energy credit represents a megawatt of electricity generated from a renewable source.
See id. (discussing how RECs function and how REC marketplaces have been established in the
United States). Many states have adopted some form of renewable portfolio standards policy that
requires electricity providers to obtain a specified percentage of their electricity from renewable
energy, with renewable energy credits as one way to meet that obligation. See Lincoln L. Davies,
State Renewable Portfolio Standards: Is There a “Race” and Is It “To the Top”?, 3 SAN DIEGO J.
CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 3, 10–11 (2012) (“The RPS’s dominance as the preferred way to promote
renewable energy became clear only in the last decade. States, however, have used the RPS since
at least the early 1990s.”); Joshua P. Fershee, When Prayer Trumps Politics: The Politics and
Demographics of Renewable Portfolio Standards, 35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 53,
57–58 (2010) (“An RPS requires, subject to penalty, that covered electricity sellers procure a
specific amount of their energy from renewable sources, with those sources defined by the
applicable statute or regulation.”).
90. See infra Part IV.B. (discussing electricity capacity markets in-depth).
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required to pay that quota share of the revenues in an auction market
for the relevant good.91
In deciding on the total amount of the good that must be acquired
and then allocating the purchase quotas to the regulated industry, the
regulator is essentially creating the demand curve for the policy
market. In typical markets, the demand curve is simply a
representation of the buyer’s willingness to pay for different quantities
of the good.92 A buyer’s willingness to pay normally reflects the
marginal benefit to the buyer of acquiring the product.93 For a positiveexternality policy market, however, the buyer’s willingness to pay does
not derive from the buyer’s marginal private benefit from acquiring the
good. Rather, the buyer’s willingness to pay derives from its regulatory
mandate to purchase the good.94 The regulatory mandate, in turn,
should derive from the social benefit of the good—for example, the
benefit to society of adding more reliability to the electricity grid.
Ideally, the regulator should construct a demand curve that
represents the marginal social benefit of the good that is transacted in
the policy market.95 We would expect this marginal social benefit to
vary depending on the amount of the benefit—for example, grid
reliability may yield decreasing returns, and so the benefit from each
additional unit of grid reliability may decrease as the total amount of
reliability increases. This would yield a downward-sloping demand
curve, with higher values at lower quantities and lower values at higher
quantities.
Like negative-externality policy markets, most positive91. For example, assume that a particular electricity consumer is measured as having
contributed 0.1 percent of demand during the time period used to allocate the costs of a capacity
markets for a particular year. Also assume that the capacity market outcome was a price of
$150/MW (mega-watt)-day and a quantity of 10,000 MWs. This consumer would be required to
pay 0.001*$150/MW-day*365 days/year*10,000MW = $547,500 in that year for capacity charges.
92. See MANKIW, supra note 2, at 68 (showing a demand curve demonstrating this
connection between willingness to pay and price).
93. See David N. Hyman, Using Marginal Benefit Curves to Illustrate Income and
Substitution Effects, 21 J. ECON. EDUC. 383, 386 (1990) (“Each point on a demand curve gives the
marginal benefit of a given quantity at that price . . . .”). For example, John J. Donohue III,
Prohibiting Sex Discrimination in the Workplace: An Economic Perspective, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1337, 1346 (1989), examined the demand curve for female workers and noted that it “reflects the
marginal benefit from hiring additional female workers.”
94. See BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 48, and accompanying text (discussing emissions
trading programs as examples of policy markets where a regulator requires procurement of a
product).
95. See Peter Cramton, Axel Ockenfels & Steven Stoft, Capacity Market Fundamentals, 2
ECON. ENERGY & ENVTL. POL’Y, Sept. 2013, at 27, 28 (“[G]iven the demand-side flaws, fully
eliminating blackouts due to insufficient generation is unlikely to be optimal.”).
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externality policy markets appear to employ vertically downwardsloping demand curves. Renewable portfolio standards, the state
policies that create policy markets for renewable energy credits, adopt
fixed purchasing quotas in amounts that do not vary based on price.
Electricity providers are required to purchase renewable energy credits
or else be charged an alternative compliance payment.96 In that sense,
they create vertical demand curves, with firms required to purchase a
fixed number of credits at any price, up to the amount of the alternative
compliance payment. These requirements do often, however, increase
over time.97

Price

Figure 3: Positive-Externality Policy Market with Vertical
Demand Curve
Demand
(Constructed)
Supply

Q*

Quantity

Figure 3 illustrates supply and demand in a positive-externality
policy market with a fixed purchasing quota. The fixed quota means
that quantity will always remain at the amount of the quota (Q*)

96. See, e.g., N.J. ADMIN. CODE §§ 14:4-8.8(c), 14:8-2.3(e), -2.10 (2019) (requiring electricity
providers to generate or purchase renewable energy certificates or make an Alternative
Compliance Payment); Steven Ferrey et al., Fire and Ice: World Renewable Energy and Carbon
Control Mechanisms Confront Constitutional Barriers, 20 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 125, 152
(2010) (noting that in Rhode Island at the time of publication, “[a]n alternative compliance
payment of $50 per MWh in 2003 dollars can be made in lieu of meeting the portfolio standard”).
97. See, e.g., Ferrey et al., supra note 96, at 152 (“Rhode Island requires that 3% of the
electricity portfolio be renewable energy starting in 2007, rising to sixteen percent in 2020.”);
James W. Moeller, Of Credits and Quotas: Federal Tax Incentives for Renewable Resources, State
Renewable Portfolio Standards, and the Evolution of Proposals for A Federal Renewable Portfolio
Standard, 15 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 69, 98 (2004) (noting that Arizona’s renewable portfolio
standard will increase between 2002 and 2012).
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regardless of the price. This creates a vertical demand curve at quantity
Q*. The shape of the supply curve therefore solely determines the
price, and changes in supply may result in dramatic changes in price
because demand is constant at the quota quantity.
Scholars have identified several problems with these priceinsensitive quotas, including price volatility and increased investment
risks.98 Demand curves with slope and shape, however, add complexity
and costs to policy market design. Administering a sloped demand
curve can impose burdens on regulators and may create uncertainty for
the regulated industry, leaving firms chasing moving quotas that vary
based on market conditions.99
2. Product Differentiation
A textbook, perfectly competitive market requires that the
products offered for sale in the market are identical.100 This allows
sellers to compete purely on the basis of price. In reality, however, this
seldom holds true. Rather, product markets tend to be examples of
monopolistic competition, in which firms sell products that are similar
enough to be considered part of the same market but not identical in
every respect.101 We can, for example, conceive of a market for fastfood hamburgers, but not all hamburgers in that market will be
identical.102
Policy markets are typical in this regard. The products sold in a
policy market almost inevitably differ from each other. Although
product differentiation is not unique to policy markets, differentiation
poses a unique challenge to policy markets as compared with markets
that arise organically. For example, as we examine in more detail

98. See, e.g., FRANK A. FELDER & COLIN J. LOXLEY, THE IMPLICATIONS OF A VERTICAL
DEMAND CURVE IN SOLAR RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS 15 (2017) (criticizing fixed
renewable energy requirements that impose a vertical demand curve and advocating a downwardsloping demand curve that adjusts requirements based on market conditions); Javad Khazael,
Michael Coulon & Warren B. Powell, ADAPT: A Price-Stabilizing Compliance Policy for
Renewable Energy Certificates: The Case of SREC Markets, 65 OPERATIONS RES. 1429, 1430
(2017) (noting “artificial vertical demand curve[s] imposed by regulations” in renewable energy
credit markets that cause problems “such as an uncompetitive market, volatile prices, higher cost
of investment (due to higher risk), and difficult policy evaluation”).
99. See infra Part IV.B.3 (exploring the complexities of constructing demand in electricity
capacity markets).
100. See supra note 16 (describing perfectly competitive markets).
101. See MANKIW, supra note 2, at 330–31 (defining monopolistic competition as “a market
structure in which there are many firms selling products that are similar but not identical”).
102. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (employing hamburgers as an example of a
traditional market).
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below,103 pollutant emissions from one source may not have precisely
the same environmental consequences as the same amount of
emissions from another source.
In a typical market, buyers work out product differentiation
through their individual preferences. If the method of cooking a
hamburger or the cleanliness of the bathroom in a restaurant matter to
consumers, then consumers will factor those attributes into their
decisions about how much they are willing to pay for different
hamburger purchasing options. Each purchaser, moreover, is able to
adjust their preferences to the particular circumstances of the
transaction—for example, today they may want a grilled hamburger,
and tomorrow they may want a fried hamburger.
Consider, however, a policy market where buyers are required to
purchase products according to a regulatory mandate. In this case,
buyers generally will have no preferences regarding the attributes of
the product they are purchasing. They are only purchasing the product
to satisfy regulatory requirements, so their preferences are simply to
purchase a product that meets the requirements at the minimum price.
If some products are better than others, buyers will tend not to care.
Indeed, if a higher-quality product costs more, as we might expect it to,
then buyers will actually have a preference against it. Therefore, if
product differentiation is to affect purchasing decisions, regulators
have to create regulatory requirements that differentiate among
products in the market—for example, a requirement that emissions
allowances may only be traded within the same local area, so that
trading does not concentrate emissions from a region in a particular
area.104 These requirements, to be workable, generally must apply
categorically and cannot be created or adjusted on a case-by-case basis.
This creates a principal-agent problem in policy markets, as the
buyer in the policy market acts to meet its regulatory requirement at
the lowest possible cost, rather than advancing the goals of the policy
market. Apart from complying with the regulatory requirements, the
buyers in the policy market have no preference for advancing the goals
103. See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the nature of emissions from varying sources).
104. In many ways, this question of product differentiation is similar to the question of
market definition in antitrust. In antitrust, the decision-maker seeks to determine in what market
the relevant product(s) compete. A theoretical market is then determined, with location and type
specifications, in which products are assumed to be fungible. Gregory J. Werden, The History of
Antitrust Market Definition, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 123, 127–28 (1992). For example, Coca-Cola and
Pepsi are not identical products. In an antitrust matter involving soft drinks, however, the two
products are likely to be treated as fungible. FTC v. Coca-Cola Co., 641 F. Supp. 1128, 1132–34
(D.D.C. 1986).
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of the policy market with their individual purchasing decisions. This is
because the nature of a policy market is such that the product being
sold and purchased creates social benefit, but not direct private benefit
for the purchasers.105
There are likely to be many potentially relevant distinctions to be
drawn in a policy market. To ensure that the products transacted are
as close to equivalent as possible therefore requires imposing many
different requirements on transactions. A policy market generally
reduces costs most effectively. However, if the attributes of the product
being traded are undifferentiated, the market for that product has
essentially just two attributes: price and quantity. This maximizes the
size of the market, enhancing competition and the ability of
transactions to increase the well-being of participants in the market.
Trading migrates allowances from sources with low abatement costs to
sources with high abatement costs, reducing the total cost of
abatement.106 In the absence of constraints on trading, this migration
of allowances will occur without regard to the geographic location of
the sources or how much harm the emissions are causing.107 Thus, the
cost minimization benefits of market forces are harnessed most
effectively when the policy market is broad and unconstrained.108
The more requirements regulators impose to ensure equivalence,
the more complex the policy market becomes, and the less effectively
the policy market accomplishes its purpose of reducing costs. Creating
regulatory requirements that differentiate among products for
purposes of trading generally has the effect of segmenting the policy
market into smaller sub-markets.109 This hinders trading and reduces
105. But see Boyd & Salzman, supra note 50, at 90–94 (noting a market for “premium”
greenhouse gas credits that exceeds regulatory requirements, a phenomenon that the authors
attribute to the fact that governments, not private firms, are purchasing the credits).
106. See supra Part III.A (describing the effect of trading on emissions).
107. See Gabriel Chan et al., The SO2 Allowance Trading System and the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990: Reflections on Twenty Years of Policy Innovation 20–21 (Harvard Kennedy
Sch., RWP12-003, 2012) (noting that cap and trade “directs abatement to where it is least costly,
not necessarily to facilities causing the most geographic-specific damage”).
108. See id. at 21 (noting “something of a tension between geographically broad-based, capand-trade approaches and state and local authorities’ desires to limit emissions within a particular
area or from a particular set of sources”).
109. Some policy markets have been able to allow and facilitate transactions among
differentiated products in the market. An example is the market for emissions offsets in some
Clean Air Act programs, in which emissions from a new source must be offset by a greater
reduction in emissions from an existing source. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(e)(1) (2012) (“For
purposes of satisfying the offset requirements pursuant to this part, the ratio of total emission
reductions of VOCs to total increased emissions of such air pollutant shall be at least 1.5 to
1 . . . .”). This essentially differentiates between new emissions and existing emissions, deeming
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the number of sellers and buyers in each market, impeding competition
and impairing the ability of the markets to reduce compliance costs
through trading.110 Segmenting the market also creates conditions
susceptible to market power.111 Regulatory requirements also increase
the complexity and cost (both administrative and compliance) of the
policy market.112
Regulators therefore face a dilemma between acknowledging and
ignoring differentiation. Acknowledging differentiation more
accurately matches reality, but ignoring differentiation creates a policy
market that more effectively reduces cost. Among the most salient
differentiations among products in policy markets are type, location,
and time.113 We will examine each factor, considering them in the
context of the emissions market example in Part IV.A.
a. Type
Policy markets assume that the products traded in the market are
identical in type.114 If, for example, an emissions trading market for
nitrogen oxide emissions allows one source to sell an emissions
allowance to another source, the market is assuming that the nitrogen
oxide the seller would have emitted is equivalent to the nitrogen oxide
that the buyer will emit. That may be true with respect to some
products, but not necessarily for all products, as the case of air
pollutants illustrates.
Some air pollutants are actually categories of substances, and not

1.5 tons of new emissions equivalent to 1 ton of existing emissions. Both policymakers and
academics have considered the possibility of interpollutant markets, which can broaden markets
but also pose difficult challenges in market design. See 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(c) (2012) (directing EPA
to study interpollutant trading between sulfur dioxide emissions allowances and nitrogen oxides
emissions allowances); Juan-Pablo Montero, Multipollutant Markets, 32 RAND J. ECON. 762, 764
(2001); Carson Reeling, Cloé Garnache & Richard D. Horan, Efficiency Gains from Integrated
Multipollutant Trading, 52 RESOURCE & ENERGY ECON. 124, 125 (2018).
110. See MANKIW, supra note 2, at 348, 352 (describing how a smaller market can “hinder a
group of firms from maintaining the cooperative outcome”).
111. See, e.g., Rory Van Loo, Making Innovation More Competitive: The Case of Fintech, 65
UCLA L. REV. 232, 279 (2018) (noting that state-specific renewable energy standards “splinter[]
undifferentiated nationwide markets, and create[] new opportunities for energy companies to
exercise market power in smaller market segments”).
112. See ANDERSON & LIBECAP, supra note 7, at 23 (“[G]overnment regulation has many of
the same costs inherent to markets . . . . Regulatory costs cannot be ignored any more than
bargaining costs in markets can be.”).
113. See James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies & the Commodification of Environmental
Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 625 (2000) (“Nonfungibilities can arise across three dimensions—
space, type, and time . . . .”).
114. See id. at 629 (“Apples are traded for apples, not oranges.”).
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all substances within the category are identical. For example, the Clean
Air Act regulates two categories of particulate matter: PM10, which
includes particles with diameters of 10 micrometers and smaller, and
PM2.5, which includes particles with diameters of 2.5 micrometers and
smaller.115 As EPA acknowledges, each category encompasses a variety
of substances.116 A trade of one ton of PM10 emissions from one source
to another therefore may change the substances that are emitted, with
potential consequences for public health and the environment.117
Greenhouse gases provide another important example of a
category of pollutants regulated as a single pollutant.118 EPA and other
regulators use the concept of global warming potential to draw
equivalence between different individual pollutants that contribute to
climate change.119 This allows regulators to regulate a broad array of
greenhouse gases in terms of a single unit, CO2-equivalent.120 Global
warming potential factors take into account the persistence of the
substance in the atmosphere (“lifetime”), the potential conversion of
the substance into another greenhouse gas pollutant, and the amount
of energy the substance absorbs and re-emits while in the atmosphere
and (“radiative efficiency”).121
Similarly, if a state’s renewable portfolio standard gives the same
renewable energy credit for electricity generated from different
sources,122 it assumes that both are equivalent. In fact, however, the
115. See Particulate Matter (PM) Basics, EPA (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.epa.gov/pmpollution/particulate-matter-pm-basics.
116. See id. (“These particles come in many sizes and shapes and can be made up of hundreds
of different chemicals.”).
117. See also Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 113, at 629–30 (making a similar point regarding
volatile organic compounds).
118. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 1036.108 (2019) (noting that greenhouse gas emission standards for
new motor vehicles regulate “the aggregate group of six greenhouse gases: carbon dioxide, nitrous
oxide, methane, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride”).
119. See Understanding Global Warming Potentials, EPA (Feb. 14, 2017),
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/understanding-global-warming-potentials.
120. See, e.g., Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program: Addition of Global Warming Potentials,
79 Fed. Reg. 44,332, 44,335 (proposed July 31, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 98) (“GWPs
are used to convert tons of chemical into tons of CO2-equivalent (CO2e) for purposes of various
calculations and reporting under the rule.”).
121. Id.
122. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 19.285.030(21) (defining renewable resources fungible
under Washington’s Energy Independence Act as water; wind; solar; geothermal; landfill gas;
wave, ocean, or tidal power; gas from sewage treatment facilities; certain biodiesel fuels; and
biomass energy); Maryland Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard Program – Frequently Asked
Questions, MD. PUB. SERV. COMM’N, https://www.psc.state.md.us/electricity/marylandrenewable-energy-portfolio-standard-program-frequently-asked-questions (last visited Dec. 15,
2019) (noting that Maryland treats as fungible electricity generated from “Solar, Wind, Qualifying
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environmental effects of such electricity may vary considerably
between generation sources.123
b. Location
If a regulated source sells an emissions allowance to another
regulated source, the resulting overall amount of emissions does not
change. Unless the two sources are co-locational, however, the trade
changes the location of those emissions.124 If emissions do not readily
mix within the geographic area covered by the market, then changes in
location of emissions may matter to air quality.125 A trade may move
emissions to an area with different population density, so that more (or
fewer, depending on the difference) people are exposed to the
pollutant. Trading also can lead to a concentration of emissions in
particular areas within the overall market. This is known as the “hot
spot” problem.126 Whether this concentration has public health or
environmental consequences depends on the circumstances—how
close the two locations are, how readily emissions mix in the ambient
air between those locations, and what populations are exposed to air
pollution at the two locations.127
One way to address a “hot spot” problem is to segment the market
geographically, to reduce the extent to which trades can change the
location of emissions.128 The problem with this solution is that it
Biomass, Methane from a landfill or wastewater treatment plant, Geothermal, Ocean, Fuel Cell
that produces electricity from a Tier 1 source, Hydroelectric power plants of less than 30 MW
capacity, Poultry litter-to-energy, Waste-to-energy, and Refuse–derived fuel”).
123. See, e.g., A.K. Akella, R.P. Saini & M.P. Sharma, Social, Economical and Environmental
Impacts of Renewable Energy Systems, 34 RENEWABLE ENERGY 390, 392 tbl.2 (2009) (reporting
significantly differing life cycle pollutant emissions for, among other energy sources, solar, wind,
and geothermal).
124. See THOMAS H. TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 75–
106 (2d ed. 2006) for an in-depth analysis on the “spatial dimension” of emission credit trading.
125. See id. at 75–77 (describing the challenge that trading between different locations can
present to maintaining optimal levels of emissions at all monitoring sites).
126. See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 770 F.3d 1260, 1264–65 (9th
Cir. 2014) (describing how EPA addresses hotspot problems); TIETENBERG, supra note 124, at
86 (“Hot spots arise when emissions are geographically concentrated, causing unacceptable
ambient concentrations in that location.”). See generally Ann E. Carlson, The Clean Air Act’s
Blind Spot: Microclimates and Hotspot Pollution, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1036 (2018) (describing
hotspot problems under the Clean Air Act).
127. See TIETENBERG, supra note 124, at 86–88 (outlining the issues that emerge from the
uncontrolled transferring of permits from one location to another and the factors that contribute
to those issues).
128. See id. at 89 (noting the option of creating “a zoned emissions permit system,” in which
“the control region is divided up into a specific number of zones,” and “trading among zones is
prohibited”).
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decreases the effectiveness of the policy market by constraining
potential trades.129 Thus, locational restrictions present a tradeoff:
taking into account location better reflects the reality of air pollution
but undermines the advantages of creating the policy market.130 It also
might create a market power problem because the smaller the market,
the easier it generally is to exercise market power due to decreased
competition from other sellers.
c. Time
Emissions allowances are generally measured over a period of
time, often one year.131 As a result, any trades neglect differences in
time within the relevant period. An avoided emission during
November is treated as equivalent to an additional emission during
July. Yet emissions during November are not necessarily equivalent to
July emissions. Weather factors such as temperature, sunlight,
precipitation, and wind can affect the impact of emissions.132 Thus,
trading can cause temporal hot spots that concentrate emissions during
certain periods.133
The problem of temporal non-equivalence is exacerbated by
programs that allow banking—saving emissions allowances from one
period and using them in another.134 The rationale for banking is the
same as the overall rationale for trading. Banking is designed to reduce
costs by allowing trades across time.135 Essentially, banking is an
129. See id. at 90 (“The inability of sources to trade permits across zonal boundaries restricts
trading opportunities and reduces the potential for cost savings.”).
130. See id. (“To provide maximum protection against hot spots, the zones should be
relatively small. On the other hand, by restricting trading opportunities, small zones raise costs.”).
131. See id. at 108 (“In cap-and-trade systems, the allocated permits usually are dated with
the year of allocation. In systems without temporal flexibility, the permit can only be used during
that year.”).
132. See id. at 109 (explaining that “[s]ome emissions rates show a striking seasonal or daily
pattern” and that “[v]ariation in meteorological conditions is a second source of concentration
variation”).
133. Even without trading, regulatory systems can give rise to temporal hot spots by limiting
emissions per some period of time, allowing sources to allocate their emissions within a given
period. This is especially true if there are reasons common to regulated sources why they would
want to allocate their emissions temporally according to a certain pattern. See id. at 111–14
(examining possible “banking and borrowing” solutions for when “emissions timing also
matters”).
134. See ELLERMAN, JOSKOW & HARRISON, supra note 54, at 5–6 (describing banking as
“reducing emissions more than required in a given year and ‘banking’ the surplus for future
internal use or sale”).
135. See, e.g., Judith Chevallier, Joanne Etner & Pierre-Andres Jouvet, Bankable Emission
Permits under Uncertainty and Optimal Risk-Management Rules, 65 RES. ECON. 332, 333 (2011)
(examining how firms who engage in banking respond to increased risk over time).
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intrafirm temporal trade. For example, a firm may believe that in the
future it will undergo changes to make it hard for it to reduce emissions.
In such circumstances, it may reduce its emissions today in order to
meet its challenges in the future. In this way, the firm will reduce its
total cost of pollution abatement while keeping the amount it pollutes
constant. Yet, because banking limits the product differentiation across
time, it may pose the threat of creating a temporal hot spot. The extent
to which banking schemes are proper or improper is thus not clear.
Ultimately, two products in a policy market are seldom equivalent
in all relevant respects. Regulators are faced with a tradeoff between
emphasizing equivalence and emphasizing trading. To emphasize
equivalence, they can segment the market locationally, temporally, or
by product—or even require preapproval of trades to monitor for
equivalence.136 But imposing such requirements reduces and constrains
the market, creating an obstacle to trading and hindering the market
from providing the benefits for which it has been created.
3. Policy Judgments
Policy market design requires regulators to make numerous policy
judgments. These judgments include the goals of the program, the
scope of the program, and distributional issues. Policy judgments add
complexity to policy markets. As with product differentiation, these
judgments pose a dilemma for regulators, because taking account of
these concerns can reduce the internal efficiency of the policy market
by adding complexity.
a. Interplay Among Goals
Policy markets generally have a clear primary policy goal. An
emissions trading market, for example, aims to reduce the costs of
improving air quality by reducing air pollutant emissions.137 The task of
creating a policy market that effectively advances its policy goal is itself
a complex task, and Part III.B.2 examined several product
differentiation factors that complicate a policy market’s attempts to
accomplish its primary goal.
In addition to their primary policy goals, however, policy markets
also often aim to advance other secondary goals. The pursuit of these
other goals also complicates policy market design. Secondary goals
136. Cf. Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 113, at 670–73 (comparing categorical “wholesale
review” of transactions with individualized “retail review”).
137. See MANKIW, supra note 2, at 205–06 (describing the economic background behind
tradable pollution permits).
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vary. Regulators may wish to reduce the administrative burden of the
policy market on themselves.138 Regulators may want to prevent firms
in the policy market from exercising market power.139 Regulators also
may want to mitigate unemployment and other economic dislocation
that may result from the policy market.140 Balancing the primary goals
of the policy market with these secondary goals adds complexity to the
policy market, especially insofar as secondary goals lead regulators to
add design features to the policy market.
Another factor complicates the goals of a policy market. The
classic paradigm of the policy market assumes that the market is merely
a means of minimizing the costs of reaching an already determined
regulatory objective—in other words, that the goal of the market itself,
as opposed to the program of which the market is a component, is
merely to reduce compliance costs.141 In the emissions trading example,
the emissions trading market allows sources to reduce the costs of
complying with the overall cap on emissions. The existence of
emissions trading (the means), therefore, does not affect the emissions
138. See, e.g., Sam Napolitano et al., The U.S. Acid Rain Program: Key Insights from the
Design, Operation, and Assessment of a Cap-and-Trade Program, ELECTRICITY J., Aug./Sept.
2007, at 47, 51 (noting the advantage of policy design elements that reduced administrative costs
for the regulatory agency); Richard Schmalensee & Robert N. Stavins, Lessons Learned from
Three Decades of Experience with Cap and Trade, 11 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 59, 63 (2017)
(same).
139. See, e.g., Makoto Tanaka & Yihsu Chen, Market Power in Emissions Trading:
Strategically Manipulating Permit Price Through Fringe Firms, 96 APPLIED ENERGY 203, 210
(2012) (suggesting that initially allocating more emission permits to smaller “fringe” producers
could mitigate the abuse of market power in emission permit trading); Yihsu Chen, Makoto
Tanaka & Afzal S. Siddiqui, Market Power with Tradable Performance-Based CO2 Emission
Standards in the Electricity Sector, 39 ENERGY J. 121, 121 (2018) (examining the difference
between a state using a “performance-based” standard versus using a “mass-based” standard in
its emission permit program); Corina Haita, Endogenous Market Power in an Emissions Trading
Scheme with Auctioning, 37 RESOURCE & ENERGY ECON. 253, 253 (2014) (creating a model that
assesses the effect of market power in an emissions market on both an initial auction stage and
on the secondary market); Bodo Sturm, Market Power in Emissions Trading Markets Ruled by a
Multiple Unit Double Auction: Further Experimental Evidence, 40 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON.
467, 470 (2008) (studying whether a Double Auction is able to suppress market power).
140. See generally, e.g., MUSTAFA BABIKER & RICHARD S. ECKAUS, MIT JOINT PROGRAM
ON THE SCIENCE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL CHANGE, UNEMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF CLIMATE
POLICY (2006) (analyzing and discussing the effects of emissions reductions on employment);
Taran Fæhn, Antonio G. Gómez-Plana & Snorre Kverndokk, How Can Carbon Policies Impact
Unemployment?, 4 CARBON MGMT. 27 (2014) (studying the effect of emissions permits on
unemployment in Spain); Thomas Wagner, Environmental Policy and the Equilibrium Rate of
Unemployment, 49 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 132 (2005) (investigating “whether a low
equilibrium rate of unemployment and a high quality of the environment are complementary
policy goals or must be traded off”).
141. See Goffman, supra note 60, and accompanying text (explaining that markets are only a
tool for encouraging emissions reduction).
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cap (the ends). In reality, however, the two are not necessarily that
separate. Policy programs are created via political processes. One of
the key factors in political processes, either explicitly or implicitly, is
the cost that a new regulation will impose on the economy. A policy
market design that reduces compliance costs therefore may induce a
political bargain with a more stringent emissions cap, as the regulated
industry is less opposed to a target that is less expensive to achieve.142
This feedback loop complicates policy market design by turning what
might be a unidirectional relationship between the policy market and
its objective into a bidirectional relationship. In this bidirectional
relationship, the design of the policy market may alter the policy
objective that the market is designed to achieve.
Regulators also must deal with the interplay of their own goals
with the goals of other markets and other programs. Policy markets do
not operate in isolation from other markets and regulatory programs.
Indeed, policy markets are designed to correct market failures in other
markets—for example, the emissions trading market aims to correct
the problem of externalities in electricity and other product markets.
The relationships between policy markets and other markets
substantially complicates the design of policy markets. For example, an
emissions trading market operates on the assumption that the
participating firms are seeking to maximize their profits, for it is the
profit-maximizing incentive that leads firms to trade in the policy
market to reduce their compliance costs.143
However, in the energy sector—a common target of emissions
trading programs—many firms are subject to “rate of return”
regulation, by which the firms receive revenues as determined by a
public utility commission rather than as determined by a competitive
market.144 Public utility commissions generally approve revenue
requirements based on the costs incurred by the firms providing
electric utility service to the public. Firms operating within such a
142. By at least some accounts, this appears to have been true with respect to negotiations
regarding the Clean Air Act’s Acid Rain Program. See Chan et al., supra note 107, at 14 (“By
reducing the costs of regulation relative to conventional prescriptive approaches, cap and trade
made it politically feasible to reduce emissions more than might otherwise have been the case.”);
Goffman, supra note 60, at 180 (“It was the promise of cost savings through emissions trading that
persuaded the Bush administration to propose in its Clean Air legislation that the SO2 program
stipulate an annual reduction of 10 million tons.”).
143. See MANKIW, supra note 2, at 205–06 (“Those firms that can reduce pollution at a low
cost will sell whatever permits they get, and firms that can reduce pollution only at a high cost will
buy whatever permits they need.”).
144. See Alexander J. Black, Responsible Regulation: Incentive Rates for Natural Gas
Pipelines, 28 TULSA L.J. 349, 373–75 (1993) (explaining rate-of-return regulation).
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regulatory system may have little incentive to minimize their costs.145
This may limit their incentive to trade emissions allowances to reduce
their costs.146 Worse, the firms may avoid trading emissions allowances
because they are uncertain how the public utility commission will treat
the cost or revenue generated from trading.
The existence of multiple interacting goals and markets
complicates both the process and substance of policy market design.
Regulators must take into account additional interrelationships and
goals in creating a policy market, which complicates the process of
market design. Regulators also must decide whether to add elements
to the policy market targeted at accomplishing the additional goals,
which may complicate the policy market at the risk of degrading its
effectiveness in reducing costs.
b. Scope
Regulators must decide who will participate in the policy
market.147 To be comprehensive, a policy market should include the
entire category of firms that participate in the market failure. In an
emissions trading market, for example, this would mean including
every source of emissions of the air pollutant in question. Covering
every source, however, no matter its quantity of emissions, may
needlessly drive up the regulator’s costs of administering the policy
market and the regulated industry’s costs of compliance with little
resulting benefit. A regulator may reasonably decide to exempt sources
with small amounts of emissions so as to reduce the overall costs of the
program.148 Exempting small sources, however, requires relinquishing
some control over the total amount of emissions, which may reduce the
program’s effectiveness in accomplishing its environmental goal and

145. See Andrei Schliefer, A Theory of Yardstick Competition, 16 RAND J. ECON. 319, 319
(1985) (noting that under cost-of-service regulation, “the firm has no profit incentive to minimize
costs” because “the regulator adjusts the firm’s prices to equal the costs it incurs in providing
service to consumers”).
146. Cf. Robert N. Stavins, Vintage-Differentiated Environmental Regulation, 25 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 29, 58 (2006) (noting that “selective deregulation of electricity markets has
presumably rendered affected generators more sensitive to environmental compliance costs than
they were in a world of rate-of-return regulation”).
147. See ELLERMAN, JOSKOW & HARRISON, supra note 54, at 6 (noting the importance of
determining which emission sources are required or allowed to participate in the market).
148. Several Clean Air Act programs, for example, regulate only major sources of emissions.
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a) (2012) (requiring preconstruction permits for any new “major
emitting facility”); id. § 7502(c)(5) (requiring permits “for the construction and operation of new
or modified major stationary sources”); id. § 7661a(a) (requiring an operating permit for any,
inter alia, “major source”).
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give small, exempt sources a competitive advantage over larger, nonexempt sources.
c. Distributional Issues
Regulators have a variety of options for allocating requirements
across sources, the most commonly cited being to distribute allowances
for free or to auction them off.149 Allocations are politically contentious
for regulators because they are granting valuable rights and costly
obligations.150 Once the initial cap is set, allocation becomes a zero-sum
game. Auctions are unpopular with the regulated industry because
they increase costs.151 When regulators have allocated allowances
based on historical data, they have used a variety of different bases on
which to make allocations, including production inputs, production
outputs, and emissions.152 The decision regarding how to allocate
allowances adds further complexity to the policy market design
process. Once a regulator has decided how to allocate allowances, the
implementation of that decision itself also adds complexity to the
policy market.
d. Responsiveness to New Information
The success of a policy market depends in significant part on the
ability of the regulated industry to make investment decisions based on
future conditions. Stable policy markets with predictable future
conditions create simplicity that increases the efficiency of the policy
market.153 But the stability of simplicity has its downside as well.
Regulators initially create policy markets based on assumptions that
experience or additional information may show to be inaccurate. For
149. See, e.g., TIETENBERG, supra note 26, at 128 (identifying grandfathering and auctions as
the two initial allocation methods “of most importance”).
150. See, e.g., Bruce R. Huber, How Did RGGI Do It? Political Economy and Emissions
Auctions, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q. 59, 84–85 (2013) (examining the history of the Regional Greenhouse
Gas Initiative (“RGGI”) and how the Working Group in charge of designing the RGGI worked
through the “question of whether allowances would be sold, given away, or, most likely, some
combination of the two”).
151. See id. at 80–81 (noting that industry “can be expected in general to oppose auctioning,
for it adds regulatory and competitive uncertainty to their business environment, increases their
costs of doing business and on the margin reduces demand for the [products] they provide”).
152. ELLERMAN, JOSKOW & HARRISON, supra note 54, at 39 (“The metric used in the
grandfathering formulas has also varied considerably, from inputs, to output, to emissions.”).
153. See Chan et al., supra note 107, at 9 (“A regulatory instrument that offers a predictable
compliance regime and greater cost certainty will usually enable companies to take advantage of
longer-term investments that may reduce costs over time.”); Richard Schmalensee & Robert N.
Stavins, The SO2 Allowance Trading System: The Ironic History of a Grand Policy Experiment, 27
J. ECON. PERSP. 103, 117 (2013) (noting that “policy stability encourages efficient investment”).
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example, an unforeseen technological innovation may reduce the costs
of reducing emissions or the health benefits of reducing exposure to a
pollutant may be greater than originally estimated.154 To take
advantage of developing knowledge and technology, the policy market
must be designed to be flexible and adaptable to changing conditions.155
The complexity dilemma manifests itself here as a choice between
simple fixed conditions, which add predictability and facilitate
investment, and more complex flexible conditions that allow the policy
market to adapt to new information and conditions.156
***
Regulators designing policy markets face policy judgments that
complicate both the process of creating a policy market and the
substantive design of the market. Regulators must consider the
interplay among different policy goals, regulatory programs, and
markets; the scope of the policy market; distributional issues; and how
to respond to new information. Policy market design requires
regulators to make numerous policy judgments. Like other policy
design issues, these elements pose the complexity dilemma to
regulators: either complicate the market to reflect these concerns and
generate more benefits or ignore or oversimplify these concerns to
keep the market simple and reduce program and compliance costs.157

154. See Winston Harrington, Richard D. Morgenstern & Peter Nelson, On the Accuracy of
Regulatory Cost Estimates, 19 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 297, 313 (2000) (stating that
“estimation errors come not only from an understandable failure to anticipate technological
change, but from equally understandable errors in characterizing the universe of firms or agents
likely to be affected by the regulation, as well as the cost and effectiveness of the compliance
technologies employed”).
155. See Schmalensee & Stavins, supra note 153, at 117 (noting that “it can be important for
policies to be flexible and responsive to changes in knowledge and technology”).
156. See Chan et al., supra note 107, at 10 (“Tension exists between providing regulatory
certainty over long periods of time (which is desirable from the standpoint of reducing costs) and
allowing for flexibility to adjust program goals (which may be desirable from the standpoint of
maximizing net program benefits over time).”).
157. Commentators often compare policy markets to Pigouvian taxes and subsidies. E.g.,
Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address Climate Change, 32
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293, 348–53 (2008); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann,
Combating Global Climate Change: Why A Carbon Tax Is A Better Response to Global Warming
Than Cap and Trade, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 37–50 (2009). Such a comparison is beyond the
scope of this Article. That said, we note that Pigouvian taxes and subsidies do not avoid the
complexity dilemma. When factors such as location and type matter, a Pigouvian tax faces the
same complexity dilemma as policy markets—either differentiate to match reality and generate
more program benefits, or keep the policy simple to reduce compliance costs. See, e.g., NICK
HANLEY, JASON SHOGREN & BEN WHITE, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 115–20 (1997) (explaining that to maximize the benefits of an air pollutant emissions
tax for a “non-uniformly mixed pollutant”—that is, a pollutant for which location of emission
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IV. POLICY MARKET CASE STUDIES
Part IV examines two case studies of policy markets that illustrate
the complexity dilemma. Part IV.A looks at one of the better-known
examples of a policy market—emissions trading markets established
under the Clean Air Act. The Clean Air Act emissions trading
programs and, in particular, the Acid Rain Program and Interstate Air
Pollution Program, are examples of negative-externality policy
markets; they use trading to reduce the burdens of complying with air
pollutant emissions limits. Part IV.B takes on the more daunting
example of electricity capacity markets, which may be the most
complex policy markets in existence. Capacity markets are examples of
positive-externality policy markets; they use trading to reduce the
burdens of complying with requirements that electricity distribution
companies purchase electricity capacity so as to support the overall
reliability of the electricity grid.158 Both the Clean Air Act markets and
electricity capacity markets have become increasingly complex over
time as they have faced greater pressure to reflect the complicated
context in which they operate.
A. Clean Air Act Emissions Trading Markets
1. Acid Rain Program
In the 1980s, scientific and public concern arose regarding the
problem of acid rain.159 The popular term acid rain refers to the
scientific problem of acidic deposition, in which pollution, caused
primarily by sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions from burning
fossil fuels, falls to the ground as gases, aerosols, and particles or
through precipitation as rain, fog, or snow.160 This acidic deposition

matters—would require “a perfectly differentiated tax system” in which every source faced “a
unique tax rate” reflecting its location).
158. See supra Part III.B.1.b. for a discussion on positive-externality policy markets.
159. E.g., Philip H. Abelson, Acid Rain, 221 SCIENCE 115, 115 (1983); Acid Rain Assailed in
New Hampshire, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1983, at A20; Ronald Kotulak, ‘Acid Rain’ Means a Dead
Lake, ‘Acid Rain’ Means Pollution, THE DAY (New London, Conn.), Apr. 4, 1982, at D4; Tapped
Out: Vermont’s Poor Maple Sap Harvest Linked to Acid Rain (NBC News television broadcast
Apr. 18, 1987); Philip Shabecoff, Scientists Give E.P.A. Chief Varying Views on Acid Rain
Problem, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1983, at A10.
160. See Acid Rain Program: Permits, Allowance System, Continuous Emissions Monitoring,
and Excess Emissions, 56 Fed. Reg. 63,002, 63,004 (proposed Dec. 3, 1991) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 72, 73, 75 & 77) (“Acid rain is the accepted term which encompasses a complex set of
phenomena that begins with fossil fuel emissions, includes the transport and transformation of
those emissions through the atmosphere, and ends with the effects of those emissions and their
resulting transformation products on the environment.”); Acid Rain Provisions, 56 Fed. Reg.
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disrupts ecological systems—for example, by killing fish, wildlife,
plants, and trees—and damages human-made materials, such as
buildings and statues.161
When Congress amended the Clean Air Act in 1990, it created a
regulatory program to address acid rain by reducing emissions of sulfur
dioxide and nitrogen oxide from power plants operated by electric
utilities.162 The Clean Air Act’s Acid Rain Program actually entails two
programs: a cap-and-trade system for sulfur dioxide emissions163 and a
more traditional set of emissions limitations (without trading) for
nitrogen oxide emissions.164 We focus here, as do most descriptions and
analyses of the Acid Rain Program, on the market-based sulfur dioxide
program.
The Acid Rain Program covers virtually every coal-fired power
plant in the continental United States.165 The Program set a fixed cap
on the total amount of sulfur dioxide emissions from such plants.166 The
amount of the cap was set by political negotiation amongst members of
10,427, 10,428 (Mar. 12, 1991) (“Acid rain occurs when sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emission
are transformed in the atmosphere and return to earth in rain, fog or snow.”).
161. See Acid Rain Provisions, 56 Fed. Reg. at 10,428 (“Acid rain damages lakes, harms
forests and buildings, contributes to reduced visibility, and is suspected of damaging health.”).
162. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651–7651o (2012); see also Chan et al., supra note 107, at 3–4 (describing
the origins of the Acid Rain Program); Richard Conniff, The Political History of Cap and Trade,
SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Aug. 2009), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/the-politicalhistory-of-cap-and-trade-34711212 (same). Power plants were responsible for a majority (but not
nearly all) of sulfur and nitrogen oxide emissions. See Acid Rain Program: Permits, Allowance
System, Continuous Emissions Monitoring, and Excess Emissions, 56 Fed. Reg. at 63,004 (“Of
the approximately 23 million tons of SO2 and 19 million tons of NOx emitted annually from all
sources in the United States in 1985, about 16 million tons of SO2 and 7 million tons of NOx were
emitted by electric utilities.”).
163. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651b–7651e.
164. Id. § 7651f.
165. The Program proceeded in two phases. Acid Rain Program: Permits, Allowance System,
Continuous Emissions Monitoring, and Excess Emissions, 56 Fed. Reg. at 63,004. The first phase,
from 1995 to 1999, included 110 of the largest coal-fired power plants located in 21 eastern and
midwestern states. 42 U.S.C. § 7651c(e). The second phase, which began in 2000, expanded the
Program to most coal-, oil-, and gas-fired power plants in the lower 48 states. Id. § 7651d. EPA’s
regulations under the Program exempt power plants with only de minimis sulfur dioxide emissions
because they operate only a few hours per year, during periods of peak electricity demand. See
Acid Rain Program: General Provisions and Permits, Allowance System, Continuous Emissions
Monitoring, Excess Emissions and Administrative Appeals, 58 Fed. Reg. 3590, 3594 (January 11,
1993) (Final Rule) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 72, 73, 75, 77, & 78) (noting that most new
units under 25 MWe will likely be peaking plants).
166. See 42 U.S.C. § 7651(b) (noting that the Program would force “reductions in annual
emissions of sulfur dioxide of ten million tons from 1980 emission levels”); Acid Rain Program:
Permits, Allowance System, Continuous Emissions Monitoring, and Excess Emissions, 56 Fed.
Reg. at 63,004 (“As a result, total annual SO2 emissions will be reduced by 10 million tons below
1980 levels.”).
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Congress, the White House, EPA, and industry and environmental
groups, rather than as the direct result of a health-based or cost-benefit
analysis.167 Indeed, by some accounts the Program’s cap was chosen
because the amount of the emissions reduction was a double-digit
number (ten million tons) and the reduction was about 50% of existing
emissions, both of which sounded significant.168
The Acid Rain Program allocated emissions allowances to power
plants based on their historic emissions and allowed plants to trade
allowances amongst themselves and to bank allowances to use in future
years.169 Each plant can only emit as much sulfur dioxide as it holds
allowances.170 The total amount of allowances across all plants equals
the Program’s total cap on sulfur dioxide emissions. To facilitate
compliance, compliance monitoring, and enforcement, the Program
requires plants to install and operate a continuous emissions
167. See Chan et al., supra note 107, at 13, 15 (noting that “the SO2 emissions cap was not
determined by formal benefit-cost analysis” but instead “in a somewhat ad hoc manner”);
Schmalensee & Stavins, supra note 153, at 105 (noting that the cap was chosen at “a level of
abatement that was possible at relatively low costs” but “big enough to gain the support of the
environmental community and to be seen as satisfying a campaign pledge of newly elected
President George H.W. Bush”); Conniff, supra note 162 (describing political negotiations that led
President George H.W. Bush to decide on a cap that represented an emissions reduction of 10
million tons).
168. See Chan et al., supra note 107, at 14 (“This ten-million-ton option presented marketing
opportunities: It was a double-digit number, and it represented a 50 percent reduction in
emissions, both of which signified that [President George H.W.] Bush was serious about pollution
reductions.”); Conniff, supra note 162 (noting the appeal of a reduction “in double digits” and
that “[t]en million tons just sounded better” than less aggressive proposals); see also Chan et al.,
supra note 107, at 27 (noting that President Bush, during his campaign, had “explicitly
promis[ed] . . . to cut acid rain by half”); Goffman, supra note 60, at 181 (“The 10 million ton
target was much closer to the reduction level first suggested by the National Academy of Sciences
as that required to curb acid deposition.”).
169. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651b(a)–(b), 7651c(e); see also Acid Rain Program: General Provisions
and Permits, Allowance System, Continuous Emissions Monitoring, Excess Emissions and
Administrative Appeals, 58 Fed. Reg. at 3590 (“Existing utility sources are allocated allowances
based on their historic fuel use and the emissions limitations specified in the Act. Utility units are
required to limit SO2 emissions to the number of allowances they hold, but since allowances are
fully transferrable, utilities may meet their emissions control requirements in the most costeffective manner possible.”). But see Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, The Political
Economy of Market-Based Environmental Policy: The U.S. Acid Rain Program, 41 J.L. & ECON.
37, 52, 56–58 (1998) (characterizing the claim that allowances were allocated based on historic
emissions as “only approximately correct” and concluding that the allocation was influenced by
interest-group politics); JUHA SIIKAMÄKI ET AL., RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, THE U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY’S ACID RAIN PROGRAM 2 (2012) (noting that EPA
allocated additional allowances to facilities that installed certain pollution control equipment, in
an attempt to protect high-sulfur coal from the eastern United States). Each allowance authorizes
a plant “to emit, during or after a specified calendar year, one ton of sulfur dioxide.” 42 U.S.C. §
7651a(3).
170. 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(g).
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monitoring system so that the plant owners and regulators can compare
a plant’s actual emissions to its regulatory limits.171
The idea of cap and trade was novel when the Acid Rain Program
was enacted in 1990.172 The Program created the first large-scale, longterm tradeable emissions markets.173 By contrast, conventional
environmental regulation, often labeled pejoratively as “command and
control,” dictates either emissions limits or specific technological
controls for each emissions source, with relatively few opportunities for
flexibility.174 Economists grimace at such regulations because their
uniformity and rigidity precludes emissions sources from reallocating
emissions in ways that can reduce compliance costs without increasing
emissions.175
The Acid Rain Program’s cap-and-trade system for sulfur dioxide
emissions is widely regarded as highly successful by several different
measures.176 The system reduced sulfur dioxide emissions dramatically
and more quickly than expected.177 Compliance was nearly universal.178

171. Id. § 7651k.
172. See Goffman, supra note 60, at 184 (describing the Acid Rain Program as “creating a
new paradigm for pollution policy”); Schmalensee & Stavins, supra note 153, at 103 (describing
the Acid Rain Program’s cap-and-trade approach as “quite novel”); see also Conniff, supra note
162 (describing advocates for cap-and-trade as “a strange alliance of free-market Republicans and
renegade environmentalists”).
173. See Chan et al., supra note 107, at 3 (“The SO2 allowance-trading program . . . was the
world’s first large-scale pollutant cap-and-trade system.”); Schmalensee & Stavins, supra note
153, at 117 (describing the Acid Rain Program as “the world’s first large-scale market-based
environmental initiative”). EPA had implemented smaller-scale market-based regulatory systems
in the 1970s and 1980s, including the nonattainment offsets program and a program phasing out
leaded gasoline. See Chan et al., supra note 107, at 29 (noting that academic works advocating
market-based regulation “eventually led EPA to experiment with small-scale emissions-credittrading systems in the 1970s and 1980s, including most importantly the phase out of leaded
gasoline in vehicle fuel in the mid-1980s”).
174. Chan et al., supra note 107, at 4; Joskow & Schmalensee, supra note 169, at 41.
175. See Chan et al., supra note 107, at 4 (“Such requirements are relatively inflexible,
imposing the same abatement path upon a range of heterogeneous facilities and ignoring the fact
that the costs of compliance might vary widely across individual facilities depending on the age,
technology characteristics, operating conditions, and quality of fuel used.”); see also supra Part
III.A (explaining the benefits of emissions trading).
176. E.g., Chan et al., supra note 107, at 1; Schmalensee & Stavins, supra note 153, at 106;
KATE C. SHOUSE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45299, THE CLEAN AIR ACT’S GOOD NEIGHBOR
PROVISION: OVERVIEW OF INTERSTATE AIR POLLUTION CONTROL 12 (2018); SIIKAMÄKI ET
AL., supra note 169, at 1.
177. See Chan et al., supra note 107, at 15 (noting that the program “delivered emissions
reductions more quickly than expected”); Schmalensee & Stavins, supra note 153, at 106 (same).
178. See Schmalensee & Stavins, supra note 153, at 106 (noting “compliance was nearly 100
percent”); SIIKAMÄKI ET AL., supra note 169, at 3 (noting that under the Program, “regulated
power plants achieved a nearly perfect compliance record”).
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Compliance costs were substantially less than alternative policy designs
and also less than predicted.179 The benefits of the system have far
outweighed its costs.180 High trading volume demonstrates the market’s
effectiveness in reallocating allowances to reduce compliance costs.181
Power plants also used banking to reduce their costs.182 Anticipating
more stringent emissions caps in future years, power plants reduced
their emissions more than required in early years of the Program to
save allowances to use in future years, when emissions caps became
more stringent.183
The Acid Rain Program emphasized simplicity in its market
design.184 The Program included a nationally standardized permitting
program so that allowances would be fungible.185 The Program also
allowed EPA to auction some of the allowances and to publicly report
the results of the auction, including prices, thereby providing vital price
information to the market.186 This increased transparency in the
market, reducing transaction costs for allowance trading and
facilitating the development of the market.187 Although Congress left

179. See Chan et al., supra note 107, at 5 (“In addition to being less costly than traditional
command-and-control policies would have been, the program’s costs were significantly below
estimates generated by government and industry analysts in the debate leading up to the passage
of the CAAA.”); ELLERMAN, JOSKOW & HARRISON, supra note 54, at 16 (reporting cost savings
of $20 billion through emissions trading under the Acid Rain Program over a period of thirteen
years); Schmalensee & Stavins, supra note 153, at 107 (noting that compliance costs “were
significantly less than they would have been with a command-and-control regulatory approach”);
SIIKAMÄKI ET AL., supra note 169, at 4 (“Generally, the actual cost of the [Acid Rain Program]
has been lower than that estimated by studies.”).
180. See Lauraine G. Chestnut & David M. Mills, A Fresh Look at the Benefits and Costs of
the U.S. Acid Rain Program, 77 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 252, 265 (2005) (reporting results of an analysis
that showed “benefits exceed costs by two orders of magnitude”).
181. See SIIKAMÄKI ET AL., supra note 169, at 4 (noting “market efficiency . . . as indicated
by high volumes of trade between economically unrelated entities”).
182. See id. (“Regulated power plants also heavily relied on banking allowances to reduce
costs.”).
183. See id. at 4–5 (“In preparation for Phase II, regulated power plants essentially
overachieved reductions in Phase I and banked the associated unused allowances for Phase II.”).
184. See Acid Rain Program: Permits, Allowance System, Continuous Emissions Monitoring,
and Excess Emissions, 56 Fed. Reg. 63,002, 63,006 (proposed Dec. 3, 1991) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 72, 73, 75 & 77) (“EPA’s goal is to structure simple, flexible and predictable Acid Rain
permit program requirements that will promote [an active allowance trading market and
compliance cost minimization].”).
185. See 42 U.S.C. § 7651g (2012) (establishing the permit program); Acid Rain Program:
Permits, Allowance System, Continuous Emissions Monitoring, and Excess Emissions, 56 Fed.
Reg. at 63,006 (noting that the regulations would “establish nationally standardized permitting”).
186. See 42 U.S.C. § 7651o (regarding “contingency guarantee, auctions, [and] reserve”).
187. See Chan et al., supra note 107, at 9 (noting that the auctions “allowed firms to forecast
allowance prices more accurately”); ELLERMAN, JOSKOW & HARRISON, supra note 54, at 14
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open the possibility of an interpollutant trading market in the future, it
limited the market to a single pollutant: sulfur dioxide.188 The Program
limited its scope to a single industry—electric power plants.189
More important, the Acid Rain Program created a nationwide
allowance trading market that ignored locational differences among
emissions.190 As explained previously,191 trading most effectively
reduces compliance costs when such trading is unconstrained and the
policy market has many sellers and buyers. A nationwide market for
sulfur dioxide emissions therefore maximized the opportunities for
trades to reduce costs.
At the time the Program was created, ignoring location appeared
to be consistent with the reality of the acid rain problem. The original
purpose of the Acid Rain Program was to mitigate the ecological
impacts of acid deposition.192 It was thought that the total amount of
acid deposition, rather than the specific location of the emissions, was
the primary driver of ecological damage.193 Thus, there was some
justification for Congress to create an emissions trading program that
did not impose locational constraints.
Over time, however, scientific understanding of the impacts of
sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions advanced. Epidemiological
research determined that sulfur dioxide emissions, which are
precursors to the formation of fine particulate matter in the ambient
air, have significant public health impacts, in addition to contributing
(noting that the auctions “provided a transparent mechanism to reveal prices, which was very
important in the early years when few private transactions were being reported”).
188. See 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(c) (directing EPA to study interpollutant trading between sulfur
dioxide emissions allowances and nitrogen oxides emissions allowances).
189. Electric power generators are responsible for about two-thirds of the sulfur dioxide in
the atmosphere. What Is Acid Rain?, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/acidrain/what-acid-rain (last
visited Nov. 3, 2019). Other significant emission sources that are not part of the Acid Rain
Program include the vehicles and heavy equipment, manufacturing, oil refineries and other
industries.
190. See Schmalensee & Stavins, supra note 153, at 108 (“Although it was clear at the time
the program was enacted that emissions from different plants had different impacts, the Title IV
emissions trading scheme ignored this fact.”).
191. See supra notes 106–108 and accompanying text (discussing the efficiency benefits of
widely tradeable permits).
192. See 42 U.S.C. § 7651(b) (“The purpose of this subchapter is to reduce the adverse effects
of acid deposition . . . .”); Schmalensee & Stavins, supra note 153, at 109 (“The central purpose of
the SO2 allowance trading program was to reduce the acidification of forest and aquatic
ecosystems by cutting precursor SO2 emissions, primarily in the northeastern United States.”)
(internal citation omitted).
193. See Goffman, supra note 60, at 188 (“Since it is the total accumulation of acid deposition
that principally determines its effect on the environment, . . . Congress concluded that it was
acceptable to allow emissions trading to occur without restrictions.”).
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to the acid rain problem.194 Moreover, the public health impacts of
pollutant emissions depend significantly on the location of the
emissions. Recognition of the adverse health impacts of sulfur dioxide
emissions led to development of more stringent regulatory programs
under other Clean Air Act provisions, essentially displacing the Acid
Rain Program.195 As explained in the next section, these new regulatory
programs paid more attention to the location of emissions.196 By
imposing location-based constraints on emissions trading, the new
rules increased protection of air quality and the public health, but with
the inevitable downside of increasing compliance costs.197
The Acid Rain Program also emphasized policy stability and
consistency over flexibility. For example, Congress legislated a fixed
cap on emissions.198 The fixed cap created predictability that made it
easier for firms to anticipate allowance prices, which in turn helped
them to decide whether to abate their emissions or to purchase or hold
allowances. However, with policy stability came inflexibility, which
hampered the Program’s ability to improve in response to new
information about costs and benefits of emissions control.199 This
rigidity in the Acid Rain Program ultimately prevented changes that
would have made the program even more effective in reducing
emissions.200

194. See Schmalensee & Stavins, supra note 153, at 109 (“Epidemiological evidence of the
harmful human health effects of these fine particulates mounted rapidly in the decade after the
CAAA was enacted.”) (citation omitted).
195. See RON CHAN ET AL., THE IMPACT OF TRADING ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF THE
ACID RAIN PROGRAM 181 (2018) (“Once the health benefits of Title IV were recognized, the
ARP was replaced by more stringent regulations.”) (citations omitted).
196. See SIIKAMÄKI ET AL., supra note 169, at 6–7 (noting that the Cross-State Rule
“introduces a new compliance instrument that can be traded; however, it limits the amount of
interstate trading or allowance banking that can occur”).
197. See Chan et al., supra note 107, at 23 (noting that interstate air pollution rules “will
reduce cost-effectiveness in favor of what is intended to be a more equitable distribution of
benefits across geographical regions”).
198. See id. at 9 (noting that the Program used a fixed emissions cap instead of allowing
adjustments).
199. See id. at 10 (“[T]he 1990 Amendments may have leaned too heavily towards providing
certainty at the cost of allowing for flexibility to adjust the policy as understanding of both science
and markets improved.”); Schmalensee & Stavins, supra note 153, at 117 (“It can be argued that
the SO2 cap-and-trade system provided valuable stability, but the legislation also made it
impossible to make what would have been responsive, effective, and efficient changes in the
policy.”).
200. See Chan et al., supra note 107, at 9 (“Instead of legislating a fixed cap on emissions in
years well beyond the planning horizon of decision makers at the beginning of the program, the
1990 Amendments could have given EPA authority to adjust the SO2 cap in future years as the
science evolved and as better information on real-world control costs became available.”);
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Despite its success in reducing compliance costs, there is some
indication that the Acid Rain Program could have been even more
effective but for the unfortunate and unintentional effects of programs
under the auspices of energy regulators. The cost-reducing incentives
of policy markets derive from efforts by firms to maximize their profits
by reducing their costs of compliance.201 Many sources of sulfur dioxide
emissions were electricity generators subject to rate-of-return
regulation,202 which provides much weaker cost-reduction incentives
than competitive markets do.203 This reduces the incentive for plants to
engage in trading.204 In addition, utilities were uncertain whether their
state regulators would allow them to pass on the costs of allowances to
their customers, which may have discouraged power plants from
pursuing advantageous trades in the market.205 Furthermore, utility
transactions often had to be approved by a regulatory body, which
increased the transaction costs of such trades.206 All of these factors
limited the gains from the Acid Rain Program.
While the Acid Rain Program had its complications, it was simple
compared to its successors. By creating a nationwide market of
virtually all power plants in the United States, with highly inclusive
definitions of allowances that did not discriminate by product type
(lumping together all sulfur dioxide emissions), time (allowing
banking), and location (not differentiating by location), the Program
maximized the size of its market and therefore the opportunities for
cost-reducing transactions. The Interstate Air Pollution Program that
has effectively succeeded the Acid Rain Program, by contrast, is much
more complex, with many more constraints on trading. The transition
away from the simplicity of the Acid Rain Program to the complexity
Schmalensee & Stavins, supra note 153, at 117 (“Thus it can be important for policies to be flexible
and responsive to changes in knowledge and technology.”).
201. See supra notes 141–142 and accompanying text (discussing the incentives created by
policy markets).
202. See Black, supra note 144, at 349 (1993) (“But despite alleged defects, rate-of-return
regulation remains the predominant means of exerting regulatory control over costs and
preventing the abuse of monopoly power in North America.”).
203. See id. at 373–75 (1993) (explaining rate-of-return regulation).
204. See ELLERSON, JOSKOW & HARRISON, supra note 54, at 17–18 (“The fact that initially
the emissions sources were primarily regulated utilities may have reduced incentives to trade and
slowed the development of efficient markets.”).
205. See Chan et al., supra note 107, at 8 (“Some [utilities] faced uncertainty over whether
state regulators would approve the inclusion of costs incurred to purchase emissions allowances,
in those states that allowed costs to be recovered from electric ratepayers.”).
206. See Don Fullerton, Shaun P. McDermott & Jonathan P. Caulkins, Sulfur Dioxide
Compliance of a Regulated Utility, 34 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGT. 32, 32–33 (1997) (discussing utility
regulation by state commissions).
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of the Interstate Air Pollution Program can be considered a version of
Paradise Lost, even if—like the original—the transition may have been
unavoidable.207
2. Interstate Air Pollution
Unfortunately, the problem of air pollution does not always
provide conditions that conveniently conform to a simple,
geographically confined emission trading market. Air pollutants
emitted in one state can be carried hundreds of miles, affecting air
quality in other, downwind states. Thus, improving ambient air quality
in an area may require regulating emissions in another area, perhaps
even in another state. Consequently, many programs to regulate air
pollution are constrained by location—that is, they limit emissions
within a particular geographic area in order to improve air quality
within that area.208
To address interstate air pollution, the so-called Good Neighbor
Provision of Clean Air Act § 110 requires states to prohibit emissions
within the state that would cause air quality problems in another
state.209 EPA’s Cross-State Air Pollution Rule, also known as the
Transport Rule, creates a program for implementing this
requirement.210 The Transport Rule limits emissions of sulfur dioxide

207. See generally JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST (1667).
208. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7503(a)(1)(A) (requiring new sources of air pollutant emissions in
areas that already violate ambient air quality standards to obtain offsetting emissions reductions
from existing sources in the area, such that air quality improves despite the addition of a new
source of emissions).
209. See id. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i). More specifically, the provision requires states to
“prohibit[], . . . any source or other type of emissions activity within the State from emitting any
air pollutant in amounts which will . . . contribute significantly to nonattainment in, or interfere
with maintenance by, any other State with respect to any such national primary or secondary
ambient air quality standard.” Id.
210. See Federal Implementation Plans to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate
Matter and Ozone, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208, 48,209 (Aug. 8, 2011) (codified in 40 C.F.R. pts. 51 et al.).
Prior to the Transport Rule, EPA addressed the Good Neighbor Provision in two different rules
aimed at reducing interstate air pollution. In 1998, EPA issued a rule requiring twenty-two states
and the District of Columbia to reduce nitrogen oxide emissions in order to reduce ozone
pollution in downwind states (nitrogen oxides form ozone in the air). See Finding of Significant
Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the Ozone Transport Assessment Group
Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone (“Final Rule”), 63 Fed. Reg.
57,356 (1998) (codified in 40 C.F.R. pts. 51 et al.). The rule, known as the NOX SIP Call, was for
the most part upheld by the D.C. Circuit in Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000). In
2005, EPA issued a new, broader rule requiring twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia
to reduce their emissions of SO2 and NOX in order to reduce ozone and particulate matter
pollution in downwind states (SO2 “is a precursor to PM2.5, and NOX is a precursor to both ozone
and PM2.5”). See Rule to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone
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and nitrogen oxide from power plants in twenty-seven eastern,
midwestern, and southern states that contribute significantly to air
quality problems in downwind states.211 Through complex modeling
that analyzed air pollutant emissions, transport, and control costs, EPA
determined how much pollutants each of the upwind states could emit
without significantly contributing to air quality problems in downwind
states.212 These emissions targets became each state’s emission
“budget”213—the equivalent of a cap. EPA then allocated these
emission budgets across power plants in the state, setting limits on each
source’s emissions of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide, and allowed
trading of emissions allowances across sources.214
EPA faced two major challenges in designing this rule. First, the
task of linking emissions in one upwind emissions location to air quality
in another downwind location is extremely complex.215 Some emissions
stay in the area in which they are emitted, while others are carried by
wind into other states.216 Emissions in an upwind state may be carried
into multiple downwind states.217 Some of these downwind states may
have air quality problems, and others may not.218 Multiple downwind
states may receive pollutants from multiple upwind states.219 Some
states may have both upwind and downwind relationships—that is,
they may both send pollution to other states and receive pollution from
(Clean Air Interstate Rule), 70 Fed. Reg. 25,162 (May 12, 2005) (codified in 40 C.F.R. pts. 51 et
al.). This rule, known as the Clean Air Interstate Rule (“CAIR”), was remanded by the D.C.
Circuit in North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008), modified on reh’g, 550 F.3d. 1176
(D.C. Cir. 2008), although the court left the rule in place pending EPA’s development of a new
rule. The Transport Rule replaced CAIR. Federal Implementation Plans to Reduce Interstate
Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone, 76 Fed. Reg. at 48,211. The Supreme Court
upheld the Transport Rule in EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1593
(2014).
211. Federal Implementation Plans to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate
Matter and Ozone, 76 Fed. Reg. at 48,209.
212. Id. at 48,211–12.
213. See id. at 48,212. (“EPA developed individual state budgets for emissions from covered
units under the Transport Rule.”).
214. See id. (“Under the Transport Rule FIPs, EPA is distributing (‘allocating’) allowances
under each state’s budget to covered units in that state.”).
215. See EME Homer City Generation, 134 S. Ct. at 1593–94 (“[C]urtailing interstate air
pollution poses a complex challenge for environmental regulators. First, identifying the upwind
origin of downwind air pollution is no easy endeavor. Most upwind States propel pollutants to
more than one downwind State, many downwind States receive pollution from multiple upwind
States, and some States qualify as both upwind and downwind.”).
216. Id. at 1594.
217. Id
218. Id.
219. Id.
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other states.220 Thus, the problem of interstate air pollutant transport
involves “thousands of overlapping and interwoven linkages between
upwind and downwind States.”221 Figure 4 provides a graphic
illustration of the complexity of the numerous linkages that comprise
interstate air pollutant transport. To make things more complicated,
pollutants can transform through chemical processes, such that a
pollutant emitted in one form may pose air quality problems in the
form of a different pollutant.222
Figure 4: Interstate Air Pollutant Linkages223

In designing its Transport Rule, EPA had to regulate interstate air
pollution in the context of these thousands of linkages between upwind
emissions and downwind air quality. This required complicated air
quality modeling. The Good Neighbor Provision prohibits emissions
from upwind states that “contribute significantly” to nonattainment in
downwind states.224 Therefore, EPA first identified all downwind
locations (receptors) that had difficulty attaining or maintaining

220. Id.
221. Id.
222. For example, nitrogen oxide (NOX) and sulfur dioxide (SO2) develop into ozone and
fine particulate matter in the atmosphere. North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 903 (D.C. Cir.
2008), modified on reh’g, 550 F.3d. 1176 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
223. Image retrieved from EPA, PROPOSED AIR POLLUTION TRANSPORT RULE 35 (July 26,
2010),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-09/documents/trpresentationfinal_726_webversion.pdf.
224. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i) (2012).
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compliance with the applicable National Ambient Air Quality
Standards.225 EPA then used air quality modeling to determine which
upwind states contributed to air quality problems in those downwind
receptors with air quality problems.226
After identifying upwind states that contributed to nonattainment
in downwind states, EPA then needed to determine the amount by
which each upwind state had to reduce its emissions so as not to
significantly contribute to nonattainment in downwind states.227 This
was known as the “‘control’ analysis.”228 EPA confronted two major
challenges during the control analysis: policy design and political
judgment. As to matters of policy design, the complexity of the linkages
among upwind states and downwind states made it impossible simply
to allocate emissions reductions across upwind states according to the
proportions of their physical contributions. This is because a single
upwind state often contributes to nonattainment in multiple downwind
states, and a single downwind state’s nonattainment can be caused by
multiple upwind states.229 EPA needed to find a method of allocating
225. Federal Implementation Plans to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate
Matter and Ozone, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208, 48,211 (Aug. 8, 2011) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52,
72, 78, & 97 ); see also EME Homer City Generation, 134 S. Ct. at 1596 (defining a “receptor” as
“a location at which EPA measures air quality”). The relevant NAAQS are the 1997 and 2006
standards for fine particulate matter and the 1997 standard for ozone. 76 Fed. Reg. at 48,208.
Because nitrogen oxides and sulfur dioxide contribute to the formation of fine particulate matter
and ozone in the ambient air, the Rule limits emissions of nitrogen oxides and sulfur dioxide. Id.
at 48,208, 48,222.
226. Federal Implementation Plans to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate
Matter and Ozone, 76 Fed. Reg. at 48,211. To avoid including upwind states that contributed only
minimally to downwind air quality problems, EPA set threshold levels equal to one percent of
the corresponding NAAQS. Id. at 48,236. A state that contributed less than the threshold level of
air pollution at downwind receptors was excluded from the Rule. Id. This was known as the
“‘screening’ analysis.” EME Homer City Generation, 134 S. Ct. at 1596.
227. Federal Implementation Plans to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate
Matter and Ozone, 76 Fed. Reg. at 48,211.
228. EME Homer City Generation, 134 S. Ct. at 1596.
229. See id. at 1604, 1605 (noting the “thorny causation problem” resulting because “multiple
contributing upwind states” cause “a downwind State’s excess pollution” and that proportionality
“appears to work neither mathematically nor in practical application”). The Homer City majority
offered the following hypothetical example to illustrate:
Assume the world is made up of only four States—two upwind (States X and Y), and
two downwind (States A and B). Suppose also . . . that the reductions State X must make
to eliminate its share of the amount by which State A is in nonattainment are more than
necessary for State X to eliminate its share of State B’s nonattainment. . . . Suppose,
however, that State Y also contributes to pollution in both State A and State B such that
the reductions it must make to eliminate its proportion of State B’s overage exceed the
reductions it must make to bring State A into attainment. In this case, the dissent [which
advocated a rule based solely on proportion of physical contribution] would have State
X reduce by just enough to eliminate its share of State A’s nonattainment and more than
enough to eliminate its share of State B’s overage. The converse will be true as to State
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emissions reductions across upwind states in a rational manner that
took account of the complex web of interstate linkages.
EPA’s second major challenge was to treat upwind emissions
equitably in its initial allocation of allowances. This distributional issue
was largely a matter of political judgment, as equity is not self-defining.
EPA originally proposed allocating allowances to power plants based
on their historical or projected emissions,230 which was the method
Congress had primarily used to allocate allowances in the Acid Rain
Program.231 However, the agency ultimately decided that basing
emissions reductions on baseline emissions would reward sources with
high historical emissions, favoring power plants that burned higheremitting fuels or that had not already taken extensive measures to
reduce their emissions. EPA decided that its approach should “avoid[]
allocating [allowances] in a way that would effectively penalize units
that have already invested in cleaner fuels or other pollution reduction
measures.”232
Instead of basing emissions reductions on historic emissions, EPA
chose to use a baseline of historic heat input data.233 EPA preferred

Y: Under the dissent’s approach, State Y would have to reduce by the ‘‘minimum’’
necessary to eliminate its proportional share of State B’s nonattainment and more than
enough to eliminate its proportion of State A’s overage. The result is that the total
amount by which both States X and Y are required to reduce will exceed what is
necessary for attainment in all downwind States involved (i.e., in both State A and State
B). . . . The problem would worsen were the hypothetical altered to include more than
two downwind States and two upwind States, the very real circumstances EPA must
address.
134 S. Ct. at 1605–06 n.19.
230. See Federal Implementation Plans To Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate
Matter and Ozone, 75 Fed. Reg. 45,210, 45,309 (Aug. 2, 2010) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. pts. 51
et al.) (“EPA proposes that, for 2012, each existing unit in a given state receives allowances
commensurate with the unit’s emissions reflected in whichever total emissions amount is lower
for the state, 2009 emissions or 2012 base case emissions projections.”).
231. See supra note 169 and accompanying text (describing the design of the Acid Rain
Program).
232. Federal Implementation Plans to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate
Matter and Ozone, 76 Fed. Reg. at 48,288.
233. Id. at 48,286. Heat input, also known as thermal power, measures the amount of
thermodynamic power consumed in a power plant. Heat input is not to be confused with heat
rate, also known as thermal efficiency, which measures the efficiency of a power plant by
comparing the heat output to the heat input. Bethel Afework et al., Thermal Power, ENERGY
EDUCATION, , https://energyeducation.ca/encyclopedia/Thermal_power (last updated July 21,
2018) (citing RICHARD WOLFSON, ENERGY, ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE 86–87 (2d ed. 2012)).
The Transport Rule limits emissions from “any stationary, fossil-fuel-fired boiler or stationary,
fossil-fuel-fired combustion turbine serving at any time, on or after January 1, 2005, a generator
with nameplate capacity of more than 25 MWe producing electricity for sale.” 40 C.F.R. §§
97.404(a)(1), 97.504(a)(1), 97.604(a)(1), 97.704(a)(1). EPA chose to allocate allowances based on
the heat input of each power plant because such an approach is neutral with respect to the type

Aagaard & Kleit_FINAL (Do Not Delete)

54

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

1/16/2020 3:50 PM

[Vol. XXX:1

historic heat input data because they are fuel-neutral, meaning that
they do not yield higher allocations for plants burning higher-emitting
fuels, and emission-control-neutral, meaning that they do not yield
lower allocations for plants that have installed pollution control
technology to reduce emissions.234 EPA also relied on both air quality
impacts (how much upwind emissions affected downwind air quality)
and abatement costs (how much it would cost to reduce emissions) to
determine the amount by which each state was required to reduce its
emissions.235 This approach allowed EPA to take into account the
extent to which existing plants already controlled their emissions and,
as a result, how difficult and costly additional emission reductions
would be.236
The challenges that EPA faced in developing the Transport Rule
added complexity to the market the Rule created for trading emissions
allowances among sources—much more complexity than the Acid
Rain Program had to address in its allowance trading market. As
explained previously, any emissions trading market creates a potential
“hot spot” problem—the risk that trading may concentrate emissions
in a particular area, causing local impairments in air quality in that
area.237 For interstate pollution transport, impacts on local air quality

of fuel combusted by the power plant and the type of pollution control technology the plant
employs. Federal Implementation Plans to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate
Matter and Ozone, 76 Fed. Reg. at 48,289. But the agency also limited each power plant’s
allowances to its historic emissions. Id. at 48,288.
234. See Federal Implementation Plans to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate
Matter and Ozone, 76 Fed. Reg. at 48,286. In addition, EPA determined that heat-input data,
which is generated from continuous monitoring systems, is more accurate than unit-level
emissions data, which relies on modeling projections. Id.
235. See id. The greater the contribution of air quality impacts and the lower the cost of
abating those impacts, the more significant the contribution. Id. EPA’s use of cost to judge
significant contribution under the Good Neighbor Provision has been controversial. See, e.g.,
Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 679 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (upholding EPA’s use of costs in the NOx
SIP Call as consistent with the Good Neighbor Provision); North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (rejecting EPA’s use of costs in the Clean Air Interstate Rule as inconsistent with
the Good Neighbor Provision), modified on reh’g, 550 F.3d. 1176. In EPA v. EME Homer City
Generation, L.P., the Supreme Court upheld the Transport Rule’s use of costs as a basis for setting
emissions limitations pursuant to the Good Neighbor Provision. 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1593 (2014). EPA
includes cost as a factor in determining significant contribution because “considering cost takes
into account the extent to which existing plants are already controlled as well as the potential for,
and relative difficulty of, additional emission reductions.” Federal Implementation Plans to
Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone, 76 Fed. Reg. at 48,248.
236. Federal Implementation Plans to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate
Matter and Ozone, 76 Fed. Reg. at 48,248.
237. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (defining and discussing “hot spot” problem).
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are not the relevant focus; only downwind impacts matter.238 However,
trading across states nevertheless creates risks that trading may shift
emissions in ways that concentrate air quality impacts in certain
downwind states. Even trading between power plants in two states that
affect the same downwind states may cause a state to contravene the
Good Neighbor Provision’s prohibition against “significant
contribution” to downwind nonattainment.239
The Transport Rule includes requirements in its trading program
to address these risks. To ensure that reallocation of emissions through
trading does not result in a concentration of emissions in an upwind
state, the Rule prohibits each state from exceeding a limit of overall
emissions, known as an “assurance level.”240 If a state exceeds its
assurance level of emissions, EPA forces power plants within the state
that have exceeded their proportionate share of the state’s assurance
level of emissions to surrender allowances to compensate for and to
penalize the excessive emissions.241
Thus, the Transport Rule’s trading provisions trigger a collective
action problem:242 Power plants can freely trade allowances, even
across state lines, as long as overall trading does not cause a state to
exceed its assurance level of emissions. If a state exceeds its assurance
level, power plants within the state face substantial penalties in the
form of emissions reductions beyond the amount of their excessive
emissions. Power plants considering a trade of allowances must

238. The Clean Air Act addresses local air quality impacts with other provisions that are in
fact the focus of the Act’s cornerstone regulatory tool: state implementation plans. 42 U.S.C. §
7410 (2012).
239. See Federal Implementation Plans to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate
Matter and Ozone, 76 Fed. Reg. at 48,210 (“The Transport Rule requires substantial near-term
emission reductions in every covered state to address each state’s significant contribution to
nonattainment and interference with maintenance downwind. This rule achieves these reductions
through [provisions] that regulate the power sector using air quality-assured trading programs
whose assurance provisions ensure that necessary reductions will occur within every covered
state.”).
240. See id. at 48,294. These state-specific limits, known as an “assurance level,” are equal to
a state’s budget plus its variability limit. Variability limits are essentially cushions that give states
some limited leeway beyond their allowance budgets to increase emissions due to factors such as
weather, changes in demand, or changes in power system operations. Id. at 48,212.
241. See id. at 48,294. Power plants must surrender twice as many allowances as the amount
by which they exceed their proportionate share—one allowance to compensate for their excessive
emissions, and one allowance to penalize them for their excessive emissions. Id.
242. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 2 (1965) (“[E]ven if all of
the individuals in a large group are rational and self-interested, and would gain if, as a group, they
acted to achieve their common interest or objective, they will still not voluntarily act to achieve
that common or group interest.”).
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consider the risk that the trade will cause the state to exceed its
assurance level of emissions and trigger the penalties.243 Ultimately,
whether a state will exceed its assurance level of emissions and trigger
the penalties depends primarily on the collective decisions of all power
plants, which is only minimally under the control of any individual
power plant.
The Transport Rule is considerably more complex than the Acid
Rain Program. EPA did not necessarily choose to make the Transport
Rule complex. The problem of interstate air transport is inherently
complex. Moreover, the Clean Air Act’s Good Neighbor Provision
created what courts have interpreted as relatively strong directives for
EPA to manage interstate air transport of air pollutants on a state-bystate basis, so that each state abides by an individualized obligation not
to contribute significantly to air quality problems in any downwind
state.244
The complexity of the Transport Rule is in some respects an
improvement over the Acid Rain Program’s simplicity. For example,
the Acid Rain Program’s nationwide market, without consideration of
the location of the emissions, did not accurately reflect the air quality
problems that sulfur dioxide emissions cause, which do depend on the
location of the emissions. The Transport Rule’s use of heat input data
to allocate initial emissions allowances also arguably distributes
regulatory burdens more equitably than the Acid Rain Program’s
reliance on historic emissions data. Whether the Transport Rule went
too far in its complexity, and thereby increased compliance costs as
compared with what might have been possible under a simpler policy
market, has not been analyzed adequately in the economic literature.
To confront that question, as Congress and EPA ideally should, would
be to grapple head-on with the complexity dilemma.
B. Electricity Capacity Markets
In this Part, we examine electricity capacity markets, a large and
important—but also extremely complex—example of a positiveexternality policy market. Capacity markets illustrate the complexity
dilemma that all regulators face in designing policy markets. In the
Clean Air Act emissions trading markets, EPA has allowed emissions
243. Federal Implementation Plans to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter
and Ozone, 76 Fed. Reg. at 48,295.
244. See, e.g., North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 907 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that EPA
must prevent significant contribution on a state-by-state rather than regional basis), modified on
reh’g, 550 F.3d. 1176 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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trading to become somewhat more complex over time while limiting
the complexity of the policy markets to enhance trading. In contrast,
the primary regulator of capacity markets, the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC), has repeatedly pushed policy market
design in the direction of increased complexity. Although in some
respects laudable for its ambition, we raise the possibility that FERC
has become lost in its complexity, apparently unable to see how the
details of its market design have undermined some of the core premises
of its market.
Part IV.B.1 explains the background of capacity markets,
including the reason regulators have felt compelled to create them.
Part IV.B.2 summarizes some of the key policy design issues regulators
have confronted with capacity markets, drawing on the framework
developed earlier in this paper.245 Part IV.B.3 focuses more specifically
on particular policy design challenges—concern over buyer market
power in capacity markets and restrictions on subsidized generators—
that have led regulators to add significant complexity to the already
intricate capacity markets.
1. Background
Each year, in many parts of the United States, electricity
distribution companies spend billions of dollars purchasing something
called capacity. Capacity is the ability to produce electricity, a concept
distinct from electricity itself.246 Capacity is sold by power generators
through auctions created by the organizations known as Regional
Transmission Operators (RTOs), sometimes called Independent
System Operators (ISOs), that operate large parts of the electric grid.247
245. See supra Part III.B (discussing the background of policy markets, including the
considerations that go into their design).
246. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control v. FERC, 569 F.3d 477, 479 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
247. See Ameren Servs. Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 893 F.3d 786, 789 (D.C. Cir.
2018) (“Electric transmission in the United States is largely managed by regional transmission
organizations (RTOs) and independent system operators (ISOs). Those entities operate the
electric transmission systems for a geographic region on behalf of the local utilities (known as
transmission providers) in a region.”); Seth Blumsack, Measuring the Benefits and Costs of
Regional Electric Grid Integration, 28 ENERGY L.J. 147, 153 (2007) (noting that RTOs centrally
dispatch generation within their footprint); Joel B. Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to
Transform the Electric Grid, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1783, 1849 n.44 (2016) (“ISO/RTOs manage
energy, capacity, and ancillary services markets.”). RTOs exist in New England (ISO-NE), New
York (NYISO), the mid-Atlantic region (PJM), the Midwest (the Midcontinent ISO and
Southwest Power Pool), most of Texas (ERCOT), and California (CAISO). Regional
Transmission Organizations (RTO)/Independent System Operators (ISO), FERC,
https://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto.asp (last updated Dec. 20, 2019). FERC
regulates all of the RTOs except ERCOT. Darryl Bush & David Spence, Why ERCOT Only Has
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Although the business of these distribution companies is to supply
electric power to their customers, capacity is not power.248 Purchasing
capacity in a capacity market thus does not entitle distribution
companies to any electricity. These firms do not turn around and sell
capacity to their customers. They purchase electricity itself from
generators in separate transactions in what are called energy markets.249
Although capacity is forward-looking, the purchase of capacity is not
an option or a futures contract.250 Purchasing capacity does not entitle
a utility to purchase electricity at a particular price at some future date
or to otherwise hedge a price risk. The generator that sells capacity is
not being paid for generating electricity; instead, it is merely being paid
to be available to generate electricity.251 So, why are distribution
companies forced to spend billions of dollars buying something that has
no apparent value to them? The answer comes from the nature of
electricity and electricity markets and provides an example of an
extremely complex positive-externality policy market.252
In the parts of the country with competitive wholesale electricity
markets, electric distribution companies buy electric power from
generators in wholesale energy markets and sell it to final consumers
in retail markets.253 If, however, the RTO does not have sufficient
One Regulator, in ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING: THE TEXAS STORY 9–21 (Andrew Kleit &
Lynne Kiesling eds., 2009).
248. See Office of Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy, What’s the Difference between
Installed Capacity and Electricity Generation?, DEP’T OF ENERGY (Aug. 7, 2017),
https://www.energy.gov/eere/articles/whats-difference-between-installed-capacity-andelectricity-generation (last visited Nov. 3, 2019) (“According to EIA, wind turbines accounted for
8% of U.S. installed electricity generation ‘capacity,’ as of December 2016. This means under
ideal conditions, utilities would be able to supply 8% of the country’s electricity needs with wind
power, but this won’t necessarily be the actual amount of electricity produced.”).
249. PJM, PJM MANUAL 11: ENERGY & ANCILLARY SERVICES MARKET OPERATIONS 17
(rev. 96, July 1, 2018).
250. Courts nevertheless sometimes incorrectly label capacity transactions as a form of an
option contract. See, e.g., NRG Power Mktg., LLC v. Me. Pub. Utilities Comm’n, 558 U.S. 165,
168 (2010) (“In a capacity market, . . . an electricity provider purchases from a generator an option
to buy a quantity of energy . . . .”).
251. See Advanced Energy Mgmt. All. v. FERC, 860 F.3d 656, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
(“Capacity is not actual electricity. It is a commitment to produce electricity or forgo the
consumption of electricity when required.”); Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control, 569 F.3d at 479
(“‘Capacity’ is not electricity itself but the ability to produce it when necessary.”). Capacity is
purchased on behalf of the overall system, and the obligation to generate and sell electricity runs
to the grid operator, not to individual buyers in the capacity market. See Advanced Energy Mgmt.
All., 860 F.3d at 659 (“PJM procures capacity for the entire system.”).
252. See supra note 76 and accompanying text (explaining positive-externality policy
markets).
253. The distribution companies may purchase the electric power from generators in a variety
of arrangements, including long-term bilateral contracts, “day ahead” markets in which power is

Aagaard & Kleit_FINAL (Do Not Delete)

Fall 2019]

COMPLEXITY DILEMMA

1/16/2020 3:50 PM

59

power to deliver to its distribution companies, major problems may
occur.
Electricity markets are more susceptible to shortages than typical
markets are.254 Three factors— an inability to store electricity, inelastic
demand, and price caps—make shortages more likely in electricity than
in typical markets. First, electricity cannot easily be stored.255 Although
electricity storage technology is advancing rapidly, storage cannot
economically be used at a sufficient scale to contribute meaningful
amounts of electricity supply to meet demand. Therefore, electricity
cannot be stockpiled in advance of periods of peak demand.
Second, shortages are also more likely in electricity markets
because demand for electricity is often less responsive to the wholesale
price.256 If wholesale prices increase in a typical market, a retail seller
passes the wholesale price increase on to retail customers by increasing
the retail price. Demand in the retail market decreases in response to
the retail price increase, and retail sellers sell less product at the new
higher price. The two markets—wholesale and retail—operate in
tandem, each one responding to changes in the other.
In electricity markets, however, the relationship between
wholesale and retail markets is impaired. Power usage by most
electricity consumers is measured by old-style “flow” meters. These
meters can measure the amount of power consumed across a reporting
period—for example, a month—but cannot determine the particular
purchased for the next day, and “real time” markets. See PJM, supra note 249, at 17. These are
known as energy markets. Id. The overriding goal of a utility in a competitive market is to purchase
sufficient power in the energy markets to meet its customers’ demand for electricity at the lowest
cost. Id.; cf. Gavin Bade, Electricity Markets: States Reassert Authority over Power Generation,
UTILITY DIVE (Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/electricity-markets-statesreassert-authority-over-power-generation/539658/ (reporting that “23 states and the District of
Columbia have enacted some form of competition in generation, energy retailing or both”).
254. In a typical market, prices reflect an equilibrium of supply and demand—the point at
which the marginal seller is willing to sell at a price equal to the price the marginal buyer is willing
to pay. At any price higher than the equilibrium price, sellers would make more product available
than buyers would be willing to buy, there would be a surplus, and the price would decrease. At
any price lower than the equilibrium price, buyers would attempt to buy more product than sellers
have available, there would be a shortage, and the price would increase. Thus, the market price
naturally moves toward a level in which the quantity demanded equals the quantity supplied. This
leads to the optimal production of the good in question. While shortages can occur, they are rare,
and usually can be fixed relatively quickly without serious cost by some combination of either an
increase in production or an increase in price.
255. Andreas Bublitz et al., A Survey on Electricity Market Design: Insights from Theory and
Real-World Implementations of Capacity Remuneration Mechanisms, 80 ENERGY ECON. 1059,
1060 (2019).
256. Miles Bidwell & Alex Henney, Will the New Electricity Trading Arrangements Ensure
Generation Adequacy?, ELECTRICITY J., Aug./Sept. 2004, at 15, 16, 23.
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time when power is consumed.257 As a consequence, consumers with
flow meters cannot be charged rates for their electricity usage that vary
by time of day, even though the wholesale price of electricity varies
based on time of day, as overall electricity usage varies.
Even if consumers have access to “smart meters” that can measure
the time of electricity usage, they may not want their electricity prices
to vary. An effective variable pricing scheme requires consumers to be
aware of, and to understand, the different prices they may pay for
power and to be able to adjust their usages of electricity accordingly.
Given the burden of dealing with this complexity, the advantages to
consumers from variable pricing may be limited, especially for smaller
consumers. In addition, variable pricing subjects consumers to financial
risk due to the possibility of price spikes during high consumption
periods. Thus, consumer demand for variable electricity pricing may be
limited.258
Given these two factors, the price consumers generally pay for
electricity is a fixed rate that does not vary based on when that power
is used. This is the case even though the wholesale price of power
changes numerous times during a day and can vary greatly.259 This in
turn implies that most consumers can only be charged an average price
for power, rather than a price based on the wholesale price of power
when that power is consumed.260

257. For a discussion of the difference between flow and smart meters, see Naperville Smart
Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, 900 F.3d 521, 524 (7th Cir. 2018) and Umang Patel & Mitul
Modi, A Review on Smart Meter System, 3 INT’L J. INNOVATIVE RES. ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS
INSTRUMENTATION & CONTROL ENGINEERING 70 (2015).
258. See Christian Schlereth, Bernd Skiera & Fabian Schulz, Why Do Consumers Prefer Static
Instead of Dynamic Pricing Plans? An Empirical Study for a Better Understanding of the Low
Preferences for Time-Variant Pricing Plans, 269 EUR. J. OPERATIONAL RES. 1165, 1175 (2018)
(finding that “for electricity markets, consumers mostly neglect time-variant pricing plans”);
Mattias Vesterberg & Chandra K.B. Krishnamurthy, Residential End-Use Electricity Demand:
Implications for Real Time Pricing in Sweden, 37 ENERGY J. 141, 160 (2016) (finding that
households generally do not adjust consumption to prices but may if the savings are substantial).
There are various programs that encourage “real-time” pricing, but their penetration rate appears
uncertain. See FERC, STAFF REPORT, DEMAND RESPONSE AND ADVANCED METERING 1–28
(2015) (reporting on demand response and advanced metering efforts in the U.S.).
259. For example, PJM’s average price for “day-ahead” power for the first nine months of
2018 was $36.04/MWh, with a standard deviation of $25.12.74/MWh, implying a percentage
standard error of 69.7. See MONITORING ANALYTICS, 2019 STATE OF THE MARKET REPORT 156,
https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/PJM_State_of_the_Market/2019/2019q3-som-pjmsec3.pdf.
260. More variable rates sensitive to time of use may not even be possible, if customers have
electricity meters that only measure total usage, rather than “smart” meters that measure usage
by time. There are various programs that encourage “real-time” pricing, but their penetration
rate appears uncertain. FERC, supra note 258, at 3–9.
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Hence, demand in wholesale electricity markets is much less
responsive to wholesale prices than in typical markets. Consequently,
demand during periods of peak electricity usage may be unlikely to be
significantly deterred by even large increases in wholesale prices. Thus,
an important reason why markets do not face shortages—because
demand will decrease when the price increases—may not be present in
electricity markets.
Third, wholesale electricity markets often have price caps that
restrict wholesale prices from rising above specified levels.261 The
precise rationale for these price caps is unclear. To the extent that
electricity distribution companies are able to pass on wholesale price
increases to their customers, price caps may be intended to protect
retail customers from higher rates. To the extent that electricity
distribution companies are not able to pass on wholesale price
increases to their customers, wholesale price caps may be intended to
protect distribution companies from losses incurred if they had to buy
at very high wholesale prices which they could not then pass on to their
retail customers. Wholesale price caps also may aim to limit the ability
of electricity suppliers to exert market power during periods of peak
demand when demand is close to total generation capacity.262
Generally, however, price caps tend to cause shortages by
preventing the market from reaching an equilibrium price that matches
supply and demand.263 In the longer term, price caps suppress supply
by reducing incentives for new firms to enter the market or for existing
firms to expand production. Electricity generators are incentivized to
enter wholesale electricity markets for the opportunity to make money
in the market. Imposing price caps that constrain wholesale prices
reduces the ability of generators to earn profits, which in turn reduces
incentives for new generation to enter the market.
This combination of features—an inability to store electricity,

261. For PJM, the Mid-Atlantic Regional Transmission Organization on which we focus in
this article, the price cap was $1,000/MWh prior to 2014. PJM Interconnection, LLC, 146 F.E.R.C.
¶ 61,078, 61,330 (2014); SUSAN KENNEY, PJM INTERCONNECTION, PRICE-BASED OFFERS >
$1,000/MWH (June 6, 2018), https://www.pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/committees/
mic/20180606/20180606-item-14a-1000-price-based-offers.ashx. PJM adopted slightly different
approaches between 2014 and 2018. As of April 2018, the price cap for most generators in PJM is
again at $1,000/MWh. Some generators, however, can gain approval for bids above that level if
they can show that their marginal costs exceed the price cap.
262. See, e.g., James F. Wilson, Scarcity, Market Power, and Price Caps in Wholesale Electric
Power Markets, ELECTRICITY J., Feb. 2000, at 33, 34 (discussing setting price caps in response to
market price spikes during periods of high demand).
263. MANKIW, supra note 2, at 114–19.
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demand that is not responsive to price in the wholesale market, and
wholesale price caps—is perceived as contributing to an
underinvestment in generation resources that threatens grid
reliability—what is known as the “missing money” problem.264 In
many—but not all—competitive electricity markets, RTOs have
created capacity markets as a tool to address the “missing money”
problem—that is, a means of ensuring that the grid will have sufficient
generation capacity in the future to satisfy peak demand and thereby
to avoid widespread grid failure.265 The revenues from capacity
markets are essentially an incentive payment for capital investment
aimed at creating the public good of grid reliability.266 Whether the
“missing money” problem actually exists, and whether capacity
markets are the appropriate means of addressing the “missing money”
problem if it does exist, are controversial questions.267 Addressing the
perceived problem, however, represents a significant part of retail
consumers’ electricity bills. Capacity market revenues for PJM are

264. Cramton, Ockenfels & Stoft, supra note 95, at 30 (2013) (“[T]here is ‘missing money,’
which implies too low a level of investment in capacity.”); MICHAEL HOGAN, HITTING THE
MARK ON MISSING MONEY: HOW TO ENSURE RELIABILITY AT LEAST COST TO CONSUMERS 3
(2016) (“It has become commonplace to hear it said that wholesale electricity markets are plagued
by a ‘missing money’ problem.”); Emily Hammond & David B. Spence, The Regulatory Contract
in the Marketplace, 69 VAND. L. REV. 141, 169–70 (2016) (“[S]ome economists worry that in
competitive wholesale markets, prices based on marginal costs will not attract sufficient
investment in new capacity—referred to as the ‘missing money’ problem.”); David B. Spence,
Naïve Energy Markets, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 973, 1015 (2017) (noting that fixed retail
electricity rates “lead[] the market to undervalue generating capacity, a problem electricity
economists call ‘the missing money problem’”).
265. See generally HOGAN, supra note 264.
266. Cf. Regional Transmission Organizations, Order No. 2000, 89 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,285, at 128
(1999) (noting that “many reliability functions are, in economic terms, ‘public goods’”).
267. See, e.g., Katharine Fraser, CERAWeek Day 3: Texas Power Struggle Over Generation
Capacity Markets, THE BARREL (Mar. 7, 2013), https://blogs.platts.com/2013/03/07/cera-day3/
(reporting “a searing debate” in Texas “over whether the state’s deregulated power market
should add a capacity market”); MIKE HOGAN, BEYOND CAPACITY MARKETS: ENSURING
RELIABILITY IN COMPETITIVE WHOLESALE POWER MARKETS UNDER THE NEW RESOURCE
PARADIGM (Aug. 14, 2012), https://www.raponline.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/rap-hoganwhat-lies-beyond-cap-mkts-2012-aug-14.pdf (criticizing capacity markets as “the ‘fax machine’ of
the power industry,” in that they already have become obsolete). The controversy extends to the
question whether grid reliability is a public good. See generally, e.g., LYNNE KIESLING &
MICHAEL GIBERSON, ELECTRIC NETWORK RELIABILITY AS A PUBLIC GOOD (2015) (arguing
that “network reliability . . . is both a congestible public good and a private good”); RICHARD
SEDANO, THE NATIONAL COUNCIL ON COMPETITION & ELECTRIC INDUSTRY, DIMENSIONS OF
RELIABILITY: A PAPER ON ELECTRIC SYSTEM RELIABILITY FOR ELECTED OFFICIALS (2001)
(“Electric system reliability is a classic public good.”); ANUPAMA KOWLI, MATIAS NEGRETEPINCETIC, & GEORGE GROSS, A SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION WITH THE SMART GRID:
DEMAND RESPONSE RESOURCES (2015) (“We continue to view the provision of such minimum
reliability level of the system as a public good.”).
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consistently in the billions of dollars annually.268 Since 2010, annual
capacity market revenues have ranged between $6.1 and $9.5 billion,
constituting between 17.8 and 24.0% of total revenues in PJM
markets.269
2. Capacity Market Design
There are many common issues in capacity market design,
consistent with the general framework for policy market design we
identified previously.270 These common issues include the type of
capacity product transacted in the market, the timing of commitments
and performance, and the location of the capacity in the grid. Each
RTO operates in slightly different ways. We will focus on the capacity
market of the largest RTO, PJM.271 PJM implemented its current
capacity market (often referred to as the “Reliability Pricing Model”)
in 2007.272
First, PJM has to make decisions regarding the type of capacity
that can be sold in its capacity market.273 The basic product in a capacity
market is capacity to generate electricity, but not all capacity sold in
the capacity market is identical. Because the ultimate goal of the
capacity market is to enhance grid reliability, capacity offered for sale
in the market should be evaluated for its ability to contribute to grid
reliability. Trying to capture the various attributes of capacity that
affect its contribution to grid reliability, however, makes the capacity
market complex and difficult to administer. For example, some types
of renewable energy generation, particularly wind and solar power, are
not always available.274 PJM deals with this issue by discounting the
268. PJM, A STEP BEYOND: 2017 PJM ANNUAL REPORT 28 (2018); PJM, PJM 2015
FINANCIAL REPORT 6 (2016).
269. PJM, A STEP BEYOND: 2017 PJM ANNUAL REPORT 28 (2018); PJM, PJM 2015
FINANCIAL REPORT 6 (2016).
270. See supra Part III.B (discussing the background and design considerations of policy
markets).
271. PJM was originally formed in 1927 as a power pool of three utilities serving customers
in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. Electric Power Markets: PJM, FERC (Aug. 22, 2017),
https://www.ferc.gov/market-assessments/mkt-electric/pjm.asp. PJM has since expanded to serve
all or parts of thirteen states and the District of Columbia. Id. It supplies power from almost 1400
generation sources to approximately 65 million customers. PJM—At a Glance, PJM (Mar. 13,
2019), https://www.pjm.com/~/media/about-pjm/newsroom/fact-sheets/pjm-at-a-glance.ashx (last
visited Sept. 25, 2019).
272. PJM Interconnection, LLC, 117 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,331, 62, 657 (2006).
273. See supra Part III.B.2.a (describing the generic issue of differentiating products in a
policy market by type).
274. See Hammond & Spence, supra note 264, at 164 (2016) (“Because of their intermittency,
neither wind nor solar facilities can provide the load-following services offered by fossil-fueled

Aagaard & Kleit_FINAL (Do Not Delete)

64

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

1/16/2020 3:50 PM

[Vol. XXX:1

generation capacity from these generators in the capacity market.275
These discounted capacity factors add complexity to the capacity
market, while still oversimplifying the effect of intermittency on grid
reliability.276 The actual effect of intermittency on reliability hinges, for
example, on the extent to which different generators are independently
or dependently intermittent.277 The effect of intermittency on reliability
also hinges on whether a generator is producing power at periods of
peak demand, when the grid is most vulnerable.278 A single discounting
factor does not capture all these complications, but attempting to
capture them would add considerable complexity to the capacity
market design.
Second, PJM has to regulate the timing of capacity sold in its
capacity market.279 Timing in the capacity market context has two
features: the interval between capacity transactions and performance
of the capacity obligation and the commitment period over which the
performance obligation must be met.280 As to the interval between
capacity transactions and performance of the capacity obligation, the
original PJM capacity market had daily markets, in which capacity was
purchased in the market the day before it was to be supplied—
essentially, a market for current capacity.281 In 2007, PJM changed to a
market for future capacity, in which capacity is purchased in the market

plants. To the contrary, their intermittency increases the load-following burden on grid operators
by adding another source of short-term variation in addition to variations in demand.”); Andrew
H. Meyer, Federal Regulatory Barriers to Grid-Deployed Energy Storage, 39 COLUM. J. ENVTL.
L. 479, 502 (2014) (“Many renewable energy resources, wind and solar in particular, are variable,
non-dispatchable resources, whose output can neither be entirely controlled nor predicted.”).
275. For example, PJM capacity factors for capacity market participation range from 14.7 to
17.6 percent for wind sources, and from 38 to 60 percent for solar sources. Conleigh Byers, Todd
Levin & Audun Botterud, Capacity Market Design and Renewable Energy: Performance
Incentives, Qualifying Capacity, and Demand Curves, ELECTRICITY J., Jan./Feb. 2018, at 65, 69.
276. See MICHAEL GOGGIN ET AL., WIND SOLAR ALLIANCE, CUSTOMER FOCUSED AND
CLEAN: POWER MARKETS FOR THE FUTURE 27–28 (2018) (criticizing PJM’s proposed method
for determining capacity factors as “a crude methodology” not reflecting “true capacity value”
for renewable resources); see also Byers, Levin & Botterud, supra note 275, at 69 (noting the
existence of different approaches to calculating capacity values for intermittent resources).
277. See GE ENERGY CONSULTING, PJM RENEWABLE INTEGRATION STUDY: EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY REPORT 15 (rev. 05, 2014) (noting that “the impacts of short-term variability in wind
and solar production is greatly reduced by aggregation and geographic diversity”).
278. Id.
279. See supra Part III.B.2.c (describing the generic issue of differentiating products in a
policy market by timing).
280. Id.
281. See Anna Creti & Natalia Fabra, Capacity Markets for Electricity 4 (Ctr. for the Study of
Energy Mkts., Working Paper No. 124, 2003) (noting that in PJM, “daily capacity markets were
introduced in 1999”).
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three years before it is to be available.282 The three-year period is meant
to create a better signal for investment in capacity, a crucial goal of
capacity markets. It also allows more resources—such as demand
response283 and planned new generation—to participate as supply in
the market.284 Adding a lag time between the purchase of capacity and
performance, however, adds complexity to the market, particularly to
enforcement of the performance obligation.
As to the commitment period, PJM also has made adjustments
over time. When PJM introduced the Reliability Pricing Model in its
2007 reforms, it required generation resources to commit to supplying
the capacity market over an entire year.285 A single annual capacity
obligation required resources bidding into the capacity market to
maintain their capacity throughout the year.286 Some have argued,
however, that winter peak demand and summer peak demand periods
have different features that should be reflected in capacity
commitments that vary by season.287 Thus far, PJM has resisted calls
for moving away from its annual commitment period to a more
complex, but perhaps more realistic, seasonal market.
Third, PJM has to consider how to incorporate location of capacity
sold in its capacity market.288 This has been a serious challenge. On the
one hand, the capacity market functions most effectively in minimizing
the cost of capacity when the market operates broadly, with as many
sellers and buyers in the same market as possible. This would seem to
counsel against differentiating capacity by location. Location matters,
however, because physical limitations on electricity transmission can
282. PJM Interconnection, LLC, 115 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,079, 61,245 (2006).
283. Demand response is defined as “a reduction in the consumption of electricity of electric
energy by customers from their expected consumption in response to an increase in the price of
electricity or to incentive payments designed to induce lower consumption of electric energy.” 18
C.F.R. § 35.28(b)(4) (2010). See generally Sharon B. Jacobs, Bypassing Federalism and the
Administrative Law of Negawatts, 100 IOWA L. REV. 885 (2015).
284. See PJM Interconnection, LLC, 117 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,331, 62,654 (2006) (discussing new
generation).
285. See id. at ¶ 62,658 (“The commitment period for capacity offered into the Base Residual
Auction remains one year . . . .”).
286. See SAM NEWELL ET AL., BRATTLE GROUP, OPPORTUNITIES TO MORE EFFICIENTLY
MEET SEASONAL CAPACITY NEEDS IN PJM 1 (2018) (“The implementation of the PJM capacity
market as an annual design made sense in the historical context with summer having both the
highest demand and shortest supply.”).
287. See id. (“Because it maintains an annual design, PJM effectively imposes the same
reliability requirement in both the summer and winter seasons even though winter peak load is
substantially lower and could be met reliably with . . . less capacity.”).
288. See supra Part III.B.2.b (describing the generic issue of differentiating products in a
policy market by location).
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create bottlenecks that prevent electricity from moving freely through
the grid.289 Thus, capacity available through, for example, power
generated in Dayton may not be able to be used to meet shortages of
power in Philadelphia.290
To address this problem, PJM divided its grid into numerous
zones.291 It then modeled the transmission limits between zones to
determine how much capacity in one zone can provide power to
another zone.292 When transmission constraints limit capacity in one
zone from providing power to another zone, the zones are treated as
separate markets, with separate prices based on the balance of supply
and demand within that zone.293 When transmission constraints are not
present and one zone can freely provide power to another zone, the
zones are treated as the same market with the same price.294
In an ideal policy market, trading continues until marginal costs
are equal throughout the market.295 With transmission constraints,
however, this condition does not apply to capacity markets. Table 1
shows the regional differences in price across the twenty PJM control
zones for auction years 2020/21 and 2021/22, with the auctions
occurring three years prior to the years in question. In general, the
western part of PJM (except for the isolated Chicago region) has lower
prices than the more congested eastern region. In the 2020/21 market,
the capacity market price in Public Service Electric and Gas Company
zone (New Jersey) was $188/MW-day, while in the Dayton, Ohio zone
it was $77. This implies that, at the margin, if transmission capacity had
been available, there was a potential savings of approximately
$111/MW-day if more trading were allowed between the two zones.
Even in the less differentiated 2021/2022 market, there were potential

289. See Gary L. Hunt & Richard Lauckhart, A Day in the Life of Transmission Congestion,
PUB. UTIL. FORT., May 2005, at 10 (“Transmission congestion affects both the cost and the
efficiency of the electric power grid.”).
290. See generally, e.g., Mostafa Sahraei-Ardakani et al., Distributional Impacts of State-Level
Energy Efficiency Policies in Regional Electricity Markets, 49 ENERGY POL’Y 365 (2012)
(analyzing the impacts of Pennsylvania energy legislation in a system with transmission
congestion).
291. See Adil Caner Sener & Stefan Kimball, Reviewing Progress in PJM’s Capacity Market
Structure via the New Reliability Pricing Model, ELECTRICITY J., Dec. 2007, at 40, 44 (“PJM
proposed 23 LDAs [Local Deliverability Areas] categorized according to geographical regions
and transmission ownership zones.”).
292. See id. at 45–48 (describing the Variable Resource Requirement Curve).
293. Id. at 47.
294. Id.
295. See Coase, supra note 13, at 15 (“[I]t was argued that such a rearrangement would be
made through the market whenever this would lead to an increase in the value of production.”).

Aagaard & Kleit_FINAL (Do Not Delete)

Fall 2019]

1/16/2020 3:50 PM

COMPLEXITY DILEMMA

67

savings of $65/MW-day if more trading were available between these
zones.
Table 1: Seller Capacity Prices Across PJM Control Zones296
2020/21 and 2021/22 Auction Years ($/megawatt day)
Control Zone
(Primary Location)
Atlantic City (New Jersey)

Obligation Obligation
2020/21
2021/22
1.67%

1.64%

Capacity
Price
2020/21

Capacity
Price
2021/22

$188.41

$166.31

AEP (Ohio)

7.77%

7.77%

$76.83

$140.53

APS (Western PA)

6.08%

6.31%

$76.83

$140.53

ATSI (Ohio)

8.83%

8.84%

$76.83

$171.86

BGE (Maryland)

4.63%

4.54%

$86.52

$203.19

COMED (Chicago)

15.23%

15.27%

$188.43

$196.08

DAYTON (Ohio)

2.33%

2.31%

$76.83

$140.53

DEOK (Kentucky)

3.15%

3.17%

$130.30

$140.53

DLCO (Western PA)

1.96%

1.95%

$76.83

$140.53

DOM (Virginia)

13.71%

13.75%

$76.83

$140.53

DPL (Delmarva)

2.71%

2.67%

$188.41

$166.31

EKPC (Kentucky)

1.49%

1.55%

$76.83

$140.53

JCPL (New Jersey)

4.10%

4.00%

$188.41

$166.31

METED (South Central PA)

2.02%

2.04%

$86.52

$140.53

PECO (Philadelphia)

5.86%

5.94%

$188.41

$166.31

PENLC (Western PA)

1.96%

1.96%

$86.52

$140.53

PEPCO (D.C.)

4.43%

4.35%

$86.52

$140.53

PPL (Northeastern PA)

4.99%

5.00%

$86.52

$140.53

PSEG (New Jersey)

6.80%

6.66%

$188.41

$204.92

RECO (New Jersey)

0.27%

0.27%

$188.41

$166.31

$121.14

$162.65

Weighted Average

296. See PJM, SUMMARY OF 2021/2022 BASE RESIDUAL AUCTION RESULTS (May 2018),
https://www.pjm.com/-/media/markets-ops/rpm/rpm-auction-info/2021-2022/2021-2022-baseresidual-auction-results.ashx?la=en (documenting seller capacity prices across PJM Control
Zones); PJM, SUMMARY OF 2020/2021 BASE RESIDUAL AUCTION RESULTS (May 2017),
https://www.pjm.com/-/media/markets-ops/rpm/rpm-auction-info/2020-2021-base-residualauction-results.ashx?la=en (same); see also ZONE MAP OVEC, https://www.pjm.com/library/
~/media/about-pjm/pjm-zones.ashx (last visited Nov. 3, 2019) (depicting a map of the PJM
transmission zones).
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The price differentials between zones show that segmenting the
market into zones significantly reduces the potential gains available
from trade. It is unclear how FERC and PJM weighed the benefits of
adding locational constraints to the capacity market—that is, more
accurately reflecting the reality of transmission-constrained capacity—
against the costs in terms of lost opportunities for cost-reducing
transactions. That balancing, however, illustrates the crux of the
complexity dilemma that regulators face in designing policy markets.
Thus, capacity market design requires FERC and the RTO to
make a series of decisions regarding how to treat differences in the
type, timing, and location of capacity sold in the market.297 With respect
to each of these decisions, FERC and the RTO must balance simplicity
that harnesses market forces against the complexities of the reality in
which the capacity market operates. At least in the PJM market, FERC
has repeatedly pushed the capacity market in the direction of greater
complexity.
3. The Limits of Complexity
The challenges FERC and PJM have faced with respect to
differences in capacity pale in comparison with the difficulties they
have encountered in designing the capacity market demand curve and
in regulating the participation of sellers in the capacity market.298 As
with other aspects of policy market design, FERC and PJM have
chosen to add complexity to the market over time. Although often
understandable when viewed individually, collectively, these decisions
have created a market that is almost hopelessly complicated. Indeed,
even FERC seems overwhelmed by the complexity it has created.
There is no natural demand for capacity because an individual
buyer receives very little benefit from its purchase of capacity. This is
because the benefit of capacity—enhanced reliability—has attributes
of a public good that inure to the advantage of all buyers of electricity
in the market.299 When PJM capacity markets began in the late 1990s,

297. See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing these three factors in policy market design generally).
298. See supra Part III.B.1.b (discussing the construction of demand in positive-externality
policy markets generally).
299. See PJM Installed Capacity Credit Mkts., 218 P.U.R. 4th 149 (Pa. Util. Comm’n June 13,
2002) (“An LSE obtains no direct benefit from purchasing [capacity] sufficient to cover its
obligation, other than the avoidance of the requirement to pay a . . . penalty. Indirectly, all market
participants benefit from the theoretical improvement in system reliability which results from the
fact that all energy transactions are backed up by deliverable generation capacity which may not
be committed to serve load outside PJM.”); Daniel Breslau, Designing a Market-Like Entity:
Economics in the Politics of Market Formation, 43 SOC. STUD. SCI. 829, 836 (2013) (“There is no
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the capacity requirement did not vary by price—essentially, the
capacity demand curve was a vertical line at the required level of
capacity, and the market cleared daily.300 This is similar to the design
of emissions trading markets for environmental pollution, such as cap
and trade.301 The complete insensitivity of demand to price in these
early capacity markets created both peculiar pricing and severe market
power problems.302 The early PJM capacity market often had prices
that were at the extremes of the possible range.303
To address this dysfunctional pricing, PJM did three things in its
2007 capacity market reform.304 First, it instituted requirements aimed
at preventing existing generators from withholding capacity from the
market.305 Withholding supply from the market could allow a generator
to exercise market power.306 Second, as discussed previously, PJM
demand for the capacity credits that are transacted in a capacity market, at least no intrinsic
interest in the credits on the part of the supposed buyers. Because reliability is a public good –
investments in reliability benefit all participating in the market, not only those making the
investment – LSEs will not pay for reliability on their own accord.”).
300. See Breslau, supra note 299, at 837 (explaining the vertical demand curve); PJM Installed
Capacity Credit Mkts., 218 P.U.R. 4th at 149 (noting that the demand curve derived from PJM’s
capacity requirement “approached the pathological case of a vertical demand curve”); JOHN D.
CHANDLEY, ICAP REFORM PROPOSALS IN NEW ENGLAND AND PJM 12 (2005) (“The ICAP
markets were thus characterized by a vertical demand curve . . . .”).
301. See supra Part III.A (describing a simplified cap-and-trade program).
302. See Joseph Bowring, Capacity Markets in PJM, 2 ECON. ENERGY & ENVTL. POL’Y 47,
48–49 (2013) (noting that “market power was exercised at all times” and that “the marginal cost
of daily capacity was effectively zero”). For example, assume a system operator determined that
the system would require 100,000 MW of capacity for the next day. Also assume that there was
only 110,000 MW available to be bid into the market and that all generators bid into the market
at their opportunity costs. Since those generators were already planning to serve the market the
next day, they would bid a price of zero. With supply (110,000 MWs) greater than demand
(100,000 MW), the clearing price in the market would be zero.
Now assume that that one firm controlled 25,000 MW. That firm would be able to bid
14,000 MWs into the market, holding back 11,000 MW. At this point, the supply bid into the
market (99,000 MWs) would be less than the demand (100,000 MW). The market price would
rise, capped only by the amount of the penalty firms would have to pay for not complying with
PJM regulations. In this scenario, the firm that withheld supply has exercised market power to
increase the market clearing price.
303. See PJM Installed Capacity Credit Mkts., 218 P.U.R. 4th at 149 (“[T]o correct flaws in
the market which were enabling a participant in the market to force prices up to or above the
PJM capacity deficiency rate . . . .”).
304. See PJM Interconnection, LLC, 117 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,331, 62,652 (2006) (“PJM filed a
proposal . . . to revise its markets to deal with current and projected violations . . . .”).
305. See Bowring, supra note 302, at 51 (noting the objective of creating market conditions
“without the exercise of market power through withholding”).
306. See PJM Interconnection, LLC, 117 F.E.R.C. at ¶ 62,659 (revealing that physical
withholding involves actually not bidding some capacity into the market, while economic
withholding entails bidding some capacity into the market at such high prices that it is effectively
withheld); Terms and Conditions of Pub. Util. Mkt.-Based Rate Authorizations, 97 F.E.R.C. ¶
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changed from daily capacity markets clearing one day before the time
in question to annual markets clearing three years before the time in
question.307 This may have facilitated the entry of new generators into
the capacity market, increasing competition. Third, PJM introduced
slope into its capacity demand curve, known as the “variable reserve
requirement” or “VRR” curve.308 A downward-sloping demand curve
(rather than the completely vertical demand curve in the previous
capacity market) makes price less responsive to changes in supply,
which reduces the incentive (as compared with a vertical demand
curve) for generators to withhold supply in the hopes of inflating the
market clearing price.309 PJM made these changes for good reasons, but
each of these changes introduced additional complexity into the
capacity market.
In Part III.B.1, we criticized policy markets that impose a
vertical constructed supply curve or demand curve, noting that they
reflect an unrealistic assumption that supply or demand is unresponsive
to price.310 Thus, FERC and PJM should to some extent be commended
for creating a demand curve for the capacity market that is responsive
to price. However, the complexity of the capacity market’s demand
curve and its dependence on and sensitivity to the accuracy of the
61,220, 61,976 (2001) (explaining that to suppress physical withholding, PJM requires generators
to bid all of their capacity as suppliers in the capacity market); Bowring, supra note 302, at 51
(explaining that to address economic withholding, PJM regulates the value of bids); see infra notes
347–349 and accompanying text (discussing that PJM was concerned about both physical and
economic withholding).
307. See supra notes 279–284 and accompanying text (discussing the timing of PJM capacity
auctions).
308. See PJM Interconnection, LLC, 117 F.E.R.C. at ¶ 62,657 (2006) (noting the PJM
market’s use of the “Variable Resource Requirement Curve,” described as “a downward-sloping
demand curve”); PJM Interconnection, LLC, 115 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,079, 61,254 (2006) (approving the
“Variable Resource Requirement,” which includes “a sloped demand curve”).
309. See PJM Interconnection, LLC, 115 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,079, at 61,254 (noting that “a sloped
demand curve would reduce the incentive for sellers to withhold capacity in order to exercise
market power”). In addition to preventing buyer market power, a sloped demand curve has other
advantages as well. It potentially more accurately reflects the actual value of capacity, which can
be expected to have declining marginal value and to have value at capacity levels above the
reserve requirement. See id. (noting that “incremental capacity above the IRM [reserve
requirement] is likely to provide additional reliability benefits, which is reflected in the positive
prices in the sloped demand curve to the right of IRM”). By contrast, a vertical demand curve
essentially assumes that capacity in excess of the reserve requirement has no benefit. See id.
(noting that the “additional reliability benefits” of capacity above the reserve requirement were
“not reflected” in the prior vertical demand curve). The sloped demand curve also makes prices
in the capacity market less volatile, which in turn makes investments in capacity less risky and
perhaps reduces the cost of financing new capacity. Id.
310. See supra notes 84–97 and accompanying text (discussing the interplay of economics and
energy).
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estimates that underlie it highlight the difficulties of creating a precise
sloped demand curve.
Figure 5: 2016/17 PJM Capacity Market Demand Curve311
97% of
Requirement,
150% of CONE
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$/MW-day
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The top solid line in Figure 5 illustrates the variable reserve
requirement curve for the 2016/2017 PJM capacity market.312 The
variable reserve requirement curve derives from two elements: PJM’s
forecast estimate of the capacity requirements for the relevant year and
the “Cost of New Entry” (CONE).313 The estimated capacity
requirements drive the quantities in the demand curve because the
purpose of the demand curve is to result in transactions that will ensure
sufficient capacity. CONE is an administrative construct that attempts
to reflect the funds that a generator would need to receive from a

311. See PJM, 2016/2017 RPM BASE RESIDUAL AUCTION PLANNING PERIOD PARAMETERS
2,
6,
https://www.pjm.com/-/media/markets-ops/rpm/rpm-auction-info/2016-2017-planningperiod-parameters-report.ashx?la=en for capacity requirement and CONE data.
312. See Bowring, supra note 302, at 51–52 (enforcing the requirement for purchase capacity
through the demand curve); supra Fig. 5 (demonstrating the variable requirement curve with the
simplifying assumption that there are not binding transmission constraints between PJM zones).
313. See James F. Wilson, Forward Capacity Market CONEfusion, ELECTRICITY J., Nov.
2010, 25, 26 (discussing the difficulty of calculating CONE, for example, “[c]ombustion turbines
are considered to be the least expensive source of incremental capacity”); supra Fig. 5 (using the
calculated CONE for gas turbines).
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capacity market to recover its costs and earn a market rate of return.314
When capacity is at a quantity below 97% of the capacity
requirement of 180,346 MW—here, 174,396 MW—demand is flat at a
level equal to 150% of CONE ($495/MW).315 When capacity is at a
quantity approaching the capacity requirement, the demand curve is
very steep (inelastic),316 but not completely vertical.317 Together with
the inelastic supply curve in the relevant region, this implies that the
market price is very sensitive to changes in demand. For example, PJM
Market Monitor Joseph Bowring’s analysis shows that, for the
2015/2016 capacity market, reducing the capacity requirement by 2.5%
decreased capacity market prices from $154/MW-day to $98/MWday.318 This implies reduced revenues from the capacity market would
have been by about $3.7 billion for that year, or approximately 38%.319
Thus, a very small change in capacity market parameters can imply a
very large change in the revenues consumers pay to generators.
The variable reserve requirement curve is highly dependent on the
level of CONE adopted by PJM. The dotted line in Figure 5 shows what
the 2016/2017 variable reserve requirement would have looked like if
the CONE used was the average price in the PSEG (New Jersey) zone
for 2008 to 2022 markets for $177/MW-day, rather than the “correct”
value of $330. Note that Figure 5 implies that, given positive market
prices, the higher the level of CONE, the higher the resulting market
price. Further, as discussed below, capacity market prices in PJM are
314. See PJM Power Providers Grp. v. FERC, 880 F.3d 559, 561 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (describing
CONE as a value that “approximates the revenue that a newly constructed power generator
would need to recoup its costs”); TC Ravenswood, LLC v. FERC, 741 F.3d 112, 115 (D.C. Cir.
2013) (“In plain English, the cost of new entry equals the hypothetical plant’s total cost of
producing a unit of electricity—the cost of constructing and operating a plant divided by its
expected lifetime energy output—minus what the plant will receive for selling this electricity.”).
315. See supra Fig. 5 (showing that for 2016/2017, the CONE for the eastern part of PJM
including PSEG was calculated to be $330 per mega-watt day (MW-day), and the capacity
requirement was 180,346 mega-watt hours), demonstrating the variable reserve requirement
curve can be constructed from these values and for quantities of capacity from 0 to 97 percent of
the capacity requirement (174,936 MW), the demand price equals 150 percent of CONE—in our
example, $495).
316. Cf. MANKIW, supra note 2, at 90 (defining price elasticity of demand as “a measure of
how much the quantity demanded of a good respond to a change in the price of that good”).
317. See supra Fig. 5 (demonstrating the demand price at 101% of needed capacity (182,149
MW) is CONE ($330), decreasing to twenty percent of CONE ($66) at 105% of the capacity
requirement (189,363 MW) and that beyond 105% of the capacity requirement, the demand curve
is a vertical line down to where price equals zero).
318. See Bowring, supra note 302, at 59–61 (“[T]he use of the 2.5 percent demand reduction
resulted in a 21 percent reduction in RPM revenues of the 2015/2016 Base Residual
Auction . . . .”).
319. See id. (explaining that there would be “a difference of $2.7 billion in market revenues”).
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generally well below the administratively determined value of CONE,
implying that PJM’s CONE value is too high and, therefore, that
capacity prices are too high as well.320
FERC changed the PJM variable reserve requirement curve
starting with the 2018/2019 market.321 FERC acted in response to a
report by the consulting firm Brattle that estimated that the thenexisting variable reserve requirement would lead to 1.2% loss of load
events per 10 years, slightly above the industry standard of 1 event per
10 years.322Abstracting from questions of false precision, this implied
that the previous variable reserve requirement was underestimating
the revenues needed through the capacity market.
Instead of being defined by five points, the new variable reserve
requirement is defined by four new points, which effectively moved the
variable reserve requirement slightly outward and made it convex
instead of concave.323 Using a CONE of $330/MH-day and a desired
capacity of 180,346 MW, as in Figure 5, Figure 6 compares the new and
old variable reserve requirements, where the solid line represents the
old variable reserve requirement and the dashed line represents the
new variable reserve requirement. Note that the new variable reserve
requirement is closest to the old variable reserve requirement at a price
of about 75% of CONE and moves away from the old variable reserve
requirement as the price moves away from 75% of CONE.324 PJM
estimated that the net increase in costs to consumers would be less than
1% per year,325 though our estimates are larger.326 FERC reports that

320. See infra note 344 and accompanying text (demonstrating the issues with PJM’s CONE).
321. See PJM Interconnection, LLC, 149 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,183, 62,121 (2014) (“PJM proposes:
(i) a revised shape for its VRR Curve . . . .”).
322. See id. (“Brattle used these results to determine whether PJM’s existing VRR Curve
would meet PJM’s resources adequacy and other capacity market design objectives . . . .”).
323. See id. (highlighting the key points on the new variable reserve requirement). The key
points are as follows: At zero quantity, price is 150% of CONE. When quantity is at 99% of the
capacity requirement, price is 150% of CONE. Thus, the curve is horizontal between those
quantities. When quantity is at 101% of the capacity requirement, price is 75% of CONE. When
quantity is at 107.5% of the capacity requirement, price is 0. Id.
324. See supra Fig. 5 (demonstrating the PJM Capacity Demand Curve).
325. PJM Interconnection, LLC, 149 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,183, 62,124 (2014).
326. We are unable to replicate the less than 1% result reported by FERC. The percent
increase in revenues will depend on what the price would have been using the old variable reserve
requirement curve. For example, using an elasticity of supply implied by Bowring, supra note 302,
if the old variable reserve requirement would have resulted in a capacity market price of 75% of
CONE, the new variable reserve requirement would increase capacity market revenues by
approximately 1.7%. This, however, is the area where the two curves are closest. If the old
variable reserve requirement would have resulted in a price equal to 100% of CONE, the increase
in revenues would have been about 6.5%. If the old variable reserve requirement price was 50%
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the rationale for a concave variable reserve requirement is that the
marginal value of capacity with respect to alleviating loss of load does
not decline as quickly as implied by the previous variable reserve
requirement,327 though it does not explain this argument in detail.328
Figure 6: Old vs. New Capacity Demand Curve
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Because the constructed demand curve for PJM’s capacity market
is so steep—that is, price inelastic—the market clearing price will
depend greatly on the amount of supply. Unlike the demand curve, the
supply curve in a capacity market is set by private companies in the
market rather than regulators.
Successful suppliers in the capacity auction promise, at the risk of
financial penalties for non-compliance, to have generation capacity
available in the relevant period. In exchange for this obligation to
provide capacity, suppliers are paid capacity market revenues.329 If
supply in the capacity market is competitive, suppliers can be expected
to bid the money they expect they will need to reach a zero economic

of CONE, the new variable reserve requirement would increase revenues by about 7.6%.
327. PJM Interconnection, LLC, 149 F.E.R.C. at 62,123.
328. We note that the new VRR continues to have the property that the higher the level of
CONE, the higher the resulting price in the VRR for positive market prices.
329. See Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control v. FERC, 569 F.3d 477, 480 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(noting that suppliers’ bids into the capacity market “commit them to supply the amount they
offer at the clearing price”).
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profit,330 which can be thought of as the market rate of return.331
The long-term nature of capital investment in electricity, however,
adds complications to the supply analysis. Assume, for example, that
an operator builds a generator, expecting it to continue producing
electricity for the next twenty years. The operator is likely to continue
operating, at least for a while, even if its revenues from the energy
market cover only its variable costs and not its fixed costs, so that the
generator is losing money on the sale—but less money than if it were
not operating. The generator therefore may require no revenues from
the capacity market in the short run to induce it to remain in operation.
Thus, it is likely to bid zero in the capacity market. Generators who are
considering either entering the generator market or exiting it, by
contrast, are likely to bid positive values into the capacity market,
indicating that they need additional revenues—that is, beyond what
they earn in the energy market—to operate. As a result, capacity
market supply curves remain at the level of a zero price for most of the
relevant capacity. When the price moves above zero, the elasticity of
supply is relatively inelastic. This implies that a small percentage
increase in the quantity supplied can result in a large percentage
increase in price.332 This, in turn, implies that a relatively small change
330. Profit refers here to economic profit, not accounting profit. See Michael A. Williams et
al., Estimating Monopoly Power with Economic Profits, 10 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 125, 128 (2010)
(“[A]ccounting profits and economic profits are very different concepts.”). Economic profit
accounts for the market rate of return to invested capital. Id. at 135. Thus, a competitive rate of
return is theoretically equivalent to zero economic profits. Accounting profits are calculated
based on rules of the accounting profession that “do not reflect the true economic cost of
producing goods or services.” Id. at 128. For example, the return on capital necessary to
compensate investors for the risk of their investment does not factor into accounting profit but
would be deducted from economic profit. Id. at 129. “Thus, a highly risky investment that
generates a high accounting return may, in fact, reflect only a modest economic rate of return.”
Id.
331. For example, assume that a (potential) generator has average incremental costs of $400
per mega-watt (MW) day and expected revenues of $300/MW-day. The generator can be expected
to bid $100/MW-day in the capacity market—the amount of money it needs to earn so as not to
lose money by producing electricity. If the price for the capacity market is greater than $100/MWday, then this generator “clears” the auction and is committed to be available to supply power in
three years’ time. If the market clearing price is less than $100/MW-hour, the generator does not
clear the market and can be expected to cease generation, or alternatively to continue to operate
and lose money (at least in the short run). See MONITORING ANALYTICS, LLC, 2017 STATE OF
THE MARKET REPORT FOR PJM 33 (2018) (describing “a forward-looking, annual, locational
market”). Some generators may profit without revenues from the capacity market. These
generators would be expected to bid ‘zero’ in the capacity market, a bid that would always clear.
Thus, a generator whose bid does not clear the capacity market can be presumed to lose money
overall, because its unaccepted bid represents the amount of revenues needed to avoid failing to
cover its costs.
332. See Bowring, supra note 302, at 60 (explaining how supply and demand are driven in
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in the demand curve (for example, the forecasted amount of capacity
needed that is used in the VRR) will result in relatively large changes
in market price. The most important capacity market outcome—
price—is thus highly sensitive to the various administrative judgments
that form the demand curve.
The amount of supply offered in the capacity market depends on
which generators are allowed to participate in the market. At first
consideration, it might seem obvious that regulators would want to
encourage as many generators as possible to bid into the capacity
market in order to maximize competition, but decisions regarding
which generators to allow to participate under what conditions
implicates other policy judgments, which quickly become very
complicated. In particular, FERC has become concerned that
unconstrained bidding from some generators may threaten the ability
of capacity markets to produce “just and reasonable” prices.
The Federal Power Act directs FERC to review wholesale
electricity rates to ensure that they are “just and reasonable.”333 While
the “just and reasonable” standard cannot be precisely defined,334 it has
been interpreted by agencies and courts to mean a price at which the
electricity provider is able to recover its costs and earn a reasonable
return on its capital investments.335 Traditionally, FERC implemented
the “just and reasonable” standard by directly reviewing rates in a costof-service ratemaking proceeding, in which the agency examines
financial data and projections from a wholesale electricity provider to
determine the appropriate rate.336 More recently, FERC has relied on

RPM).
333. See 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2012) (“All rates and charges made, demanded, or received by
any public utility for or in connection with the transmission or sale of electric energy subject to
the jurisdiction of the Commission, and all rules and regulations affecting or pertaining to such
rates or charges shall be just and reasonable, and any such rate or charge that is not just and
reasonable is hereby declared to be unlawful.”).
334. See Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish City, 554 U.S.
527, 532 (2008) (“The statutory requirement that rates be ‘just and reasonable’ is obviously
incapable of precise judicial definition . . . .”); Alabama Elec. Co-op. v. FERC, 684 F.2d 20, 27
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (noting that “neither statutes nor decisions of this court require that the
Commission utilize a particular formula or a combination of formulae to determine whether rates
are just and reasonable”).
335. See City of Charlottesville v. FERC, 774 F.2d 1205, 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (stating that
“just and reasonable” rates “under cost-of-service ratemaking principles” allow an electric utility
to earn “sufficient revenue to cover all proper costs . . . plus a specified return on invested
capital”); Alabama Elec. Co-op., 684 F.2d at 27 (stating that a “just and reasonable” rate includes
“the costs of providing service to the utility’s customers, plus a just and fair return on equity.”).
336. See, e.g., NorthWestern Corp. v. FERC, 884 F.3d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (examining
FERC’s analysis of electricity rates); Boroughs of Ellwood City v. FERC, 731 F.2d 959 (D.C. Cir.
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market competition, rather than direct supervision of rates, to ensure
that rates are “just and reasonable.”337 FERC has reasoned that
competition results in a market price at the marginal cost of
production, which covers the marginal electricity provider’s costs but
does not allow it to earn monopoly profits.338
Thus, in restructured electricity markets, FERC’s concern is that
market prices reflect the forces of competition. In capacity markets,
that can be difficult due to vertical integration between generators and
load serving entities (distribution companies). A firm that both buys
and sells in the capacity market may gain advantage from bidding into
the market at below its costs in an effort to drive down the market
clearing price.339 Although this could reduce the firm’s revenues from
capacity payments, the gains to the firm from lower expenses (due to a
lower market clearing price) in purchasing capacity could more than
offset the lost revenue from selling capacity. FERC refers to the
strategy of bidding below costs in this circumstance as “buyer market
power.”340
1984).
337. See FERC v. Electric Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S.Ct. 760, 768 (2016) (“FERC often
forgoes the cost-based rate-setting traditionally used to prevent monopolistic pricing. The
Commission instead undertakes to ensure ‘just and reasonable’ wholesale rates by enhancing
competition . . . .”).
338. See Tejas Power Corp. v. FERC, 908 F.2d 998, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“In a competitive
market, . . . it is rational . . . to infer that the price is close to marginal cost, such that the seller
makes only a normal return on its investment.”); see also Jeffrey McIntyre Gray, Reconciling
Market-Based Rates with the Just and Reasonable Standard, 26 ENERGY L.J. 432 (2005) (exploring
FERC’s obligations to regulate the energy market and competition).
339. A firm could have, for example, 1000 MWs of generation capacity. It also might be
serving a load with a peak demand for 2000 MWs. In such a case, this firm is “long” net 1000 MWs
of load. Thus, on balance, as a net buyer of capacity, it might want a lower price in the capacity
market than a higher price. Such a firm could be expected to bid into the capacity market at below
its costs.
340. See PJM Interconnection, LLC, 117 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61331, 62,659 (2006) (discussing market
power provisions generally and distinguishing “between sellers that are net buyers that may have
incentives to depress market clearing prices below competitive levels and sellers of planned
generation that may have incentives to increase market clearing prices above competitive
levels.”). Assume, for example, that a capacity market equilibrium is reached at a price of
$200/MW day and a quantity of 162,000 MW. Assume that a generator owned by a vertical
integrated company with 500MW of capacity had an economic cost of entry of $250/MW-day.
Due to the incentives arising from vertical integration, however, it bid a price of $150/day. This
bid cleared the market and the generator received the relevant payment. In economic terms,
however, this generator should not have cleared the market. In that case, the market would have
reached equilibrium by finding the next available 500 MW of capacity on the supply curve above
$200/MW-day, which would increase the market clearing price. Thus, if the bid of the vertically
integrated generator is allowed the market price is considered too low, and therefore in FERC
legal terms not just and reasonable.
The term buyer market power as used by FERC is not the same as the somewhat more
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PJM created its Minimum Offer Price Rule (MOPR) to prevent
buyers in the capacity market from exercising buyer market power.341
MOPR regulates bids into the capacity auction for new generation
resources, seeking to make sure that those bids are offered
competitively, without an attempt to exercise buyer market power.342
First, MOPR screens capacity offers from new generation resources to
determine whether they are too low (noncompetitive).343 Then, if this
process deems an offer noncompetitive, MOPR requires the new
resource to be bid at or above the relevant CONE.344
Figure 7 shows capacity market prices in two PJM zones: the
PSEG zone in eastern PJM (New Jersey) and the Dayton zone in
western PJM (Ohio). The average Dayton price of $100/MW-day is
well below the PSEG average of $177. Also included is a line depicting
the CONE for the eastern region of PJM, where PSEG is located. For
every year after auction year 2010/11 the PSEG CONE exceeds the
capacity market clearing price.345 The CONE average price of
commonly used term monopsony. In monopsony, a monopoly buyer will consume less that the
economically efficient quantity of an input in order to reduce the price of that input. See, e.g.,
ROGER BLAIR AND JEFFREY HARRISON, MONOPSONY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS (1991)
(explaining how a monopsony works). Buyer market power, on the other hand, will change the
shape of the relevant supply curve.
341. See New Jersey Bd. of Pub. Util. v. FERC, 744 F. 3d 74, 85 (3d Cir. 2014) (“‘MOPR,’
that is designed to curb monopsony power”); Monitoring Analytics, LLC, supra note 331, at 42–
43 (discussing generally the impacts of MOPR).
342. See MONITORING ANALYTICS, LLC, supra note 331, at 42 (explaining that MOPR
addresses new entry).
343. See PJM Interconnection, LLC, 137 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,145, at P 2 (2011) (“The MOPR
imposes a minimum offer screen to determine whether an offer from a new resource is
competitive . . . .”). The restriction on bidding only applies to the first year a generator
participates in the capacity market and submits a market-clearing bid. See MONITORING
ANALYTICS, LLC, supra note 331, at 265 (explaining how MOPR Screened Generation Resource
are subject to the MOPR Floor Offer Price in many circumstances). Once a generator has entered
a market, the sunk costs of construction presumably commit the generator to operate for several
years. See PJM Interconnection, LLC, 137 F.E.R.C. at P 132 (“[C]onstruction costs become
sunk.”). It thus is common for existing generators in a market to bid zero for their capacity,
indicating a willingness to operate regardless of the capacity price. See id. (“[A] competitive offer
would typically be very low . . . .”). This assumption does not hold if a generator is considering
exiting the market. In that case, capacity market revenues could affect the generator’s decision to
stay in or exit a market, and the generator might decide to bid above zero. See id. (discussing
possible bidding scenarios).
344. See PJM Interconnection, LLC, 137 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,145 at P 9 (discussing a change in Net
Asset Class Cost of New Entry).
345. The difference between the average prices is a statistically significant $77.56/MW-day.
Similar data, with similar results, can be generated for other PJM capacity zones. See infra Fig. 7
(demonstrating capacity market prices in two PJM zones). Independently, the volatility of the
prices raises concerns about the capacity market’s effectiveness in sending a signal to investors to
build the desired level of capacity. Price volatility creates noise in that signal.
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$255/MW-day is $78/MW-day above the PSEG average price. (Both
differences are statistically significant.) Thus, as this data implies, the
PJM’s CONE value is systematically too high. In turn, as the discussion
relating to Figure 5 indicates, this implies that the resulting market
price is too high. Simply put, it means that PJM capacity prices are
higher than what is needed to provide the desired level of capacity. In
addition, it also implies that the MOPR, by forcing affected units to bid
at CONE, effectively excludes those units from earning capacity
market revenues. This in turn will further increase the capacity market
price.
Figure 7: PJM Capacity Market Prices346
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As this discussion demonstrates, PJM’s capacity market has
become bewilderingly complex. Policy decisions and market design
decisions has been layered upon each other. It is not clear that, as it
makes these successive decisions, FERC has been able to maintain a
focus on the overall policy market design and the core assumptions and
objectives on which it is built. The agency is increasingly focused on
ancillary objectives, such as buyer market power, at the risk of
346. The data underlying this figure is available at Capacity Market (RPM), PJM,
https://www.pjm.com/markets-and-operations/rpm.aspx (last visited Dec. 21, 2019), under
“Delivery Years.” For the relevant years listed in the figure, the data is located in the files labeled
“Planning Period Parameters for Base Residual Auction” and “Base Residual Auction Results.”
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undermining its chief objective, which is to supply the public good of
capacity at the lowest possible cost. This has become more apparent in
recent decisions in which FERC has attempted to modify capacity
market rules to counteract state subsidies that affect electricity
generation.347
In addition to its concern about buyer market power in capacity
markets, FERC has become increasingly worried about capacity bids
by state-subsidized generators. FERC is concerned that subsidies of
generation will artificially reduce energy and capacity prices in the near
term, suppressing construction of additional generation, which will
increase prices in the long term. This could lead to “boom and bust”
cycles over time, caused by the inability of capacity prices to send
accurate price signals to the market.348 This is a potential problem for
capacity markets because their purpose is to encourage investment in
generation.
Significant increases in unconventional natural gas production
have decreased the price of natural gas.349 Lower natural gas prices, in
turn, reduce the cost of producing electricity from natural gas
generators.350 In addition, state policies mandating and encouraging
renewable generation are increasing generation of electricity from
wind and solar energy.351 The result has been lower energy prices for
electricity and threats to the economic viability of nuclear generators
across the PJM region.352 Several states, including Illinois, Ohio,
347. See, e.g., PJM Interconnection, LLC, 137 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,145, at P 3 (“We are forced to
act, however, when subsidized entry supported by one state’s or locality’s policies has the effect
of disrupting the competitive price signals . . . .”).
348. See PJM Interconnection, LLC 128 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,787, at P 91 (2009) (“Although
capacity prices might be lower in the short run, such a strategy will not attract sufficient private
investment to maintain reliability.”). Academic studies provide some support for FERC’s
concern. R.J. Briggs and Andrew Kleit’s theoretical economic model concluded that government
subsidies of generation reduces resource adequacy, which can induce states to increase subsidies,
further impairing market incentives for new capacity. See R.J. Briggs & Andrew Kleit, Resource
Adequacy Reliability and the Impacts of Capacity Subsidies in Competitive Electricity Market, 40
ENERGY ECON. 297, 298 (2013) (“[T]he presence of price caps in the wholesale energy market
further reduces incentives for resource adequacy.”). Extending the Briggs and Kleit model, David
Brown derived that, because state subsidies would narrow the range of firms willing to supply
generation, subsidies would decrease the responsiveness of the market to capacity needs. See
David Brown, The Effect of Subsidized Entry on Capacity Auctions and the Long-Run Resource
Adequacy of Electricity Markets, 70 ENERGY ECON. 205, 213 (2018) (Proposition 6).
349. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2019, at 71, 74 (2019)
(discussing the development of natural gas).
350. See id. at 98 (discussing the dynamics of electricity prices and natural gas prices).
351. See id. at 102 (“[E]xtended tax credits account for much of the accelerated
growth . . . .”).
352. See id. at 105–06 (predicting continued retirements of nuclear power plants as a result of
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Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, and Connecticut, have enacted
or considered enacting subsidies on these plants with the stated
purpose of protecting employment in state nuclear sectors.353 Between
the nuclear and the renewable subsidies, nearly 10,000 MWs of
subsidized power are in a position to supply power to PJM.354
In a recent proceeding, captioned Calpine Corp. v. PJM
Interconnection, LLC, FERC attacked these state subsidies on the
grounds that they have an anticompetitive impact on the capacity
market.355 FERC reasoned that state subsidies artificially reduce the
costs to generators that receive the subsidies, which allows those
generators receiving subsidies to outbid other generators that do not
receive subsidies and that would be successful in a purely competitive
capacity market.356
In light of this concern, FERC ruled that PJM must amend its
MOPR to restrict the bids of resources receiving state subsidies to
prevent any uncompetitive effects from the subsidies.357 FERC focused
solely on counteracting the effects of state energy-specific subsidies,
while apparently excluding state subsidies that are not energy-specific
and all federal subsidies, energy-specific or not.358 Yet, whether a
low electricity prices).
353. See, e.g., Daniel Carson, New Coalition Seeks to Save Ohio Nuclear Plants, FREMONT
NEWS-MESSENGER (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.wkyc.com/article/news/local/ohio/new-coalitionseeks-to-save-ohio-nuclear-plants/95-602533240; Sonal Pakel, Connecticut, Ohio, Pennsylvania
Make Substantive Gains for State Nuclear Subsidies, POWER (Nov. 1, 2017),
https://www.powermag.com/connecticut-ohio-pennsylvania-make-substantive-gains-for-statenuclear-subsidies (discussing generally the state of nuclear subsidies in three states).
354. See Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection, LLC, 163 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,236, at P 1 (2018)
(“[S]upport for thousands of megawatts (MWs) of resources ranging from small solar and wind
facilities to large nuclear plants.”); see also Danny Cullenward & Shelley Welton, The Quiet
Undoing: How Regional Electricity Market Reforms Threaten State Energy Goals, 36 YALE J.
REG. 106, 108 (2018) (referring to the “maddingly technocratic veneer” of FERC’s rule).
355. See Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection, 163 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,236 at P 156 (explaining
the impact of a state subsidy on the energy market).
356. Id. at P 2. The Commission stated:
Over the last few years, the integrity and effectiveness of the capacity market
administered by PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. have become untenably threatened by
out-of-market payments provided or required by certain states for the purpose of
supporting the entry or continued operation of preferred generation resources that may
not otherwise be able to succeed in a competitive wholesale capacity market. The
amount and type of generation resources receiving such out-of-market support has
increased substantially. What started as limited support primarily for relatively small
renewable resources has evolved into support for thousands of megawatts of resources
ranging from small solar and wind facilities to large nuclear plants.
Id. at P 1.
357. See id. at P 8 (requiring regulation of capacity market bids by generators that receive
subsidies, which FERC refers to as “out-of-market support”).
358. See id. at PP 35–41 (discussing the impact of different definitions for Material Subsidy).
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subsidy distorts the capacity market, which is FERC’s putative
concern, does not depend on which level of government creates the
subsidy or whether the subsidy is energy-specific.359 Thus, FERC’s
attempt to counteract subsidies has no logical conclusion and
theoretically requires the agency to counteract all sorts of federal,
state, and local policies that affect electricity markets.
This restriction will apply to new and existing generators.360 FERC
gave subsidized generators two options. First, subsidized generators
can bid into capacity markets at the level of CONE.361 The effect of this
restriction is likely to preclude a generator from receiving any capacity
market payments because a bid at CONE is generally above the market
clearing price in the capacity market.362 Second, subsidized generators
may sell capacity through bilateral contracts with electricity providers
that satisfy the providers’ purchasing quotas in the capacity market.363
Thus, an electricity provider would have a choice between either
buying capacity from generators subject to the MOPR, paying the
capacity market clearing price, or engaging in some combination of the
two.364

359. See id. (discussing PJM’s proposed definition of Material Subsidy and the different levels
of government it would impact).
360. See id. at P 8 (directing PJM to “modify PJM’s MOPR such that it would apply to new
and existing resources that receive out-of-market payments, regardless of resource type, but
would include few to no exemptions”). Prior MOPR restrictions on bidding applied only to new
entrants.
361. See id. (directing PJM to apply its MOPR to “new and existing resources that receive
out-of-market payments” and noting that MOPR requires generators to bid at or above CONE);
see also Wilson, supra note 312, and accompanying text (explaining the concept of Cost of New
Entry (CONE)).
362. See supra Fig. 6 (illustrating the demand curve for PJM’s capacity market).
363. See Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection, 163 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,236, at P 161 (allowing
subsidized generators to sell their capacity outside of the capacity market and load-serving entities
that purchase their capacity to reduce their load in the market).
364. The precise FRR mechanism of this second approach, referred to as “Fixed Resource
Requirements” (FRR), was left to be determined in future proceedings. FERC did not explain
the rationale for this approach—that is, why subsidized generators should not be allowed to
submit unconstrained bids into the capacity market, but should be allowed to negotiate bilateral
contracts that circumvent the capacity market. FERC may be reasoning that, once subsidized
generators and matching demand are excluded from the capacity market, the capacity market
price will reflect competitive conditions and therefore be “fair and reasonable.” Further, as
Gramlich and Wilson point out, , buyers of capacity should be indifferent between buying one
unit of capacity unilaterally through the FRR process or purchasing that unit through capacity
auctions. ROB GRAMLICH & JAMES WILSON, MAINTAINING RESOURCE ADEQUACY IN PJM
WHILE ACCOMMODATING STATE POLICIES: A PROPOSAL FOR THE RESOURCE-SPECIFIC FRR
ALTERNATIVE 10 (2018). Thus, the FRR price and the expected capacity auction price should be
the same.
Because under the July 2018 order any FRR obligations contracted for would have to be
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Under FERC’s MOPR order, subsidized resources will likely
choose to pursue bilateral contracts with load-serving entities rather
than to take part in the capacity auction. This raises a question: should
the capacity market constructed demand curve be adjusted to exclude
load that has its capacity needs covered through bilateral trades? If the
demand curve should be adjusted, by how much should it be adjusted?
There is unfortunately no non-arbitrary answer to these questions.
FERC and PJM may decide to exclude subsidized capacity sold
through bilateral contracts from the capacity market constructed
demand curve and the supply curve, on the ground that the total
amount of capacity sold in the capacity auction and bilateral contracts
remains constant. If a generator enters into a bilateral contract with a
load-serving entity, then it would make sense to reduce both supply
and demand by the amount of capacity sold in the bilateral contract.
Since both supply and demand move by the same amount—that is, the
amount of capacity sold in the bilateral contract—the market clearing
price should not change.365 FERC’s order in Calpine seems to preclude
such a resolution, concluding that the clearing price in PJM’s capacity
market is not just and reasonable. To address FERC’s concern, a
capacity market design apparently must change the capacity price.
Thus, FERC, under the reasoning of its Calpine order, would have to
reject a remedy that excludes subsidized capacity sold through bilateral
contracts from the capacity market constructed demand curve and the
supply curve, simply because such a remedy would not change the
capacity price.
Alternatively, FERC and PJM may decide to exclude subsidized
capacity sold through bilateral contracts from the capacity market
demand curve only insofar as subsidized capacity has “crowded out”
unsubsidized capacity.366 Conceptually, a sensible approach would

taken out of the demand curve during the capacity auction, FRR sales would have to happen
before that auction. In such circumstance, buyers of capacity can be expected to be indifferent
between purchasing through the FRR mechanism or having the level of their capacity payment
obligation set during the capacity auction.
365. Assume, for example, that a subsidized generator enters into a bilateral contract to sell
500 MW of capacity to a load-serving entity. This would imply, under the option identified in the
text, reducing both supply and demand by 500 MW. In graphical terms, both the demand curve
and the supply curve move 500 MW inward, or to the left. Since both the demand curve and the
supply curve move the same amount, the price does not change. See, e.g., Affidavit of Hung-Po
Chao Aff. ¶ 9, Calpine v. PJM Interconnection, LLC, Docket No. EL16-49-9000 (Oct. 1, 2018)
(analyzing the impacts of RCO and subsidies).
366. For example, subsidies for renewable generation are clearly meant to replace “dirty”
coal and gas generators with “clean” wind and solar sources of power. Theoretically, if more firms
enter a market, this drives down the price, and there are fewer profit opportunities for other firms.
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involve reducing demand by the amount of unsubsidized capacity
crowded out by subsidized capacity. Unfortunately, what makes sense
conceptually may be impossible to implement in practice. There is no
way to accurately determine the amount of crowding out. This is
relevant given that the capacity market demand curve is extremely
inelastic—even small shifts in the curve can cause large changes in
price.367
FERC’s approval of the PJM capacity market, and other capacity
markets, rests on the premise that these markets create competitive
conditions in which the market clearing price reflects the point at which
sellers are just barely earning enough revenue to recover their costs.368
Over time, PJM—often at FERC’s insistence—has repeatedly made
decisions that add complexity to its capacity market. These decisions
are intended to reflect the complicated context of the capacity market,
which is a reasonable objective. But the overall effect of the decisions
has been to add artificial values and unstated and untested assumptions
to capacity markets. This calls into question whether FERC had any
basis in its June 2018 order to conclude that the results of the markets
do not satisfy the “just and reasonable” standard. The premise of that
order was that state subsidies inject policy judgments into energy
markets in ways that adversely affect the competitiveness of PJM’s
capacity market. But, as the discussion in this section has shown, that
capacity market itself is constructed administratively via numerous
policy judgments. State subsidies are thus not injecting policy into a
pristine market; they are simply one of many policy judgments that
impact the capacity market.
FERC’s concerns regarding state subsidies raise a final question
about the Commission’s policy judgments. Subsidies of a wide variety
are endemic to markets. Energy markets are no exception. The Federal
Government subsidizes nuclear power plants under the PriceAnderson Act by limiting their liability.369 Numerous federal tax
Thus, the entry of subsidized capacity into the market would be expected to reduce the quantity
of unsubsidized capacity. See Briggs & Kleit, supra note 346 (modeling a competitive electricity
market); Brown, supra note 346. For example, if the subsidy to a 2000 MW nuclear power plant
crowded out 800 MW of new natural gas generation, the net effect of the nuclear subsidy on
capacity would be a reduction of 1200 MW. The demand curve should be reduced by the net effect
of 1200 MW rather than the entire 2000 MW of subsidized capacity.
367. See Bowring, supra note 302, at 59–61 (showing that a 2.5% reduction in required
capacity for 2015/16 led to an increase in capacity market payment of $3.7 billion.).
368. See supra notes 336–337 and accompanying text (discussing recent court decisions
affecting FERC).
369. See Jeffrey A. Dubin & Geoffrey S. Rothwell, Subsidy to Nuclear Power Through PriceAnderson Liability Limit, 8 CONTEMP. POL’Y ISSUES 73, 76 (1990) (estimating the amount of the
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subsidies aid the production, transport, and consumption of fossil
fuels.370 State subsidies exist as well.371 Indeed, a PJM study group
compiled a list of over one hundred different energy subsidies across
the PJM states.372 In a context in which subsidies proliferate so widely,
it is unclear whether FERC has any principled basis to treat some
subsidies as “uncompetitive,” and therefore to be counteracted in the
capacity market, while other subsidies are not addressed.373 If such a
judgment is to be made, it would not appear that FERC, as a federal
regulatory agency focused on energy markets, has any special
normative expertise in making such decisions.374
V. CONCLUSION
Market-based regulation through the mechanism of policy
markets increases the efficiency of regulation by leveraging market
forces to accomplish regulatory objectives while reducing regulatory
burdens. In this manner, regulatory goals can be reached while
significantly reducing compliance costs. Policy markets have become

subsidy to be about $22 million per reactor-year). There does not appear to be recent research on
the magnitude of this subsidy.
370. See GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-00-301R, TAX INCENTIVES FOR
PETROLEUM AND ETHANOL FUELS 5–15 (2000) (describing the legislation behind some
subsidies); John A. Bogdanski, Reflections on the Environmental Impacts of Federal Tax Subsidies
for Oil, Gas, and Timber Production, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 323, 325 (2011) (“Their
activities are blessed with many special tax provisions, which provide benefits that most businesses
find enviable.”). Estimates of the magnitude of these subsidies vary greatly. Compare Benedict
Clements et al., Energy Subsidies: How Large Are They and How Can They Be Reformed?, 3
ECON. ENERGY & ENVTL. POL’Y 1, 5 (2014) (estimating that the annual tax subsidy in the U.S.
for fossil fuels is approximately $410 billion per year), with U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION
ADMINISTRATION, DIRECT FEDERAL FINANCIAL INTERVENTIONS AND SUBSIDIES IN ENERGY
IN FISCAL YEAR 2016, at 2 (Apr. 24, 2018) (estimating that the subsidy for fossil fuels in the U.S.
for 2016 was $15 billion).
371. See, e.g., Act of May 12, 1999 (Pub. L. No. 26-4) (eliminating the utilities gross receipts
tax on natural gas in Pennsylvania); Va. Code § 58.1-433.1 (1999) (providing a tax credit for
Virginia electricity generators that purchase and consume coal mined in Virginia).
372. See
Capacity
Construct/Public
Policy
Senior
Task
Force,
PJM,
https://www.pjm.com/committees-and-groups/closed-groups/ccppstf.aspx (last visited Nov. 3,
2019) (identifying ways states could improve subsidy programs).
373. See Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection, LLC, 163 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,236, at 5 (LaFleur,
C., dissenting) (noting the lack of clarity in how PJM will be regulated going forward).
374. For other criticisms of FERC’s decisions with respect to state subsidies, see Danny
Cullenward & Shelley Welton, The Quiet Undoing: How Regional Electricity Market Reforms
Threaten State Clean Energy Goals, 36 YALE J. ON REG. BULL. 106, 130 (2018) (criticizing FERC
for “allow[ing] nebulous appeals to preserving ‘investor confidence’ or ‘market integrity’” to
allow fossil fuel generators to subvert state climate policies); Joshua C. Macey & Jackson
Salovaara, Rate Regulation Redux, 168 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (criticizing FERC’s
decisions as “fossil fuel bailouts”).
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more common as more policy advocates and commentators have come
to accept the basic economic principles underlying them. These
markets, however, are not simple. Embedded into them are a host of
policy and political challenges that tends to push policy markets toward
greater complexity.
Policy markets are most effective when they are large and simple
because those are traits that facilitate cost-reducing transactions.
Keeping policy markets large and simple, however, requires
oversimplifying reality. Every policy market therefore poses a
complexity dilemma for regulators: increase efficiency by simplifying
or reflect reality by complicating. Both factors—accurately reflecting
reality and creating an efficient market—instrumentally advance the
objectives of the policy market, so there is no clear answer to the
dilemma.
As the emissions trading and capacity market case studies in this
Article illustrate, no policy market is nearly as simple either in concept
or in operation as the textbook cap-and-trade market. Policy market
design requires regulators to make difficult decisions about how to
construct administrative demand or supply curves, whether and how to
differentiate among products traded in the market, and how to balance
numerous policy objectives. There is often little theoretical guidance
to direct these decisions. This is in contrast to typical markets, where
market forces can ably make these decisions without government
intervention. The inherent complexity of policy markets reduces the
cost reductions available from trade and forces challenging decisions
for regulators.
The original Acid Rain Program policy market for sulfur dioxide
emissions was a significant success in economic terms. It was also, not
coincidentally, a relatively simple policy market. Yet, the Acid Rain
Program’s simplicity was only possible by overlooking what turned out
to be important differences in the location of emissions. When the
Transport Rule eventually implemented an emissions trading program
that accounted for locational differences, it had to impose complicated
locational constraints, based on highly complex environmental models.
This complexity reduces the trades that can be made, limiting the
ability of this policy market to reduce regulatory burdens—while, for
the same reasons, also more accurately reflecting reality.
The challenge of managing complexity in policy market design
becomes overwhelming in the context of FERC-approved electricity
capacity markets. The design of capacity markets requires difficult
decisions about geographic areas of trading, product definition, and
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market timing. It also requires the creation of a market demand curve
for capacity. In theory, such a demand curve should represent the
marginal value of additional generating capacity to the electricity grid.
In practice, this has resulted in PJM capacity market prices that are
consistently higher than what is needed to reach the relevant policy
goal.
FERC’s recent decision to restrict participation by statesubsidized generators in PJM capacity markets signals a particularly
worrisome development. Capacity markets interact with numerous
other energy policies and markets. The idea that FERC can somehow
create a pristine market insulated from other public policies sets up the
agency for a whack-a-mole game in which it is bound to fail—and could
lead to perpetual conflict with state regulators attempting to pursue
their own policy objectives. More dangerous, FERC’s efforts to pursue
these ancillary objectives appear to have led the agency unwittingly to
undermine some of the fundamentals of its capacity market. In short,
chasing reality without regard to complexity has taken FERC “A
Bridge Too Far”375 and serves as a cautionary example for other
regulators designing policy markets.

375. See CORNELIUS RYAN, A BRIDGE TOO FAR 89 (1974) (purporting to quote British
Lieutenant-General Frederick Browning warning Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery before the
disastrous Battle of Arnhem, “I think we may be going a bridge too far”).

